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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the corporate merger process as a bargaining game, under the 
assumption that the two companies are essentially in conflict over the single issue of the 
price to be offered by the acquirer to the target. 
The first part of the thesis deals with the construction and testing of analytical game-
theoretic models to explain the proportion of the synergy gains accruing to the target 
company under different assumptions about the players' a priori knowledge. Assuming 
full certainty amongst the players about the pre- and post-merger values of the 
companies, the distribution of gains between target and acquiring companies that would 
be consistent with the Nash-Kalai axioms is determined in principle. The resulting model 
depends on the players' utility functions, and is parameterised by the relative bargaining 
strength of the players and their risk aversion coefficients. An operational version of the 
model is fitted to empirical data from a set of 24 recent mergers of companies quoted on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The model is shown to have good predictive power 
within this data set. 
Under the more realistic assumption of shared uncertainty amongst the two players about 
the post-merger value of the combined company, a Nash-Kalai bargaining model 
incorporating this uncertainty is developed. This model is an improvement over those 
with complete certainty in that it offers improved model fit in terms of predicting the 
total amount paid by an acquirer, and is able to dichotomise this payment into a cash 
amount and a share transfer amount. The theoretical model produced some results of 
practical value. Firstly, a cash-only offer is never optimal. Conditions under which shares 
only should be tendered are identified. Secondly, the optimal offer amount depends on 
the form of payment and the level of perceived risk. In a share-only off er the amount is 
constant regardless of risk, whilst if cash is included an increase in risk will imply a 
decrease in the optimal amount of cash offered. The Nash-Kalai model incorporating 
shared uncertainty is empirically tested on the same data set used previously. This allows 
a comparison with earlier results and estimation of the extent of the uncertainty. 
An extension of this model is proposed, incorporating an alternative form of the utility 
functions. 
The second part of the thesis makes use of ideas from negotiation analysis to construct 
a dynamic model of the complex processes involved in negotiation. It offers prescriptive 
advice to one of the players on likely Pareto-optimal bargaining strategies, given a 
description of the strategy the other party is likely to employ. The model describes the 
negotiating environment and each player's negotiating strategy in terms of a few simple 
parameters. 
The model is implemented via a Monte Carlo simulation procedure, which produces 
expected gains to each player and average transaction values for a wide range of each of 
the players' strategies. The resulting two-person game bimatrix is analysed to offer 
general insights into negotiated outcomes, and using conventional game-theoretic and 
Bayesian approaches to identify "optimal" strategies for each of the players. It is shown 
that for the purposes of identifying optimal negotiating strategies, the players· strategies 
(described by parameters which are continuous in nature) can be adequately approximated 
by a sparse grid of discrete strategies, providing that these discrete strategies are chosen 
so as to achieve an even spread across the set of continuous strategies. A sensitivity 
analysis on the contextual parameters shows that the optimal strategy pair is very robust 
to changes to the negotiating environment, and any such changes that have the players 
start ·negotiating from positions more removed from one another is more detrimental to 
the target. 
A conceptual decision support system which uses the model and simulated results as key 
components is proposed and outlined. 
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§1.l MERGERS, ACQUISIDONS AND GAMES 
Growth of a company by acquisition of another going concern (as opposed to 
internal expansion) is one strategic alternative that can be used by management to achieve 
it's planned growth targets. A merger or acquisition can thus be considered as a special 
case of capital budgeting, where it is assumed that management's objective is to 
maximise the wealth of the shareholders who have placed their confidence in them by 
investing in the company. Mergers and acquisitions are not purely a phenomenon of the 
latter part of the twentieth century: amalgamations between businesses are as old as 
business itself. However the number of mergers that have taken place since the "frantic 
merger activity" (Rappaport (1979) p. 99) of the 1960's, and the corresponding total 
monetary value of the transactions indicate that merger activity is an integral part of 
modern industrial and commercial development. Indeed, in recent years an entire 
vocabulary has built up within the merger industry: today one hears of a threatened target 
company laying down a poison pill or a shark repellant to ward off a dawn raid, and 
companies attempting a bear-hug or a pac-man if a suitable white knight is unavailable! 
Broadly speaking, a merger is simply the linking of two or more companies, either 
by consolidating the original companies into a single entity or by absorbtion of one (or 
more) by the other. In practice this can be achieved in a number of ways (Macgregor 
(1979) p.29, Jensen and Ruback (1983) p.6). A merger, in the strict sense of the word, 
refers to a combination in which all the assets and liabilities of the selling company are 
transferred to, and absorbed by, the buying company. The seller, in effect, disappears as 
a separate entity. Usually a merger is negotiated in an amicable manner between the two 
companies' managements, and if an agreement is reached it is put to the vote at a 
shareholder's meeting. In a hostile takeover attempt (i.e. one which does not have the 
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support of the selling company's management) the buying company can approach the 
seller's shareholders individually with a tender offer, and thereby bypass the seller's 
management completely. Providing that the buying company can accumulate enough of 
the selling company's voting stock it can call a shareholder's meeting and force through 
the merger. An alternative way of bypassing the selling company's management is to 
attempt to get the right to vote the selling shareholders' shares at an annual meeting of 
the selling company. This is called a proxy contest, and is often expensive and difficult 
to win. The buyer in a proxy contest generally has a large percentage holding in the 
selling company in the first place. 
The acquiring company could pay for the purchase of the selling company (or it's 
shares) by means of a cash payment,. an exchange of common stock, preferred stock or 
debentures, or a combination of both cash and shares. The corporate merger is thus seen 
to be an extremely complex capital budgeting decision process: not only does a potential 
acquiring company's management team have to identify a potential target company and 
value it accurately, it must also consider issues such as potential synergies, the available 
financing options, a negotiating strategy, tax considerations, the timing of the offer and 
many other related issues. The finance literature abounds with work relevant to 
determining offers in a merger or acquisition situation. For instance, the question of how 
large the gains to the shareholders of the two companies are has been studied extensively 
by Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978), Dodd (1980), Asquith (1983), Bradley, Desai 
and Kim (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Affleck-Graves, Flach and Jacobson (1988) 
and Van den Honert, Barr, Affleck-Graves and Smale (1988) amongst others, and the 
choice of a medium of exchange has been investigated by Hansen (1987), Fishman 
(1989), Carleton, Guilkey, Harris and Stewart (1983) and Travlos (1987). However, one 
area in the so-called market for corporate control that has not been adequately researched 
is that of the negotiating or bargaining strategies and processes that must of necessity 
occur between the competing management teams. Some attempts at quantitative 
modelling of general negotiation processes do exist (see Kersten (1985), Kersten and 
Szapiro (1986). Fraser and Hipel (1984), Jarke, Jelassi and Shakun (1988)). However 
these approaches tend to produce models and procedures which are formally elegant but 
inflexible and inaccessible to practitioners (Sycara (1990), Raiffa (1982)). Thus part of 
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this thesis will revolve around building and testing a model of the dynamic merger 
negotiation process which might prove useful in offering decision support to negotiating 
practitioners involved in mergers. 
Since it is reasonable to assume that both companies are wealth maximisers, there 
will be an element of competition between the two "players" arising out of their 
conflicting objectives. They can thus be construed to be playing a "merger game" of 
strategy. The most significant contribution to the early study of game theory was Von 
Neumann and Morgenstem's (1947) "The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour", 
and this aroused such interest in the field that a complete literature now exists. Standard 
works include Luce and Raiffa (1957) and Owen (1982). An important class of game is 
the bargaining game, which was considered by Nash (1950), who proposed an axiomatic 
solution to the two-player case. A lot of game-theoretic literature on bargaining makes 
the assumption of complete information on the part of both players (see Harsanyi (1965) 
and Roth (1979, 1987)), but bargaining games with incomplete information have also 
been researched (Chattergee and Samuelson (1983), Samuelson (1984) and Harsanyi 
(1968a,b,c)). 
A special case of the two-player bargaining game, which in many respects closely 
resembles the merger bargaining situation, is the so-called ultimatum game (see Thaler 
(1988), Guth and Thietz (1990)). In this type of bargaining game Player 1 (called the 
Allocator) must divide some amount n (a monetary amount, or some other commodity 
measured on a continuous scale) between himself and Player 2 (the Recipient). If the 
offer x is accepted by the Recipient then the Allocator receives n -x and the Recipient 
receives x. If the offer is rejected then both players receive nothing. Rubinstein (1982) 
suggested that if both players act rationally then the Allocator need offer the Recipient 
only a small positive amount e, and the Recipient should accept e, since e > 0, the payoff 
due to him if he rejects the offer. The first laboratory experimental evidence on 
ultimatum games came from Giith, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), who showed that 
real subjects do not act in accordance with Rubinstein's model, with the mean offer by 
the Allocator being near 0.370 and almost all offers equal or close to zero being rejected 
by the Recipient. An explanation is that when the Recipient declines a small but positive 
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offer he is sending the signal that he would rather sacrifice £ than accept what he 
considers to be an unfair allocation of the stake. The actions on the part of the Allocator 
could be explained by the motive that he has a taste for fairness and/or is worried that 
the Recipient would be likely to decline an unfair offer of only £. Experimental work on 
the ultimatum game described above, and on slight variations thereof, has been carried 
out by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Hoffman and Spitzer (1982, 1985), and 
all produced results similar to Giith et al. This game has been extended to two-stage 
bargaining (Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1985), Giith and Tietz (1987)) and to multi-
stage games (Neelin, Sonnenschein and Spiegel (1987), Ochs and Roth (1988)). In the 
context of the merger bargaining situation at hand, the acquirer assumes the role of the 
Allocator, and the target the Recipient. The amount 0 is the synergistic gain created by 
the unification of the two separate entities, and the offer amount x is the proportion of 
the synergy accruing to the target company's shareholders. 
Analogous to the case of the ultimatum game in its general form, it is of interest 
to investigate how the overall synergistic gains arising out of a company merger (we will 
group together operational synergies and those arising from accounting/taxation 
advantages) are split between the shareholders of the two participating companies (Roy 
(1989) p. 594). A large portion of this thesis will be devoted to the construction and 
empirical testing of game-theoretic models to aid in this investigation. These models, if 
successful, will help to shed light on, and provide understanding of, the process of 
merger bargaining. 
§1.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF MERGERS IN A GAME-TIIEORETIC CONTEXT 
Little work has been published explicitly modelling a corporate merger or 
acquisition as a mathematical game. Milnor and Shapley (1978) developed the concept 
of an oceanic voting game in the early 1960's, in which certain fixed fractions of the 
voting strength are held by a few 'major' players, while the rest is scattered amongst a 
large number of individually insignificant and indistinguishable 'minor' players, 
collectively referred to as an 'ocean' to suggest the homogeneity of the group and its 
total lack of order or cohesion. As an example of such an oceanic game they studied a 
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corporation with common stock held by two large stockholders who own significant 
portions of the corporation, and numerous minor stockholders (aggregated into a group, 
the 'ocean') who individually own very small portions of the corporation. These minor 
stockholders hardly ever investigate policy matters, and most likely do not know each 
other, so that it is usually impractical for them to coordinate their actions. It was assumed 
that control of the corporation hinges entirely on a simple majority vote of the stock. 
They investigated the distribution of power of the two major stockholders as the 
distribution of stock among each of them and the ocean varies. They identified 
distributions of shares where each major stockholder has absolute control and no control 
over the policies of the corporation, and where they hold a balance of power, and where 
the ocean has a significant share of the power. 
Powers' (1987) work was based on Milnor and Shapley's, but instead of being 
concerned with the distribution of power in terms of stockholdings, a model of exchange 
between cash and shares (voting power) was developed to study the feasibility and 
profitability of corporate takeovers. The threat-resistant Nash equilibrium strategy was 
found which would result in one major stockholder taking control of the company. 
Powers, however, did not consider uncertainty, and assumed that the transaction price 
was the highest price quoted by the seller. On the contrary, Roy (1989) argued that a 
merger or acquisition involves bargaining, i.e. that a buyer generally makes an offer and 
the seller merely accepts or rejects it. Furthermore, there is always an element of 
uncertainty in the valuation of the target company, since its value is merely the present 
value of its future cash-flows (Myers (1976)), which cannot be known in advance with 
certainty (Rappaport (1979)). Hence there may well be some disagreement on the price 
to be paid; the two parties will bargain, and may or may not agree on a price. Roy thus 
modelled the corporate takeover process as a bargaining game under uncertainty. He 
derived the optimal off er strategies for a buyer when there is uncertainty about the 
minimum price (which is dynamic and may change during the offer process) that the 
target shareholders would accept. The uncertainty about the target's minimum acceptable 
price was represented by some probability distribution. This was the first financial model 
which represented a merger as a bargaining game and which provided guidance to a firm 
as to the optimal bargaining strategies during a takeover. 
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§ 1.3 THE MERGER BARGAINING PROCESS 
As Roy (1989) has argued, a merger or acquisition only takes place after some 
negotiating or bargaining between two or more parties, one of whom is the target (or 
more correctly, the group of target shareholders) and the others who are prospective 
acquirers. In the case of a friendly takeover attempt a prospective acquirer may bargain 
indirectly with the target shareholders, using the target firm's management as a 
negotiating agent. On the other hand, in a hostile tender offer the negotiations usually 
take place directly with the target shareholders, thus bypassing the target company's 
management who may not be acting in the best interests of the target shareholders, or 
who themselves might become a potential acquirer. The models we will develop 
throughout this thesis do not distinguish between direct and indirect bargaining: what is 
important is whether or not the offer is accepted. Whilst there may be hundreds or even 
thousands of individual target shareholders, the acquirer generally makes a single off er 
to all of them and does not negotiate prices with each of them individually. Thus we may 
treat the target shareholder group as a single bargaining entity. 
There are several reasons why the parties bargain over an acceptable price at all. 
Firstly, as mentioned above there is uncertainty about the present value of the target's 
future cash-flows, which implies that the two parties may well arrive at different values 
for the target company. Secondly, at any stage in the bargaining process the target 
company forms an idea of its minimum acceptable price and the acquirer forms an idea 
of the maximum price it would be prepared to pay, given all available information, 
including the evaluation of any synergistic gains which may accrue from a successful 
merger. These prices are not likely to be disclosed to one another. Naturally, the target 
would like to settle on a price as much as possible over it's minimum while the acquirer 
would prefer the transaction to occur at a price as close to the target's minimum as 
possible. The two parties may try to resolve this conflict of interests by means of 
bargaining. 
A corporate merger can be thought of as a multi-stage, multi-party bargaining 
game, where the parties are the target and all prospective acquirers, and the stages are 
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each off er made by a prospective acquirer and the associated reaction from the target. A 
prospective acquirer makes a price offer, acting independently of the target. If the target 
accepts the off er, a transaction is concluded at the off er price. If the target rejects a 
prospective acquirer's offer at any stage, any of the prospective acquirers may make a 
new offer (the next stage). Since it is assumed that target management's prime objective 
is shareholder wealth-maximisation, it follows that rejection of an offer would only occur 
if the off er was less than a price which the target believes to be the minimum acceptable 
price given all available information and/or the target believes that a better price off er 
will be forthcoming from one of the prospective acquirers in due course. The off er 
process continues until either the target accepts an offer or the target rejects all offers 
and/or the acquirers all do not proceed with further offers. A prospective acquirer will, 
of course, withdraw from the offer process if there are no perceived economic benefits 
to be had from the merger. All offers are public in the sense that the parties involved 
have complete information about the offers. 
§ 1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists, in essence, of a set of mathematical models which describe 
the merger and acquisition conflict situation under various knowledge scenarios. In Part 
A we will propose and test several analytical models. To begin with, in Chapter 2 we put 
aside the complexities associated with the uncertainties that may exist in the real world 
and consider the completely deterministic case, in which both acquiring and target 
company has full and certain information about the financial worths of the two companies 
involved in the merger negotiations as separate entities, and as a combined unit. We will 
construct a model based on a generalisation of the axiomatic solution to the bargaining 
problem proposed by J.P. Nash (1950), which will explain how the synergistic gains from 
merger may be split between the acquiring and target companies. This level of model will 
be empirically tested on a data-base of recently-observed mergers on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE). on the assumption that observed market values can be used as 
surrogates for the (deterministically-known) financial "worth" of the individual 
companies. 
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This model is, of course, a gross simplification of reality, but does provide 
insights into key issues in the bargaining process. In particular though, the concept of 
uncertainty has been ignored entirely. Realistically stated, before negotiations actually 
commence it is extremely unlikely that the parties will have deterministic knowledge of 
the post-merger value of the combined entity; this amount will be estimated by both 
companies' experts and advisors subjectively and independently of each other, by 
evaluating aspects of the proposed combined company deemed important by the 
respective managements, which may of course differ from company to company. They 
would analyze various available company records in an attempt to predict future cash 
flows after merger which, after discounting, would yield a subjective estimate of the post-
merger value of the merged company. In Chapter 3 we discuss the inclusion of 
uncertainty in the previously-developed generalised Nash model. In particular, the 
estimation of the uncertainty, or pre-merger perceived risk, present in the merger is one 
of the main aims of the modelling process. The presence of uncertainty in the model 
provides a further advantage: it facilitates a dichotomy of the payment by the acquirer 
into a cash portion and a share portion. Again the model will be tested empirically on the 
sample of recently-observed mergers on the JSE. 
In Part B we will drop the assumption that the two players act in accordance with 
the precepts of game-theoretic rationality (a necessary assumption in Part A), and in so 
doing hopefully get closer to a model that more accurately represents the real-world 
bargaining situation. We will investigate how the merger participants formulate offers and 
responses to these offers, using ideas from negotiation analysis. Thus in Chapter 4 we 
will advance a parsimonious description of a "negotiation strategy" for each player, and 
build these into a dynamic, multi-stage model of the bargaining process, assuming 
symmetric uncertainty on the part of each player about the other's reservation price and 
strategy. The model may thus be useful in offering prescriptive advice to one party on 
what might prove to be a "good" strategy to employ, given some sort of description of 
the other player's negotiating strategy. Apart from the player's negotiating strategies, the 
model will also consider the effect of external conditions, such as the players' relative 
bargaining strengths. 
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The model we will develop in Chapter 4 will make use of parameters which are 
judgemental and subjective in nature, and so empirical data is not available at this level 
of modelling. In Chapter 5 we will thus implement a Monte Carlo simulation of the 
model which will describe typical long-term average outcomes of similar negotiations. 
In particular we will examine the probability of achieving successful merger agreement 
and the expected transaction value for various combinations of the two players' 
negotiating strategies. This will provide the players with expectations of the gains that 
they might expect to earn as a proportion of the overall synergy created from merger. 
This will allow a focus on what might prove to be "optimal" negotiating strategies for 
the two players. 
In Chapter 6 we will investigate the effect of the bargaining environment (i.e. the 
external conditions that do not form part of the negotiators' strategies) on the optimal 
strategies and the associated expected payoffs to the players. We will specifically look 
at the robustness of the optimal strategies to changes in the players' perceptions of the 
magnitude of uncertainty and players' relative bargaining strengths. 
We propose that.the model to be developed in Chapter 4 and the simulation 
results of Chapters 5 and 6 could form the basis of a useful management decision support 
system regarding the choice of bargaining strategies to be employed by real-world merger 
negotiation practitioners. In Chapter 7 we will briefly examine the role of decision · 
support systems in helping management involved in merger activity, and propose a 
conceptual system which will incorporate the model and a set of simulated outcomes to 
aid in determining optimal negotiating strategies. 
The final chapter summarises the main findings and conclusions of the thesis and 
offers a few suggestions for extending this research. 
PART A 
ANALYTICAL MODELS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
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CHAPTER2 
SIMPLE BARGAINING MODELS WITH FULL AND SHARED 
INFORMATION FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
§2.1 INTRODUCTION 
We consider the negotiations preceding a merger between two companies. We 
model the merger or acquisition as a conflict situation in which the conflicting parties 
may co-operate for mutual benefit. Thus some bargaining may ensue with both parties 
secure in the knowledge that if either company breaks off the negotiations they are left 
with what they started with; that is, the two separate entities. This specialised conflict 
situation is an example of the generalised bargaining problem which was solved in an 
axiomatic way by Nash (1950). 
We assume in this chapter1 that all relevant information relating to the financial 
worths of the two companies as separate entities pre-merger and as a single combined 
unit post-merger is known with certainty by both parties involved. We will employ a 
generalised version of Nash's solution to construct and empirically test a series of 
parsimonious descriptive models of the behaviour of acquirers and targets (represented 
by their respective management teams) during the negotiation phase using the above 
certain information. The aim of the models will be to give some explanation of how the 
synergistic gains to be had from the merger may be divided between the two parties. This 
will yield an understanding of a fair price that a prospective acquirer should be prepared 
to pay to a prospective target and as such may form the basis of a simple decision 
support system under certainty. 
1 Parts of this chapter have been published in European Journal of Operational Research, 
59, 1992. The paper is entitled "A game-theoretic model for mergers and acquisitions" 
(see Van den Honert and Stewart (1992)). 
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In §2.2 we describe the assumptions of this chapter in detail and their 
implications, and introduce the notation to be used. The following section describes the 
Nash axioms and the generalised Nash solution to the bargaining problem, and discusses 
the application of this solution to the merger situation. As will be indicated in §2.3, the 
Nash solution requires that the gains to both parties be in utility terms. It is thus 
necessary to define 'utility functions for the acquiring and target companies so that the 
bargaining model may be tested empirically. Thus in §2.4 we propose two distinct 
families of utility functions: a simple linear family and a negative exponential family. We 
derive the bargaining models and discuss how the parameters may be estimated. We 
choose a sample of mergers from listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
describe the collection of data, and present our empirical findings in §2.5. In the final 
section the two families of utility models are compared on the basis of their empirical 
results. 
§2.2 NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
We suppose that it is possible to associate precise financial worths with each 
company in the absence of a merger, which will be viewed conceptually as net present 
values. We call these PV A and PV B for the financial worths of the acquirer and target 
respectively. In §2.5.1 of this chapter we indicate how these may be assessed practically 
on the basis of current market values, i.e. by making use of the current stock price and 
the number of shares in issue. We suppose further that the corresponding worth of the 
merged company is also known with precision, which we shall call PV AB· In this chapter 
we assume for simplicity that PV A• PVB and PV AB are known to both parties with 
certainty. In the next chapter we will relax this assumption by assuming that the post-
merger worth of the combined company is a random variables having some probability 
distribution. This certainty assumption about PV A• PVB and PV AB implies that only net 
returns, and not any risk considerations, will be relevant to the analysis. 
In this context we define the total net gain as 
G = PV AB - PVA - PVB. 
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On the assumption of rationality of net value maximisers, it is evident that no deal will 
be forthcoming if G ::; 0. Let Q be the· net amount allocated to the target (that is, their 
shareholders). This may be any combination of cash and shares in' the merged company, 
but under conditions of complete certainty these are effectively equivalent, and thus only 
Q is relevant to the present model. Invoking again the assu.mption of rational net value 
maximisers, it is clear that in any acceptable deal 
(i) Q > PVB (otherwise there is no benefit to B), 
(ii) Q < PV AB - PV A (otherwise there is no benefit to A). 
Thus PVB is assumed to be the target company's reservation price; that is, the minimum 
price that the target would accept. Similarly, PV AB - PV A is the acquiring company's 
reservation price, or the maximum price that the acquirer would be willing to offer. Since 
G > 0 by assumption, i.e. PV AB - PV A> PVB, the zone of agreement for Q (the net 
amount allocated to the target) exists and is the interval from PVB to PV AB-PV A· The 
acquirer's net gain or surplus value is 
gA = PV AB - PV A - Q 
and the target's net gain or surplus value is 
gB = Q- PVB. 
At any stage of the bargaining game the target will be interested in setting Q as close to 
the maximum (PV AB - PV A) as possible, whilst the acquirer would be concerned with 
offering a value of Q as close to the minimum (PVB) as possible. The above discussion 
is depicted in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1. The geometry of the bargaining model with full 
and shared information 
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The sum of the net gains to both acquirer and target is simply G, which is 
independent of the intervening value Q. Thus providing the two parties come to a 
mutually acceptable agreement within the zone of agreement this bargaining game is 
constant-sum in net gains. 
In practice, of course, situations do arise in which Q ~ PV B or Q ;;:: PV AB - PV A 
i.e. the merger is irrational by our definition. In terms of our notation this implies that 
the agreed-upon value of Q lies outside the zone of agreement [PVn;PV AB - PV Al· Many 
reasons may exist for this phenomenon. For example, the acquirer's management may 
perceive an increase in status or power in heading up a large conglomerate, and will 
actively pursue a growth policy through merger in order to achieve their objectives. They 
may well offer an "irrationally" large amount to ensure their goals. On the other hand, 
target management may well accept a "golden handshake" in return for accepting an offer 
favourable to the acquirer, and vacating their position. Furthermore, it is possible that 
certain company managements might be led to economically irrational behaviour simply 
through the thrill of achieving an apparent victory in bargaining over another, or the 
dread of being beaten. In any event the model in this chapter assumes that PV AB is 
known with certainty a priori, and so an irrational merger should theoretically not arise. 
In practice PV AB is only observable after the merger has occurred, and this explains why 
some "irrational" mergers do occur. We will not consider these "irrational .. situations in 
our model. 
We now define Y = gB I G, the proportion of the net gain allocated to the target. 
In view of our rationality assumptions it follows that 0 ~ Y ~ 1. Due to problems of 
scale it will be convenient to develop the model in terms of Y. 
The aim of this model will be primarily to predict Y. By means of empirically 
fitting our model to a random set of mergers we will show that this model is a reasonable 
first representation of the observed situation and hence yields some understanding of the 
real-world bargaining process. 
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§2.3 A NASH-KALAi SOLUTION TO THE GAME 
We model the negotiations between companies A and B as a co-operative two-
person non-zero sum game. Nash (1950) considered the two-person bargaining problem 
in which the resulting feasible payoffs to the players form a closed bounded convex 
· subset S of the plane (called the feasible region) with some status quo point (u*,v*) in 
S, which is the outcome if there is no agreement. Nash defined a bargaining solution 
(or arbitration scheme) as a function <I> which maps the triple (u* ,v* ,S) into some unique 
point (ii,v) in s, i.e~ 
<j>(u*,v*,S) = (u,v) . 
Nash's axiomatic solution to the bargaining problem is in terms of payoffs to each player 
(in the sense that more of u is always preferred by one party and more of vis always 
preferred by the other party), relative to the status quo point (u* ,v*). These payoffs may 
directly be monetary returns, but need not be; we will call u and v "utilities". The only 
properties claimed for these utilities at this stage are those specified in Nash's axioms 
defined below (for example, these are not necessarily Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utilities). 
Nash defined the following axioms as being reasonable for some independent 
arbitrator to follow in arriving at a satisfactory bargaining solution <1>: 
Nl (Individual rationality) 
ii>u*,v>v*. 
The arbitrated outcome must be at least as good as the status quo. 
N2 (Feasibility) 
(u,v) e s. 
The arbitrated solution must lie in the feasible region. 
N3 (Pareto optimality) 
If (u,v) e S , u ~ ii and v ~ v , then (u,v) = (ii,v) . 
The arbitrated value must not be bettered by any other feasible point. 
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N4 (Independence of irrelevant alternatives) 
-- -- . . -- .. If (u,v) e Tc S and (u,v) = cp(u ,v ,S), then (u,v) = cp(u ,v ,T). 
If certain feasible outcomes are eliminated from a bargaining problem but the 
arbitrated solution (ii,v) remains available, then this remains the arbitrated 
solution. 
N5 (Invariance with respect to affine utility transformations) 
Let S' be obtained from S by the transformation 
u' = a1 u + b1 (a1 > 0) 
v' = ai v + b2 <ai > 0). 
Then if cp(u*,v*,s) = (ii,v) we require that 
cp(a1u* + b1 , a2v* + b2 , S') = (a1 'ii + b1 , a2 v + b2). 
The payoffs, or utilities, u and v are thus presumed to be measured on an interval 
preference scale. In other words, if every payoff is increased by the same fixed 
amount b, then preferences between outcomes remain unchanged. That is, the 
preferential value gained in moving from u' to u" is the same as that gained in 
moving from u' +b to u" +b. Financial gains do not in general satisfy this property 
however: for any single party the marginal utility gain of one further monetary 
unit is likely to decrease as the payoffs increase. 
N6 (Symmetry) 
If (u*,v*,S) is such that 
(i) • • u =v 
(ii) (u,v) e S => (v,u) e S 
and . (iii) • • (u,v) cp(u ,v ,S) = 
' 
then -u = v 
If~ abstract version of a bargaining game places the players in completely 
symmetric roles, the arbitrated outcome shall give them equal utility payoffs, 
where utility is measured in the units which made the game symmetric. 
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In the context of the merger bargaining problem, and assuming that the 
participating companies prefer more financial payoff to less, Nash's axioms may be 
interpreted as follows: 
For an arbitrary merger the value of the two participating companies' shareholder's 
wealth after a merger is agreed upon must be at least as great as its value in the absence 
of a merger (i.e. they must not lose by participating in the merger) (NI) and must be 
realistically obtainable (N2). Furthermore it must not be possible to achieve any further 
simultaneous increase in shareholder wealth to both parties from this merger (N3). 
Assume that many potential deals exist which each could affect the synergy from the 
merger. If a number of these are withdrawn (i.e. the range of possible payoffs is reduced) 
but the current offer providing the greatest payoff to the shareholders is not withdrawn, 
then shareholder wealth will remain unchanged (N4). Payoff is in utility terms, and it is 
immaterial what units of utility payoff are used (NS). Finally, it is assumed that an 
acquirer and a target would bargain identically if their roles were reversed and they each 
had access to all the other's a priori information (N6). 
In his pioneering work, Nash (I950) proved the following theorem: 
Suppose there exist points (u,v) e S with u > u* and v > v*, and that the maximum of 
• • g(u,v) = (u - u ) (v - v ) 
over this set is attained at (u,v) . Then the point (u,v) is uniquely determined, and the 
function cj>(u*,v*,s) = (u,v) is the unique function which satisfies axioms NI to N6 
above. The theorem is proved and extensively discussed in, for example, Luce and Raiffa 
(I957), Owen (I982) and Jones (I980). 
In the problem at hand the feasible space S consists of union of (0,0) (the status 
quo point, discussed below) and the utilities corresponding to monetary rewards satisfying 
gA + gB = G. The space S is non-convex, but can be made convex if we allow a 
randomised rule to apply; this implies the assumption that utilities for gambles are linear 
in probabilities (i.e. utilities satisfy the Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility 
hypothesis). The utilities u and v will be assumed to be derived as functions of the net 
gains to the acquirer A and to the target B, namely gA and gB, or equivalently of I-Y and 
Y, where Y = gB/G. We will call these utility functions UA(I-Y) and UB(Y). 
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For convenience we will define the origin for the utility functions such that u A (0) 
= UB(O) = 0, giving the status quo point (0,0). That is, if no agreement is reached, neither 
party gets anything of the overall net gain, and this situation has a utility value of zero 
to both parties. Under the assumption that each company is rational and prefers more 
financial net gain to less, all else being equal, U AO and UBO must be increasing in 
their arguments. 
In the context of the merger bargaining game at hand, the Nash bargaining 
solution is defined by gA = (1-Y)G and gB = YG, where Y maximises 
UA(l-Y) U8 (Y) 
over 0 ~ Y ~ 1. 
A generalised version of the Nash solution is that due to Kalai (1976); he showed 
that by relaxing axiom N6 (symmetry) the non-symmetric Nash solution (or Nash-Kalai 
solution) would be to maximise 
[ U A(l-Y)] Y [ U8 (Y)] I-y 
where 0 < y < 1. Note that the symmetric Nash solution is equivalent to the non-
symmetric case with j-=0.5. We term the parameter y the negotiating power of company 
A; it is in some sense a measure of the relative power vested in the acquirer vis-a-vis the 
target at the bargaining table. Thus the model requires a knowledge of the functional 
form of the utility functions of the two companies involved in the merger, as well as the 
negotiating power pertaining to the pair. 
§2.4 OPERATIONALISATION OF THE MODEL AND PARAMETER 
ESTIMATION 
For a model such as the Nash-Kalai solution to be operationally successful, it 
must be possible to identify the utility functions U A(-) and UB(-). This is necessary both 
in fitting the model to empirical data as a test of its validity (as we do in §2.5), and in 
using the model as the basis of a decision support system to help the parties involved to 
predict outcomes of future mergers. 
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§2.4.1 A LINEAR UTILITY MODEL 
As we have argued, U A ( ·) and UB( ·) will be assumed to be increasing functions 
of their arguments. Initially we assume the simplest such function, that is where the 
utility value of net monetary gain is linear. We call these the family of linear utility 
functions, and thus suppose that both U A ( ·) and UB( ·) have the general property that 
U(x) = x 
for all x, i.e. that 
and 
UB(Y) = Y 
where (0,0) is the status quo point. 
The Nash-Kalai optimal solution is obtained from 
Maximise F = ( 1-Y)'Y Y l-y 
QSY:s;l 
This is equivalent to solving 
Maximise 'I'= yln(l-Y) +(1-y) lnY . 
QSY:s;l 
Since y is assumed to lie inside the interval (0,1), the maximum of 'I' occurs away from 
the boundary, i.e. at d'I' I dY = 0. We obtain 
__ Y_ + 1-y =O 
1-Y Y 
as the necessary condition for Y to be the Nash-Kalai solution. The solution of this is 
y = 1 -y (2.1) 
which is a function only of the parameter y. This is not yet sufficient to give a fully 
operational model, as it appears prima facie unlikely that y will be a universal constant 
applicable to all mergers. It is likely that y will be dependent at least on the relative size 
of the acquiring company to the target company. 
For empirical testing of the model in §2.5 we have made the simplifying 
assumption that y is a function only of the ratio of company sizes, PV A I PVB. It is 
tempting to use a linear functional relationship as an approximation, but this will not in 
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general obey the restriction that y must lie in the unit interval. We thus propose functions 
of the form 
ln[y I (1 - y)] = a 1 + ~l (PV A I PVB) (2.2a) 
or 
ln[y I (I - y)] = CX:i + ~2 ln(PV A I PVB). (2.2b) 
We now have a simple functional form of model which we may attempt to apply across 
a whole spectrum of mergers, and which would predict the final value of Y as a function 
of PV A and PVB. The general function depends on only two parameters (a1 and ~1 , or 
alternatively a:i and ~2) which in principle can be estimated from empirical data. This 
also enables us to evaluate the model fit. 
To see how well our Nash-Kalai bargaining model fits actual observed values of 
Y, it is necessary to collect the information vector x = [ ~~; ] of ex-post assumed 
PVAB 
known variables for each of a number of observed mergers. The estimation of x from 
published data is described in §2.5.1. We will need to estimate a vector 0 of unknown 
parameters, where 0 = [ ;:] or 0 =·[ ~] . For any 0, (2.2a) or (2.2b) allows us to 
calculate y for a particular merger, and thus also the predicted value of Y from (2.1). We 
call this predicted value Y(x 1;0) . Since Y and Y(xi;0) are standardised onto the 
unit interval, it is convenient to use the usual residual sum of squares to estimate an 
optimal value for 0, i.e. to estimate 0 by minimising (over all possible values of 0) 
L (Yi -Y(xi;0))2 (2.3) 
all mergers 
where Yi is the actual proportion of the net merger gains accruing to the target in merger 
i, and Y (xi; 0) is the predicted proportion of the net merger gains accruing to the 
target in merger i. Clearly (2.3) also provides a measure of the goodness-of-fit of the 
model. 
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§2.4.2 A FAMILY OF NEGATIVE EXPONENTIAL UTILITY MODELS 
§2.4.2.1 THE GENERAL NEGATIVE EXPONENTIAL UTILITY MODEL 
In many practical settings a linear utility function may not be representative of 
reality, and U A ( ·) and Ua( ·) might be expected to exhibit decreasing marginal returns 
to scale (i.e. to be concave) (see, for example, French (1988), p 172). The negative 
exponential function is one of the simplest such functional forms, and is in fact implied 
as the form or' the utility function if certain behavioural properties are satisfied (cf . 
. Keeney (1981)). In this section we suppose that both U AO and UaO have the general 
form 
U(x) = ae-cx + b (a< 0). 
Since we require that U(O) = 0, we have that a = -b. The scaling is irrelevant. We 
arbitrarily choose a = -1. Utility functions of the above form are well-known in decision-
making under uncertainty, where the parameter c is called the coefficient of risk 
aversion. While not strictly true in the deterministic sense, we will continue to use this 
terminology for consistency. Thus we let c=r A be the coefficient of risk aversion for the 
acquirer and c=r B be· the coefficient of risk aversion for the target. The coefficient of risk 
aversion is, in general defined as -U"(x) I U'(x); for the negative exponential utility 
function above we have that -U"(x) I U'(x) = c (= rA or ra). Thus this form of the utility 
function implies constant risk aversion for all values of x for both acquirer and target. 
Then 
and 
UB(Y) = 1-e -rs Y 
and the Nash-Kalai optimal solution is found from 
M . ·. F' [ 1 -rA(l-Y)]y [ 1 -rBY]t-y ax1m1se = -e -e 
OSYS 1 
This has the same solution as 
-r (1-Y) -r Y Maximise 'I' ' = y ln ( 1 - e A ) + (1 -y) ln (1 - e B ) 
OSYS 1 
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As in the case of the linear utility model, since y lies inside the interval (0,1), the 
' maximum of'¥' occurs away from the boundary, i.e. at d'P' I dY = 0. This yields 
-rA(l-Y) (l ) -rBY 
-yr A e + -y rB e = 0 (2.4) 
1 -e -rA(l-Y) 1 -e -rBY 
as the.necessary condition for Y to be the Nash-Kalai optimum solution. Thus the model 
predicts Y as a function of only the parameters y, rA and rB, and can be uniquely 
computed. From (2.4) we get 
which can be written as 




C = ( 1 -y) rB > 0 
D =Ce -rA > 0. 
Now let z = e Y. Then 
A rA (D B) (rA-rB) C -rB 0 z + - z - z = 
Multiplying this by z rB yields 
Az(rA+rB) +(D-B)zrA -C = 0 . (2.5) 
In principle, therefore, if we know the coefficients rA , rB and y then the Nash-Kalai 
predicted point of agreement is given by Y = In z, where z is the solution (uniquely 
defined below) to (2.5). This is the basis of the negative exponential utility model for all 
empirical calculations. 
In the special case in which rA = rB (acquirer and target have equal risk aversion 
coefficients), (2.5) is exactly solved, since it reduces to 
A Z 2r A + ( D - B ) Zr A - C = 0 
which is quadratic in z r A , and has solution 
z r A = er A Y = [ ( B - D ) ± J ( D - B )2 + 4 A C ] I 2 A . 
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That is, 
Y = _!_ In ( [ ( B - D ) ± J ( D - B )2 + 4 AC ] / 2 A) . 
rA 
Since A > 0 and C > 0, it follows that for all values of A, B, C and D, the smaller root 
is always negative, and thus only the larger root yields a real-valued solution for Y. So 
in this case 
1 -r -2r 2 Y = - ln ([e ArA(2y-1) + [e A[rA(l-2y)] 
rA 
In the more general case where rA cannot be assumed equal to rB, a Newton-
Raphson procedure may be employed to obtain the desired value of Y. As a starting point 
for the procedure we use the solution corresponding to the case where the sum of the risk 
2 r +rs aversion coefficients are set equal to 2 in (2.5), i.e. x = z A . Then 
(rA +r8 )/2 x = z , , and we start with the case rA = rB . Then 
A x2 + (D - B) x - C = 0 , 
which implies that 
z = exp[ ( 2 ) In ( [ ( B - D ) ± J ( D - B ) 2 + 4 AC ] / 2 A ) ] (2.6) 
rA +rB 
is the required starting point. Providing that the initial values of the parameters are not 
too pathological, the procedure will converge to a point z * within some suitable tolerance. 
We then calculate Y as Y = ln z *. 
As in- the case of the linear utility model, it appears prima facie that y, rA and rB 
are likely to be dependent at least on.the sizes of the organisations involved. We assume 
that rA is a function of PV A only, and rB of PVB only. Since rA and rB cannot be 
negative (to ensure an increasing concave function) we cannot use a linear function to · 
approximate these relationships. We thus propose 
ln rA =a.A+ ~A PV A' (2.7) 
or equivalently r A = e aA e ~A PV A , 
and (2.8) 
or equivalently r B = e as e ~ PV 8 • 
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It is interesting to note that (2.7) and (2.8) imply constant proportional rates of change 
of rA and rB with respect to company size, rather than the constant absolute rate of 
change implied by a linear relationship. We again assume that 'Y depends only on the ratio 
of company sizes, PV A I PVB, and in the same spirit as before we use 
that is, 
In f'Y I (1-y)] = a* + ~· (PV A /PVB) , 




a• 13•cpv A/PV8 ) + e e 
(2.9) 
The general functional form of the model thus depends on six parameters which can, in 
principle, be estimated from empirical data. 
We will need to estimate the 6-vector, 0, of unknown parameters for the negative 
CJ.A 
CJ.B 
exponential model, where 0 = a• ~A • Once 0 is determined the empirical values of r A• 
~B 
~· 
rB and y for a particular merger can be found from (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9), as well as the 
predicted value of Y from (2.6) and the Newton-Raphson procedure described above. To 
estimate 0 we need to minimise (over all values of 0) 
~ A 2 
~ (Yi -Y(xi;0)) (2.10) 
all mergers 
where Yi and Y(xi; 0) are the observed and predicted proportion respectively of the 
net gains accruing to the target in merger i. 
§2.4.2.2 A HIERARCHY OF MODELS 
The general negative exponential model described by (2.5) and (2.7) to (2.10) will 
be termed the full negative exponential model (FNEM) and has the six parameters 
found in the vector 0 in §2.4.2.1. In an attempt to simplify this model and to remove 
partially the problem of any inter-relationships that might exist between the parameters, 




dimensional parameter vector 0 = ~A to be ·estimated. This would be expected to 
~B 
result in a computationally more efficient and quicker solution to the problem, although 
the model fit might be expected to be poorer. Thus y was varied in discrete steps over 
a range of values from 0.5 (equivalent to the Nash solution to the problem) to 0.9, and 
for each case an optimal solution was arrived at1. This wiU be termed the fixed y model 
(PyM). 
The model PyM can be further simplified in either of two different ways. Firstly,· 
the risk aversion coefficients can be considered to be the same function of company size 
for both acquiring and target firms, whilst y is held constant over the same range of 
values as in the model PyM. Thus 0 = [ ~] , which is merely the model PyM with a A 
= a.B =a. and ~A.=~ =~·We term this simplified model SL 
The second simplification amounts to the risk aversion coefficients being 
considered as different functions for acquirers and targets, but not dependent on company 
size. Again y is held constant over the range of values as in the model FyM. In this 
case 0 = [ :; ] , which is the model PyM with ilA=i3e=<l. This simplified model is . 
depicted in Figure 2.2, and the functional forms of the risk aversion coefficients and 
negotiating power for each model can be found in Table 2.1. 
1 The values actually used for y were 0.50, 0.55, 0.60, 0.6667, 0.75, 0.793, 0.85 and 
0.90. The value 0.793 was simply 
(average size of acquirer)/(average size of acquirer + average size of target), where 
these average sizes were calculated from the set of empirical data described in §2.5.1. 
Sl 




Fixed y model 




rA and rB are 
different functions, 
but not dependent on 
company value 









Table 2.1. Functional forms of the risk aversion coefficients 









Length of 0 
6 
as PsPVB rs = e e where t =a•+~• (PV A/PVs) 
Constant in [0.5;0.9] 4 
Constant in [0.5;0.9] 2 
Constant in [0.5;0.9] 2 
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§2.5 EMPIRICAL FI'ITING OF THE MODEL 
§2.5.1 THE DATA 
The input requirement for the model is the vector xi = [ ~~~:: ] for each 
PVAB. 
,I 
merger i considered. In §2.2 we defined PV A and PVB to be the financial worths of the 
acquirer and target respectively in the absence of a merger. To test the model empirically 
it is necessary to quantify these worths. Assuming an efficient market, we suppose that 
the pre-merger market values (MV) of A and B are surrogates for PV A and PVB 
respectively, that is PV A= MV A= (number of shares in issue for company A) x (share 
price of company A) and PVB = MVB =(number of shares in issue for company~) x 
(share price of company B). These may be converted to any monetary units for ease of 
calculation. Thus 
py. = n. P· i =A or B 
1 1 1 ' 
where ni is the pre-merger number of shares in issue for company i, and Pi is the pre-
merger share price of company i. 
As pointed out by, for example, Brealey and Myers (1981), it is important to bear 
in mind that if investors expect company A to acquire company B, the market value of 
A as ~efined above may be a poor measure of its value as a separate entity: the market 
value of company A will be its value in the absence of a merger plus some part of the 
benefits of the merger. That is, the market value of A will tend to overstate PV A· On the 
other hand if investors perceive that no merger will occur the market value of A will 
indeed be its value as a separate entity. There may be similar aberations when using the 
market value of company B to estimate its value as a separate entity. It is thus necessary 
to investigate when (relative to the merger announcement date) expectations of a 
successful merger start to become noticeable. The pre-merger share price of the company 
involved will then be measured at a point some time before this. 
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In all studies of these pre-announcement effects, the share price returns of the 
target companies are affected much more than those of the acquiring companies. In 
studies on US markets the pre-announcement effects have begun up to 6 or 7 months 
prior to the merger announcement. Examples of such empirical studies are those which 
were performed by Halpern (1973), Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978), Dodd (1980), 
Asquith (1983), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Malatesta 
(1983), to name but a few. The above all performed event studies using the cumulative 
average abnormal return approach first suggested by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(1969). On the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) from which the data for this study 
were taken, studies have shown that this effect begins some three months prior to the 
announcement (Affleck-Graves, Flach and Jacobson (1988), Bhana (1987) and Van den 
Honert, Barr, Affleck-Graves and Smale (1988)). Thus the pre-merger share prices of 
acquirers and targets were calculated as the average of the high and low monthly prices 
for the three months before the merger announcement. 
If a merger is financed by means of a share exchange, the acquirer swaps k of the 
combined company's shares for each target share. Thus post-merger the new company 
AB will have (nA + knB) shares in issue, and PV AB• the post-merger financial worth of 
the combined company, will be estimated by (nA + knB)P AB• where P AB is the post-
merger share price of company AB. P AB was taken to be the average of the high and low 
prices of the resulting merged company in the month after the merger. The actual traded 
value of the target is (knBP A +znB), where the first term is the portion paid out as an 
exchange of shares and the second term is the portion paid out in cash. The term z is the 
cash payment per share. 
The empirical data came from mergers between companies listed on the JSE and 
which took place between February 1972 and April 1987. For the purposes of this study 
mergers and acquisitions were only included if the following conditions held: 
(i) Full documentation regarding the exchange ratio was available (i.e. k and 
z above were available); 
(ii) The acquirer should not have undertaken any other merger in the six 
months prior to the current merger announcement; 
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(iii) There should not have been any change to the issued ordinary shares of 
either participating company in the six months prior to the merger 
announcement; 
(iv) Only acquisitions of a single target at a time were considered; 
(v) Thinly and infrequently-traded shares were eliminated to ensure market 
efficiency. Thus it was required that at least 100 000 shares had to have 
been traded per annum on average over the five years prior to the merger 
and at least ten deals had to have taken place per month over the same 
period; 
(vi) The merger had to be "rational" in the sense that the net gains were 
positive, and the net amount allocated to the target was greater than PVB 
but less than PV AB-PV A· Five mergers were eliminated from the sample 
through the enforcement of this condition, even though they satisfied 
conditions (i) to (v). 
A set of 24 mergers remained, and the acquirer/target combinations as well as the values 
of PV A• PV B and PV AB can be found in Appendix 2.A. 
§2.5.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
§2.5.2.1 LINEAR UTILITY MODEL RESULTS 
At convergence the linear utility model with y related to PV A I PVB as in (2.2a), 
that is 
I 
ln [y I (1-y)] = cx1 +~I (PV A I PVB) 
produced a solution vector of 
0 = [ ;; ] = [ Z:~~ri] 
with residual sum of squares L (Yi - Y(xi;0)) 2 = 0.7803. We term this model 
linear utility model 1 (LUMl). 
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Similarly, the solution vector for the linear utility model with y related to 
PV A/PV B as in (2.2b ), that is 
In [y I (1-y)] = <lz + ~2 ln(PV A I PVB) 
converged to 
0 = [ ~] = [ ~:~] 
with residual sum of squares 0.7127. We term this model linear uti.Jity model 2 (LUM2). 
Table 2.2 shows the actual values of Yi on the unit interval and the corresponding fitted 
values Y (xi; 0) and residuals ei = Y (xi ; 0) - Yi for both the linear utility models 
considered here. 
Since Y (xi; 0) is a predicted value of Yi, an obvious measure of the quality of 
prediction is a least squares regression of Yi on Y (xi; 0) . Clearly a least squares 
regression of the form Y = b0 + b1 Y should have b0 not different from 0, b1 not 
different from 1 and a coefficient of determination r2 as close as possible to 1. The OLS 
regression for model LUMl for data in Table 2.2 yields 
y = 0.06136 + 0.7545 y 
with correlation r=0.4511 and coefficient of determination r2=0.2035. The 
predicted Y thus explains 20.35% of the variation in the observed Y values. This 
indicates a clear linear trend with a significant correlation (p = 0.0270). Tests on the 
regression coefficients show that the intercept and slope are not significantly different 
from 0 and 1 respectively (tb = 0.8982, tb = - 0.7712) . The OLS regression for 
0 1 
model LUM2 yields 
y = 0.007376 + 0.9683 y 
with r = 0.4960 (r2 = 0.2460). Thus the predicted Y explains 24.60% of the variation 
in the observed Y values. There is a significant correlation (p = 0.0138) and again the 
intercept and slope are not statistically significantly different from 0 and 1 
respectively (lb = 0.0928, lb = -0.0879) . Table 2.3 provides a comparison of the 
0 0 
models LUMl and LUM2. Table 2.4 shows the actual monetary amount allocated to the 
target, Q, the value of Q estimated from Y in our model, as well as the percentage error 
of the estimate for the better-fitting of the two models, LUM2. In this case it will be 
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Table 2.2. Values of actual Yi, fitted Yi, and residuals for linear utility 
models 
LUMl LUM2 
Obs y. 1 Fitted Yi Residual Fitted Yi Residual 
1 .7079 .3054 -.4024 .2973 -.4105 
2 .0731 .3236 .2505 .3736 .3005 
3 .0977 .0000 -.0977 .0515 -.0462 
4 .0859 .1496 .0637 .1433 .0574 
5 .2774 .0407 -.2366 .0991 -.1783 
6 .2142 .0885 -.1258 .1185 -.0958 
7 .2829 .3241 .0412 .3766 .0938 
8 .0435 .3119 .2684 .3183 .2748 
9 .4873 .3144 -.1729 .3277 -.1596 . 
10 .0679 .0697 .0020 .1112 .0434 
11 .2955 .0250 -.2705 .0912 -.2043 
12 .3358 .3087 -.0270 .3075 -.0283 
13 .0470 .0020 -.0449 .0688 .0219 
14 .0483 .2460 .1977 .2031 .1548 
15 .1004 .0440 -.0564 .1006 .0002 
16 .0064 .0634 .0569 .1087 .1022 
17 .5085 .2785 -.2300 .2415 -.2670 
18 .1469 .2748 .1279 .2360 .0891 
19 .1039 .2276 .1236 .1875 .0836 
20 .0341 .2345 .2005 .1930 .1590 
21 .0498 .1059 .0561 .1252 .0755 
22 .0240 .1792 .1552 .1575 .1334 
23 .6221 .3170 -.3051 .3388 -.2834 
24 .0508 .0577 .0069 .1064 .0556 
2-23 
Table 2.3. A comparison of models LUMl and LUM2 
LUMl LUM2 
e Cl= 0.6514 Cl= 0.5523 
~ = 0.0920 ~ = 0.5007 
I. e2 0.7803 0.7127 
ho 0.061355 0.007376 
se(b0) 0.068309 0.079503 
t(b0) 0.8982 0.0928 
b1 0.754518 0.968251 
se(b1) 0.318307 0.361359 
t(b1) -0.7712 -0.0879 
r 0.4511 0.4960 
r2 0.2035 0.2460 
p 0.0270 0.0138 
noted that the percentage errors are normally distributed <x21 =0.502). Figure 2.3 shows 
a scatterplot of Y against Y for model LUM2 (the better-fitting of the two linear utility 
models) together with the fitted regression line and 95% and 99% confidence bands for 
the fitted regression line. 
On the basis of all the above information LUM2 provides a somewhat better fit 
than does LUMl: the improvement in correlation is 9.95% and in percent of variation in 
the Y explained it is 20.88%. We note that 8 points have absolute residuals greater than 
0.2 and 2 points have absolute residuals greater than 0.3 in LUMl, whilst the 
corresponding number of points in LUM2 are 6 and 2. If these ill-fitting points (those 
with absolute residual greater than 0.2) are omitted and the regression lines of Y 
against Y recalculated for models LUMl and LUM2, the functions become 
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Table 2.4. Actual traded values and estimates (in monetary tenns) 

















































122.857 ' -10.18 
9.640 14.85 
Average % error: 5.51 % 














0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Estimated Y 
- Regression line ·---·Ideal line 
Figure 2.3. Scatterplot of actual Y against Y for model LUM2 together with 




y = 0.01907 + 0.7510 y 
r = 0.6530 
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r2 = 0.4264' p < 0.00005 
y = -0.02010 + 0.9339 y 
r = 0.6448 
r2 = 0.4288' p < 0.00005. 
based on n=16 points 
based on n=18 points 
Thus the relatively low predictive power (represented by r2) of models LUMl and LUM2 
is caused by a fairly low proportion of outlying cases which are not well described by 
these models. 
§2.5.2.2 NEGATNE EXPONENTIAL UTILITY MODEL RESULTS 




-0.0070 0 = 
-0.0345 
0.0151 
with residual sum of squares of 0.6371. Table 2.5 shows the actual values of Yi on the 
interval [O; 1], the corresponding values of Y (xi; 0) and the resulting residuals. The OLS 
regression of Y on Y yields 
y = 0.01652 + 0.9259 y 
with r=0.5725 and r2=0.3277. The linear trend is very highly significant (p = 0.0034). 
Furthermore the intercept and slope are not significantly different from 0 and 1 
respectively ( se(b0) = 0.064041, th = 0.254 ; se(b1) = 0.282735, th = --0.262) · 0 1 
Figure 2.4 shows a scatterplot of Y against Y for model FNEM together with the fitted_ 
regression line and 95% and 99% confidence bands for the fitted regression line. A 
glance at Figure 2.4 shows that points 1, 2, 8 and 17 clearly do not fit the model well, 
all having absolute residuals of greater than 0.2. If these four points are omitted and the 
regression line recalculated on the remaining 20 points, the function becomes 
y = -0.009326 + 0.9762 y 
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Table 2.5. Actual values of Yi, fitted values of Yi and residuals for the full 
negative exponential utility model, FNEM 
Merger Actual Yi Fitted Yi. Residual 
1 .7079 .2690 -.4389 
2 .0731 .2810 .2079 
3 .0977 .0368 -.0609 
4 .0859 .1109 .0250 
5 .2774 .0775 -.1999 
6 .2142 .0926 -.1216 
7 .2829 .4164 .1335 -
8 .0435 .2962 .2527 
9 .4873 .3892 -.0981 
10 .0679 .1120 .0441 
11 .2955 .1254 -.1701 
12 .3358 .4167 .0809 
13 .0470 .0647 .0177 
14 .0483 .1608 .1125 
15 .1004 .1709 .0705 
16 .0064 .1512 .1448 
17 .5085 .1624 -.3461 
18 .1469 .1646 .0177 
19 .1039 .1581 .0542 
20 .0341 .1598 .1257 
21 .0498 .1477 .0979 
22 .0240 .1150 .0910 
23 .6221 .4931 -.1290 













0 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Estimated Y 
0.4 0.5 0.6 
- Regression line -----Ideal line 
Figure 2.4. Scatterplot of Y against Y for model FNEM together with the fitted 
regression line and 95% and 99% confidence bands 
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with r = 0.7733 and r2 = 0.5980, i.e. a line even closer to the desired line, Y =estimated 
Y, and with a superior fit (p < 0.00005). Clearly the model FNEM has considerable 
predictive power for all but a small number of outlying cases. 
Consider now the fixed y model, FyM. Table 2.6 shows the values 
CXA 
ex 
of 0 = ~: for the fixed values of y, as well as the goodness-of-fit statistics r, r2 and 
~B 
the residual sum of squares, SSE. It will be noted that the correlation r remains virtually 
unchanged over a wide range of y from 0.75 to 0.90, reaching a peak of 0.5695 when 
J-{).793 and a low. point in this range of 0.5597 when J-{).90, a drop of only 1.75%. 
Furthermore over this range the regression of Y on Y is significant at the 0.5% level. 
As y tends towards 0.50, so the correlation decreases in significance until it is only 
significant at the 2% level for r-:;0.55. The symmetric Nash solution provides the least 
good fit of all the models considered here. 
Comparing the model FyM with values of y in the range [0.75 ; 0.90] to the 
model FNEM we see that the maximum loss in explanatory power occurs when J-{).90. 
This loss amounts to only 1.91 % (S~) and 2.29% (r). This is shown in Table 2.7. 
From Tables 2.6 and 2.7 we note that the loss is minimised (for the values of y 
considered here) when J-{).793. At this value of y three observations (numbered 1, 8 and 
17) have absolute residuals greater than 0.2. Omitting these points we observe a 
correlation based on the remaining 21 points of 0.7519 (r2=0.5654), i.e. an improvement 
of 32.03% in correlation and over 74% in the explanation of the variation of the Y 
values. Thus the model FyM could be considered an improvement on the full model in 
the sense that it offers an almost equivalent explanatory power whilst reducing the 
number of estimated parameters by two. From the above discussion it is clear that it is 
extremely difficult to estimate the value of y accurately. Table 2.8 shows the values of 
Q (the actual monetary amount allocated to the target) for each merger in the sample, the 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.793. It may be noted that the percentage errors are normally distributed (X21=0.502). 
For the first simplification of the fixed y model, SI, i.e. when the risk aversion 
Table 2. 7. Loss in explanatory power by model FyM 
Model SSE % loss r % loss 
FNEM 0.637120 - 0.5725 -
FyM y=0.75 0.641658 0.71 0.5681 0.77 
0.793 0.639492 0.37 0.5695 0.53 
0.85 0.643800 1.05 0.5649 1.34 
0.90 0.649317 1.91 0.5597 2.29 
coefficients are the same function of company size for both acquirers and targets, the 
resultant correlations never rise above 0.0558 (not significantly different from 0) for any 
value of y between 0.50 and 0.90. The residual sum of squares ranges from 0.9419 when 
y=0.90 to 3.1509 when y=0.50. Oearly this model is thus an oversimplification of reality, 
despite saving on two further degrees of freedom, and indicates that the risk aversion 
coefficients rA and rB are indeed different functions of company size for targets and 
acquirers. 
The second simplification of the fixed y model, S2. i.e. when rA and rB are 
considered to be different functions, but not dependent on company size, yielded equally 
disappointing results with the correlations never rising above 0.0001 for any value of y 
in the interval [0.5 ; 0.9]. The residual sum of squares is constant at 0.9449 for all values 
of y considered. This model is clearly also an oversimplification of reality, and indicates 
that r A and rB are indeed functions of company size. 
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Table 2.8. Actual traded values and estimates (in monetary terms) for model 
FyM with y=O. 793 
Merger Q Fitted Q 
1 333.775 299.075 
2 559.576 678.523 
3 5.176 . 4.079 
4 67.573 72.355 
5 17.187 10.133 
6 10.381 9.701 
7 280.017 284.912 
8 278.122 291.398 
9 263.088 247.025 
10 6.287 7.623 
11 2.629 1.088 
12 92.478 94.782 
13 3.958 4.468 
14 2.225 2.589 
15 206.479 278.446 
16 0.475 0.768 
17 1.203 1.039 
18 3.339 3.411 
19 3.276 3.507 
20 1.872 3.316 
21 1.643 4.125 
22 24.121 35.131 
23 135.365 129.488 
24 8.208 9.256 
Average % error: 





























Thus the reduction of model PyM to S 1 and/or S2 yields essentially zero 
correlations. This implies the necessity of the PyM model, and that the significant 
correlations in the Fy1vl model are not spurious. 
§2.5.3 A COMPARISON OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE LINEAR AND 
NEGATIVE EXPONENTIAL FAMILIES OF MODELS 
Table 2.9 summarises the empirical results of the goodness-of-fit statistics of the 








Table 2.9. Summary of empirical results of goodness-of-fit 





y::0.5 0.8004 0.4609 
y::0.55 0.6395 to 0.5147 to 
to 0.90 0.7278 0.5695 
y::0.5 3.1509 0.0118 
y::0.55 0.9420 to 0.0120 to 
to 0.90 2.4888 0.0558 
y::0.5 0.9449 0.0000 
y::0.55 0.9449 0.0000 to 


























amongst the parties concerned. Note that the table includes the number of parameters 
estimated in each model. In models PyM, Sl and S2, the case y=0.5 implies the 
symmetric Nash solution and hence requires one less parameter than for other y values. 
Since the two families of utility functions are not nested the usual model 
comparison procedures are not relevant. As a heuristic measure of goodness of fit we 
propose to use the root of the residual sum of squares, adjusted for the number of 




where n is the number of data points (in all cases n=24) and p is the number of 
parameters estimated. This measure is analagous to the usual measure used in multiple 
regression models. Table 2.10 displays the value of for R(SSadj) for all the models 
considered and the number of parameters in the model, and a graphical presentation is 
Table 2.10. R(SSadj) values for models with full and shared information 
Model p 
LUMI 2 0.1883 
LUM2 2 0.1800 
FNEM 6 0.1881 
FyM y=0.5 4 0.2001 
y=0.55 to 0.90 5 0.1835 to 0.1957 
SI y=0.5 2 0.3784 
y=0.55 to 0.90 3 0.2118 to 0.3443 
S2 y=0.5 2 0.2072 
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Figure 2.5. R(SSac1j) plotted against the number of parameters estimated for all 
models with full and shared information 
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given in Figure 2.5. Clearly the best model will provide the lowest R(SSad} value. 
Amongst the negative exponential family the model PyM with selected values of "( 
provides the best fit in tenns of R(SSadj). Amongst the linear family, model LUM2 is 
best and indeed this is the best model of all. Note that in Figure 2.5 the point 
representing model Sl, 'Y = 0.55 has been completely omitted. and the range of points 
representing model S l, y = 0.55 - 0.90 has been partially omitted due to the scaling 
chosen, but these are clearly the poorest models of all those considered. 
We can thus conclude that on an adjusted basis and using (2.11) as a means of 
model comparison, the linear utility model LUM2 provides as much infonnation (and 
possibly more) as any of the (more complex) negative exponential models. 
§2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we have constructed and analysed a number of relatively 
parsimonious models based upon, firstly, a linear utility function and, secondly, a 
negative exponential utility function, to explain the proportion of the synergy gains from 
merger that accrue to the target company. We showed that several provided a reasonably 
good description of the real-world decision-making process. 
Amongst the linear utility family the best model comprised of only two 
parameters which were used in the estimation of the relative bargaining strength of the 
acquirer vis-a-vis the target, which was the only important measure used in explaining 
the variation in the proportion of the synergy gains accruing to the target. 
Amongst the negative exponential utility family the best model comprised of four 
estimated parameters which were used in the estimation of the risk aversion coefficients 
of the acquiring and target companies. It was shown empirically that for this family, 
unlike the linear utility family, the fit of the model did not depend to any great extent on 
the negotiating power of the acquiring company for a wide range of such power. Simpler 
negative exponential models with fewer parameters did not provide any significant fit at 
all. Specifically, the risk aversion coefficients of the two companies involved were 
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(i) different functions (although possibly of the same form), and 
(ii) dependent on company size. 
This model is at best a simplification of reality, and many of the complications 
associated with a complex investment decision such as a corporate merger have been set 
aside. Thus any deviations between the actual value of the proportion of the synergy 
gains accruing to the target and our fitted model can be attributed to these simplifications 
in our assumptions. Furthermore, differing perceptions of the values of the input variables 
between the decision-makers and ourselves would contribute to the residual; it should be 
boume in mind that the empirical testing performed here used actual ex post data, some 
of which were unknown before the actual merger announcement. As regards the 
simplifying assumptions of the model, areas which could further contribute to our model 
deviating from reality are the form of the utility functions and the form of the 
relationship between company size and risk aversion coefficient, and between relative 
company size and negotiating power. 
In the models presented in this chapter we assumed that the worth of the merged 
entity, and hence the synergy gains from merger, was known with cenainty. In a real-
world decision-making environment this value will have to be estimated a priori, and thus 
it is likely that acquirer and target (and any other interested party) will arrive at different 
values for the worth of the combined company. Decisions taken on the strength of these 
uncertain estimates will thus contain an element of risk. The current models do not 
consider the effects of uncertainty or risk in any way, and hence these models are unable 
to explain what proportion of the amount paid to the target was in the form of cash and 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































BARGAINING MODELS WITH SHARED UNCERTAINTY 
§3.1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
If two companies enter into negotiations which may lead to merger, and one or 
both choose to employ the type of model developed in the previous chapter as a form of 
decision support, they will have to make an estimate of the post-merger value of the new 
company well before the merger occurs. Since not all the relevant information may be 
known at that time it is likely that the acquirer and target may well arrive at different 
estimates of this value. In this chapter we attempt to extend the realism of the model by 
incorporating and quantifying this uncertainty. For the time being we will suppose that 
while uncertainty exists, its extent is known to both parties with certainty. That is, we are 
dealing with a situation in which there is shared uncertainty amongst the two parties. 
Uncertainty may occur in at least two different forms: the uncertainty relating to an 
estimate of some future outcome (as above); and the uncertainty relating to the way in 
which each bargaining party assesses net present value in "utility" terms {quantified in 
terms of a company-specific risk aversion coefficient). Apart from adding realism to the 
model, another advantage of introducing a measure of uncertainty is that such a model 
will be able to discriminate between the amount paid to the target shareholders by means 
of cash and by means of a share transfer, thus adding an extra dimension of usefulness 
to the model as a decision support tool. 
We again assume a single-stage two-party bargaining game between acquirer and 
target, and we develop the Nash-Kalai bargaining model in §3.2 for a simple form of 
utility function. In §3.3 we derive the optimal solution to the Nash-Kalai model. The 
important mathematical results are interpreted in a practical way for management in §3.4. 
In §3.5 we arbitrarily choose a single merger from our empirical data-set and show how 
in a particular case the various solution possibilities arise as the uncertainty associated 
3-2 
with the merger changes. We construct a simple global model in §3.6 to describe the 
behaviour of the bargaining parties, the aim being (i) to quantify the uncertainty involved 
in a merger, and (ii) to predict the split of cash and shares. We will test this model on 
a set of mergers from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and in so doing hope to 
show that by including an uncertainty term we obtain an improvement in model fit over 
the models of the previous chapter. Thus an understanding will be gained of how 
uncertainty fits into the complex bargaining process, and how this affects the form of 
payment. Finally, in §3.7 we look at an extension of this model, by examining how 
different utility functions might impact on the results. 
§3.2 NOTATION, ASSUMPTIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NASH-KALA! 
BARGAINING MODEL 
As in the previous chapter we suppose that the pre-merger worths of the acquiring 
company (PV A) and of the target company (PVB) as separate entities are known to both 
parties. We suppose now that a priori there is uncertainty about the post-merger value of 
the merged entity. We model this uncertainty by assuming that the post-merger value of 
the combined company viewed from the pre-merger perspective (we call it fIAB ) is 
some random variable which has a probability distribution whose mean and variance are 
known to both parties. Thus µAB is the expected post-merger value of the combined 
company AB, and a k is the variance in the estimate of the post-merger value of the 
merged entity. We make no assumptions initially about the form of the probability 
distribution of fIAB , and indeed there is no theoretical or empirical evidence to suggest 
that some particular functional form (for example, a normal distribution) should be 
chosen ahead of any other. Since a merger is a one-off event, the variance cannot be 
empirically measured. Thus a AB 2 is merely a conceptual variance, which gives an 
indication of how accurately the two parties are able to estimate the post-merger value 
of AB. All the above information is symmetric in the sense that both acquirer and target 
know the values of PV A• PVB and µAB with certainty, and have the same perception of 
the amount of uncertainty (a AB 2) involved. Empirical estimation of a AB 2 is the subject 
of a later section. 
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We noted in §2.2 that under conditions of complete certainty the form of payment 
by the acquirer to the target was irrelevant. That is, it was immaterial whether the 
payment was by means of cash, an exchange of shares, or a combination of both cash 
and shares. Since the present model contains an element of uncertainty we may be able 
to differentiate between the cash and share transfer portions of the payment. Thus we 
define ~s to be the portion of the value of the combined company allocated to the target 
(or more correctly, to the target shareholders) in the form of shares (0::;; ~s ::;; 1), and c.o 
tO' be a cash side-payment (c.o ~ 0). The net amount allocated to the target shareholders, 
Q, is thus a random variable and can be written as ~s fiAB + c.o • We will assume (as 
in the previous chapter) that the two parties are both rational, and we will restrict 
ourselves to the case where both parties are risk averse (we invoke this assumption later). 
Then the expected net value to A after the merger must exceed its value before merger, 
i.e. 
µAB - E(Q) = (1-{3g) µAB - co > PV A 
(otherwise there is no expected benefit to A). Similarly, the expected net value to B after 
the merger must exceed its value before merger, i.e. E(Q) > PVa (otherwise there is no 
expected benefit io B). 
Employing the above notation the actual net gain to the acquirer is the random 
variable 
This has expectation of 
and variance of 
A 2 2 ( 1 - PS ) cr AB · 
Similarly, the actual net gain to the target is the random variable 
gB = ~s fiAB - PV B + co • 
which has expectation of 
~s µAB - PVB +co 
and variance of 
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The sum of the expectations of the actual net gains to the acquirer and the target is 
simply 
0-Ps) µAB - PV A - co+ Ps µAB - PVB +co 
= µAB - PV A - PVB , 
which is merely the expected total net gain or synergy from the merger. To avoid 
problems of scale we will use the expected total net gain as a convenient standardisation. 
We will develop the model in terms of the standardised net gain to the acquirer and 
target companies. The standardised net gain to the acquirer is the net gain to the acquirer 
expressed as a fraction of the total expected synergy, and is defined as 
f A = gA I (µAB - PV A - PV8 ) 
and the standardised net gain to the target is defined as 
f B = gB I (µAB - PV A - PV B) • 
The standardisation conveniently provides the result that 
E(fA) + E(f B) = 1. 
The expectation of r A can be written as 
( 1 - ~s) µAB - PV A 
E(fA) = --·------
. µAB - PV A - PV B 
Recall from § 1.3 that we are modelling an asymmetric bargaining relationship between 
an acquirer and a target; the acquirer makes an off er to the shareholders of the target, and 
the target merely reacts to this offer. Part of the offer may be in the form of a cash (as 
opposed to a share) deal;. in any event the cash portion will be non-negative, i.e. a cash 
payment by the acquirer to the target and not vice versa. We have defined two policy 
variables to describe the offer: Ps• the portion of the value of the combined company 
allocated to the target, and ro, the cash side-payment Now Ps is already standardised (and 
thus unitless), whilst ro is expressed in units of monetary value. We thus define A. = ro 
I (µAB - PV A - PVB) as the standardised cash payment Thus A. ~ 0. An upper limit on 
A. is not explicitly required as it is implied by the inequality (l-~8)µAB - ro > PV A· So 
( 1 - rt ) µ - PV 
E( r A) = ..,s AB A - A. , 
µAB - PVA - PV8 
which can be written as 
(3.1) 
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where C1 = (µAB -PV A) I (µAB - PV A - PVB) and C2 =µAB I (µAB - PV A - PVB). Since 
A would only enter into the merger if the expectation of gA excyeds zero, and since the 
total expected synergy gain (µAB - PV A - PVB) > 0 (we assume that both parties are 
rational net value maximisers and would not enter into a deal that would result in an 
· overall expected net loss), we have that E(f A) > 0 is a necessary condition for a risk 
averse acquirer. The variance of r A is 
( 1 R )2 O' . 2 
Var (f A) = - t-'S AB 
(µAB -PV A -PVB )2 
We will find it convenient to develop the model in terms of the coefficient of variation 
of the post-merger value of the combined company, CV AB = O' AB I µAB, which we call 
the relative uncertainty of the merger. Thus we can write 
. ( 1 - Ps )2 µAB 2 CV~ 
Var(fA) =~~~~~~ 
(µAB -PV A -PVB )2 
= ( 1 -P8 ) 2 c/ CV AB 2 
using the notation developed above. 
Similarly, the expected standardised net gain to the target is 
R µ -PV 
E(fB) = t-'g. AB B + ').., 
µAB - PV A - PV B 
= c2 Ps - c 1 + 1 + A. 
where c1 and c2 are as previously defined. r B has variance 
R 2 2 CV 2 
Var ( r B) = t-'S µAB AB 
(µAB - PV A - PVB)2 




The aim of the models we build will primarily be to predict Ps and A. as a 
function of the known variables µAB, PV A and PVB and the uncertainty, and to show by 
means of empirical testing that this model provides an improvement on the models 
proposed in the previous chapter in at least two senses: firstly, that it offers a better fit 
(in terms of predicting the total amount paid by the acquirer) due to the prescence of an 
.extra explanatory parameter (the uncertainty, modelled as a variance), and secondly that 
it is able to model the mix of cash and shares in the payment. 
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We follow the spirit of the previous chapter and model the bargaining process as 
a co-operative two-person non-zero sum game, where the outcome of the game is the 
expected utility .of the standardised net gains to A and B, that is E[U A (f A)] and 
E[UB(f B)]. From a bargaining game point of view (in the sense of Nash {1950)) we 
define the origin of both of the utility functions such that E[U A(O)] = E[UB(O)] = 0 
giving a status quo·point (f A;r B) = (0;0), i.e. if the merger does not materialise, neither 
party has any utility gain. The expected utilities to, both companies are monotone 
increasing in their standardised net gains. The Nash-Kalai solution to the problem is the 
point (/1.;~s) which maximises the function 
4> = {E[U A(f A)] }'Y. {E[UB(f B)J }1-Y , 0 ~ y ~ 1 
in the range A ;;:: 0 , 0 ~ ~s ~ 1. The parameter y indicates the negotiating power of 
company A relative to company B. 
A Taylor expansion of U A (f A) around E(f A) can be written as 
[ ] 
fA -E(fA) '[ ] (fA -E(fA))
2 
"[ ] 
UA(fA) =UA E(fA) + 1! UA E(fA) +. 
2
! UA E(fA) + .... 
So 
We assume concavity . and monotonicity of U A (f A). This implies that higher order 
derivatives cannot be very large; it is assumed that these derivatives are sufficiently small 
relative to the higher order moments of the distribution of r A so that higher order terms 
can be neglected. Then 
E[UA(f A)]= uA[E(fA)] - k~ Var(rA) 
.. 
Concavity also implies the strict positivity of kA *, which is an indicator of the acquirer's 
attitude toward excessive deviations from U A[E(f A)]. A risk averse acquirer will have 
kA * large, whilst a risk-taker will have kA * close to 0. Similarly, it can be shown that 
E[Ua(fs)] = ua[E<fB)] - k; Var(fB) 
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where kB"' > 0. This approximation in effect models uncertainty in such a way that the 
two sources of uncertainty, viz. the variance associated with the estimate of the post-
merger value of the merged entity, and the acquirer's and the target's attitude towards 
risk, are additively independent. For purposes of empirical fitting we introduce the further 
approximation that for both parties U[E(f)] can be approximated by some linear function 
of E(f). With these approximation$, maximisation of E[U(f)] is equivalent to 
maximisation of E(f) - k Var(f) for both parties, where k here is some positive constant 
times the k"' value introduced previously. From here onwards we will refer to k as the 
risk aversion coefficient of the party concerned. Then for the acquirer 
E[U A(r ~] = E(f A) - kA Var(f A) 
= c1 - c2 ~s - A. - kA (1-~8)2 cl CV AB2 • 
The two sources of uncertainty are represented by a single measure, ~A· Thus 
E[UA(f A)]= c1 - c2 ~s - A.- (l-~s)2 c/ ~A 
where ;A = kA CV AB 2 • Since kA > 0 we have that ;A > 0. Similarly, for the target 
E[UB(f B)] = E(f B) - kB Var(f B) 
= c2 ~s - c1 + 1 + A. - ~s2 c/ ;B 
where ~B =kB CV AB2 > 0. ~A and ;Bare the risk/uncertainty measures associated with 
the post-merger company AB as perceived from the acquirer's and target's point of view 
respectively. Thus these additive mean/variance utility functions have a linear 
component (the standardised net gain to the party concerned) and a quadratic component 
(the risk as perceived by the party concerned). The above remains an approximation 
which is of course only justifiable insofar as the underlying assumptions remain a 
reasonable approximation. For example, the approximation would no longer be 
appropriate if it led to non-monotonic behaviour over the range 0 < ~s < 1. 
The Nash-Kalai criterion based on the above is the point (A.;~8) which maximises 
the function 
'1>(A.; ~s) = (c1 -c2 ~s -A.-(1-~8 ) 2c/;A] 1 ( c2 ~s -c1 +1+A.-~82c/;B] l -y (3.5) 
in the range A. ~ 0 , 0 :S ~s s 1. This is equivalent to maximising L=ln'1>(/i.;~8), i.e. 
maximising 
L = yln[c1 -c2 ~8 -A.-(1-~8 )2c/;A] + (1-y) ln[c2 ~8 -c1 +1 +li.-~82 c22;8 ] (3.6) 
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This function describes a response surface for a given merger over the two-
dimensional space defined by all (/";p8) pairs, and is parameterised by the uncertainty 
terms ~A and ~B· The required non-negativity of E[U A(r A)] and E[U8(r 8)] imply that 
'A~ - (c/ ~A) Ps2 + (2 c/ ~A - c2) Ps + c1 - c/ ~A (3.7) 
and 
(3.8) 
The feasible range for A. and Ps is thus an area bounded by the two quadratic equations 
implied by (3.7) and (3.8) in the range A.~ 0 and 0 ~ Ps ~ 1. The derivation of the roots 
of the two equations and the turning points can be found in Appendix 3.A. The feasible 
range depends only on the constants c1 and c2, and the risk/uncertainty components ~A 
and ~B· A change in the perceived risk associated with the merger by both parties 
concerned will thus alter the shape and size of the feasible region, assuming that kA and 
ka do not change. As the perceived post-merger risk, O' AB• increases, the feasible region 
will decrease in extent as the quadratics pass through one another, eventually becoming 
a single point on the P8-axis (a share-only transaction), and then disappearing entirely 
from the region of all practical meaning (i.e. from the area A. ~ 0, 0 ~ Ps ~ 1). This 
would imply that no rational merger would occur due to the large uncertainty involved. 
§3.3 THE NASH-KALAI SOLUTION 
where 
The Nash-Kalai criterion in (3.5) can be written as 
Maximise <I> ('A; Ps) = [ Q1 <Ps) -A. ]
1 [A. -Q2<Ps)] i -y 
1..~o.os13ss1 
Q1<Ps) = C1 - c2 Ps - c/ ~A 0-Ps)2 
and Q1<Ps) = C1 - 1 - c2 Ps + c/ ~B Ps2 
(3.9) 
We first investigate the unconstrained maximum of the Nash-Kalai criterion; we return 
later to investigate the effect . of imposing the constraints on A and Ps on this 
unconstrained solution. Necessary conditions for an unconstrained maximum 
a <I><A.; Ps) a <I><A.; Ps) 
are = 0 and = 0 simultaneously, which give rise to the optimal ()').. aps 
solution point (A* ;p8 *) where 
'A* = (1-y) Q1<P;) + Y Q1<P;) 
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=c1 -y-c2 ~; +c2 2 CV k [ ykB (~;) 2 -( 1 -y) kA ( 1 -~;)2 J 




Derivation of these results is contained in Appendix 3.B. 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
Provided A,* ~ 0, the solution given by (3.10) and (3.11) is feasible (since A,* 
satisfies (3.7) and (3.8), and 0 s; ~s * s; 1 as both kA>O and kB>O), and is the solution to 
the constrained problem. Ii A.* < 0 (i.e. the unconstrained optimum is infeasible in the 
constrained problem), then we can set up the Kuhn-Tucker conditions on A. in the Nash-
Kalai criterion to determine the optimal constrained value of A.. Since ~s * was feasible 
in the constrained problem we do not consider the constraint on ~s at this stage. A 
derivation of the optimal constrained solution point ("A. +;~5 ~ when A."' <O can be found in 
Appendix 3.B, and is shown to be 
and ~s + the feasible root of the cubic equation 
y Q2 (~;) Q: (~;) + (1-y) Ql (~;) Q; (~;) = 0 (3.12) 
which maximises <I>(0;~5) in (3.9). In the case where none of the roots proves feasible 
then no negotiated solution exists, and the status quo (i.e. no merger agreement) applies. 
The three possible solutions for ~s +arising from (3.12) have not been detailed here: their 
complicated and extremely lengthy structure mitigates against gaining further insights. 
We can however note that a resulting ~s + depends in a complex way not only on kA and 
kB, but also on the other parameters c1, c2, y and the uncertainty CV AB 
2• We have not 
been able to prove the general feasibility of any of the above three solutions for ~s +. 
However in principle in any specific case all real roots of (3.12) can be investigated for 
feasibility, and the resulting feasible ones examined to determine the optimal constrained 
solution, ~s +. 
In summary, the optimal bargaining solution consists of two distinct cases: 
(a) that when the unconstrained A.·~. in which case the unique solution is available 
in closed form by (3.10) and (3.11); 
and 
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(b) that when the unconstrained A.*<(), in which case the optimal solution has A.+ =O 
and ~s + one of the feasible roots of a cubic equation, providing at least one exists 
(failing which the status quo applies). 
§3.4 DISCUSSION AND PRACTICAL INTERPRETATION OF SOME 
MATHEMATICAL RESULTS 
As already noted the optimal bargaining solution to the Nash-Kalai criterion 
consists of two distinct cases. In practice a merger can be financed by a share exchange 
and/or a cash payment; one aspect a rational acquirer must consider in formulating an 
offer is the level of the cash payment. This could be nothing or some positive amount: 
a negative cash payment (i.e. demanding cash back from the target shareholders) is not 
considered. Thus the solution given in (3.10) and (3.11) is important for practical 
application of the model and warrants further interpretation. Further· work will be 
restricted to this case, with only brief observations made regarding the other solution 
case. 
1. Cash alone is never the optimal form of payment according to this model: since 
the optimal ~s = kA/(kA +kB) > 0, a share exchange will always form part of the optimal 
form of payment. On the basis of the assumptions of this model we note that the target 
shareholders are optimally required to bear at least a part of the risk (and also share in 
some of the gains) associated with the merger. This point is widely accepted in the 
Finance literature (see, for example, Brealey and Myers (1981)). 
Note that there may, of course, be other external factors affecting the mix of cash 
and shares (for example, the acquirer may be cash-rich, and may be acquiring the target 
purely as a sensible means of redeploying this cash (Brealey and Myers (1981)), which 
we do not consider here. 
2. The optimal amount offered (in cash and shares) for a specific target depends on 
the a priori perceived level of risk involved. The share exchange portion of the offer is 
independent of the uncertainty, CV AB· However the cash portion of the offer does depend 
on CV AB• and thus more uncertainty will imply a change in the amount of cash offered. 
From (3.10) we observe that providing the risk aversion coefficient of the target is 
relatively large compared to that of the acquirer then an increase in uncertainty implies 
a decrease in the optimal cash offer quantity. This might be typical of a situation in 
which a large acquiring company in a healthy financial position attempts to acquire a 
small target with precarious finances. The acquirer demands "payment" for the extra 
uncertainty in the form of a lower (risk-free) cash portion in the offer. On the other hand, 
if the risk aversion coefficient of the target is small relative to that of the acquirer 
(typical of the case of the acquirer being smaller and/or less financially secure than the 
target) then an increase in uncertainty is accompanied by an increase in the cash portion 
of the offer. The acquirer here has to offer more in the form of (risk-free) cash to the 
target to tempt it to enter into the more risky deal. 
In either of the above cases the uncertainty and risk aversion coefficients might 
be such that the optimal cash payment reduces to zero. Any further change in uncertainty 
in the same direction will result in a change in the share exchange portion of the payment 
whilst the cash portion of the offer remains zero. 
Thus the decision as to whether to finance the merger by a share exchange alone 
or by a combination of cash and shares should depend (per the Nash-Kalai rationality 
assumption) entirely on the risk aversion coefficients of both target and acquirer, the 
relative bargaining strength of the players and the level of uncertainty present. The 
merger agreement does not merely involve the acceptance by the target of an amount 
offered by the acquirer: the form of payment is also central to the agreement, and so 
should be considered carefully by the acquiring company when making the offer. 
Management of .a rational acquiring company might use the following steps in arriving 
at an acceptable bargaining solution: 
Step 1. 
Step 2. 
Determine the total amount T that the acquirer is willing to off er for the 
target company. This will be based in part on the overall uncertainty 
associated with the merger. 
Estimate the risk aversion coefficients of the acquirer (kA) and of the target 
(kB), and hence calculate ~s = kA I (kA +kB) . 
Step 3. 
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If T ~ ~ s , the acquirer should off er the full amount T in a share 
exchange. If T > P s , the acquirer should off er an amount of P s in a 
share exchange and the balance T - ~ s in cash. 
§3.5 AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 
In this section we choose an empirical example from the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) to exhibit the results obtained in the previous sections. In particular, we 
examine the shape and extent of the feasible range of (A.;p5) points, identifying the 
position of the optimal point (A* ;Ps *) for varying values of the risk/uncertainty 
parameters ~A and ~B· 
In January 1982 Huletts Corporation, a predominantly sugar-producing company 
with a listing in the Industrial sector of the JSE announced that it had concluded 
negotiations with Tongaat Foods to acquire all their listed stock, employing a share 
exchange of 117 Huletts shares per 100 Tongaat shares. Tongaat was subsequently 
delisted. Six months1 prior to the announcement Huletts had 32.9 million shares 
outstanding, each trading at R8-09, for a total market capitalisation of R266.161 million, 
whilst Tongaat had 227. 795 million shares outstanding, each trading at R6-87, for a total 
market capitalisation of R190.952 million. A month after the merger announcement the 
combined company had a market value of R605.136 million - we use this ex post 
observed value as an estimate of the a priori perception of the expected value of the 
merged entity. From the above we calculate 
c1 = (605.136 -266.161) I (605.136 - 266.161 - 190.952) = 2.290 
and C2 = 605.136 / 148.023 = 4.088 
Figures 3.1 to 3.9 exhibit the extent of the feasible (A.;Ps) space and the iso-Nash 
contours (lines of equal value of L= In CI>(A.;Ps) from (3.6)) within this feasible space for 
1 To avoid pre-announcement share-price effects (especially notable amongst target 
companies) a time period of six months prior to the merger announcement was chosen 
for the estimation of the pre-merger values of the two participants for the JSE (Affleck-
Graves, Flach and Jacobson (1988), Bhana (1987), Van den Honert, Barr, Affleck-
Graves and Smale (1988)). This period may well differ on other exchanges. See also 
§2.5.1. for a fuller discussion of the estimation of the financial worth of the participating 
companies. 
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the various values of ~A and ~B in the table below. We note that ~A=kACV AB2 and 
~s=kBCV AB 2, and we call these the "risk parameters" of the acquirer and the target 
respectively; we do not attempt to differentiate between the risk aversion component and 
the ·a priori estimation uncertainty component. Figures 3.1 to 3.9 were created by 
evaluating the Nash-Kalai function Lin (3.6) at each point in a 40x40 matrix of (A;~8) 
points in the range 0 ~A::;; 1, 0::;; ~s ~ l, and then fitting contours through these values. 
The contour levels and the extent of the (A;~8) space chosen for each plot may vary from 
Figure ;A ;B 
3.1 0.00 0.00 
3.2 0.10 0.02 
3.3 0.10 0.04 
3.4 0.10 0.08 
3.5 0.10 0.10 
3.6 0.10 0.135 
3.7 0.04 0.10 
3.8 0.08 0.10 
3.9 0.04 0.04 
figure to figure to ensure ease of reading. Figure 3.1 is merely the risk-free case, and we 
observe that the feasible (A;~g) region is a band of uniform width running from the · 
interval (0.32; 0.56) on the ~8-axis in a south-easterly direction to the interval (1.29; 
2.29) on the positive A-axis, and is not defined for (A.;J3s) values outside of this range. 
The plot shows the following iso-Nash contours: -2.5, -1.5, -1.0, -0.75, -0.65 and -0.55. 
All the iso-Nash contours are parallel to one another; the Nash-Kalai function reaches a 
maximum along a ridge situated in the feasible space at a value of just less than -0.50 
and decreases in value towards both edges. The rate of decrease is much more rapid on 
the south-western edge than on the north-eastern edge. This model is unable to 
differentiate between cash and shares as a medium of payment and thus it is unable to 
locate a single optimal (A.;J38) point (the optimal locus consists of all (A.;~8) points along 
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Figure 3.1. Feasible (A.;~s) space for the Hulettsffongaat merger 
(SA= SB= 0) 
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Figures 3.2 to 3.9 exhibit the effects of risk on the feasible space of the Nash-
Kalai function. The sequence of Figures 3.2 to 3.6 show the effect of a change in ~B 
from 0.02 (low target risk parameter) through to 0.135 (high target risk parameter) whilst 
~A is fixed at 0.1 (high acquirer's risk parameter). Whilst the actual contour levels 
indicated vary from plot to plot, it will be noticed that the upper boundary of the feasible 
space is entirely stationary (since the value of ~A is constant): the lowest contour level 
indicated passes through the point (0; 0.425) in all the plots. The lower boundary moves 
up towards the upper boundary as the target's risk parameter increases, hence reducing 
the size of the feasible space. Thus when ~8=0.02 the range of possible ~s values (when 
A.=0) is the interval (0.322; 0.425) and this reduces to the interval (0.41; 0.425) when 
~B=0.135. At the same time the "point" of the feasible space is receding in a north-
westerly direction: when ~B=0.02 the point of the feasible space is situated close to (0.34; 
0.24), but when ~B=0.135 the point is at (0.19; 0.33). When ~B exceeds approximately 
0.1483 the "lower boundarytt is situated above the "upper boundary" and the feasible 
space disappears entirely. For risk levels larger than this the set of feasible (A.;~8) points 
is empty, indicating that there are no possible cash/share combinations which would 
satisfy both parties simultaneously, and thus there is no likelihood of a successful merger 
offer. In all the plots the contours increase in value towards the middle of the feasible 
space, forming a "shoulder"-like surface. The rate of increase is much slower on the 
north-eastern slope than on the south-western slope, where it is almost vertical in all 
cases. The Nash-Kalai function reaches a maximum on the ~8-axis (i.e. when the amount 
of cash offered is 0). Since the acquirer's risk parameter is large (i.e. the acquirer's 
perception of the post-merger risk is large and/or the acquirer has large risk aversion), 
a rational acquirer will not be prepared to enter into the merger unless the target 
shareholders share the merger risk fully, and so the optimal offer will be a share-only 
offer, regardless of the level of the target's risk parameter. We note that the smaller ~B 
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Figure 3.2. Feasible (/1.;~s) space for the Hulettsffongaat merger 
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Figure 3.3. Feasible (A.;~s) space for the Hulettsffongaat merger 
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Figure 3.4. Feasible (A.;~5) space for the Hulettsffongaat merger 
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Figure 3.5. Feasible 0\.;~8) space for the Hulettsffongaat merger 
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Figure 3.6. Feasible (/1.;~s) space for the HulettsfTongaat merger 
(~A= 0.1; ~B = 0.135) 
0.50 
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The sequence of Figures 3. 7, 3.8 and 3.5 demonstrates the effect of a change in 
;A from 0.04 (low acquirer's risk parameter) through to 0.1 (high acquirer's risk 
parameter) whilst ~B is fixed at 0.1 (high target risk parameter). For this sequence of 
diagrams the lower boundary of the feasible space remains stationary now since the value 
of ~B is constant: the lowest contour level indicated passes through the point (0; 0.37) 
in all cases. The upper boundary curve moves downwards as the acquirer's risk parameter 
increases, reducing the size of the feasible space. Thus when ;A=0.04 the range of 
possible ~s values (when /..::0) is (0.37; 0.525) and this reduces to (0.37; 0.425) when 
;A =0.1. When ~A exceeds approximately 0.1160 the feasible space disappears entirely. 
At low values of ~A (Figure 3.7) the contours are almost parallel to one another and only 
curve gently inwards near the edges of the plot (i.e. near the axes). We note that a cash-
only offer is feasible, since when ~8::0, values of A. in the interval (1.33; 1.61) are 
defined. The contours increase in value from both the north-east and south-west 
boundaries towards the middle of the plot (the rate of increase is slower on the north-
eastern slope), reaching a maximum close to the point (0.4; 0.28), i.e. at some point 
where Mt:O. Thus an exchange of shares together with a cash payment form the optimal 
offer. Since the target's risk parameter is at such a high level (and thus the target 
perceives that the post-merger risk will be large and/or the target has a high level of risk 
aversion), the rational acquirer will be forced to include at least a portion of cash (which 
is, of course, risk-free) in the optimal offer to entice the target to accept. For higher 
values of ;A (Figures 3.8 ·and 3.5) a cash-only offer is no longer feasible; the feasible 
space returns to the familiar shoulder-like shape not intersecting the A.-axis. At these and 
higher levels of ~A the Nash-Kalai function is maximised at a point on the ~8-axis, 
implying that the optimal offer will be a share-only offer. This is due to the acquirer 
(who makes the offer anyway) having a large risk parameter, and thus demanding to be 
compensated for this risk by forcing it partly onto the target. The target's large risk 
parameter (which would seem to indicate the requirement for a portion of (risk-free) cash 
in the offer) appears to play a secondary role to that of the acquirer. This situation thus 
illustrates a further facet of the conflict: if both companies have large risk parameters, 
the acquirer will desire a share-only offer and the target will desire some form of cash 
payment as well as a share exchange. Finally, the smaller ;A is, the larger the value of 
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Figure 3. 7. Feasible (A.;~5) space for the Hulettsffongaat merger 
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Figure 3.8. Feasible (A.;~5) space for the Hulettsffongaat merger 




The situation where both companies have small (but not zero) risk parameters is 
illustrated in Figure 3.9. Here both ~A and ~B are set to 0.04. The shape of the feasible 
space is very similar to that of Figure 3.7 in that it cuts both axes, and the outer contours 






L__ __ .J ___ [ ___ __, ____ ~-----0.0 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 







Figure 3.9. Feasible (A.;~s) space for the Hulettsffongaat merger 
(~A = 0.04; ~B = 0.04) 
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. 
~8-axis (thus implying a. share exchange offer with possibly a very small cash side-
payment). Since the target's risk parameter is small (and hence the target would not be 
· unwilling to bear some degree of risk), the acquirer is able to capitalise by making what 
is largely a share-exchange offer, and hence ensuring that what risk there is will also fall 
on the shoulders of the target shareholders. 
· The table below summarises the above discussion on the optimal form of payment 
for this empirical example. 
Figure 
3.8 I 3.5 I 3.6 
3.9 



















cash and shares 
any form 
any form 
cash and shares 
The columns headed "favoured outcome" indicate the form of the optimal offer that 
would be favoured by each of the parties for their own level of risk parameter. For 
example, if the acquirer has a large risk parameter it would favour a share-only offer, to 
pass part of the risk on to the target. This is true irrespective of the size of the target's 
risk parameter. The modelled outcomes observed in Figures 3.2 to 3.9 are represented in 
bold in the table. It appears that the acquirer (the party that makes the offer) is dominant 
over the target when it comes to the optimal form of payment, the optimal offer always 
satisfying its favoured outcome. We see that if the acquirer has a small risk parameter 
(and hence would be prepared to tolerate any form of payment) its optimal offer 
comprises cash and shares if the target's risk parameter is high (to satisfy the target's 
desire to receive at least some cash) with a decreasing amount of cash as the target's risk 
parameter decreases. Eventually the cash payment will be zero (which, of course, will 
satisfy both parties). However, if the acquirer's risk parameter is large, a share-only offer 
is always the optimal offer, which satisfies a target with a small risk parameter (who is 
indifferent to the form of payment) but does not satisfy the target with a large risk 
parameter, which would prefer a cash payment. 
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§3.6 FllTING A GLOBAL MODEL WITH SHARED UNCERTAINTY 
§3.6.1 CONSTRUCTION OF A GLOBAL MODEL WITH AN ADDITIVE MEAN I 
VARIANCE UTILITY FUNCTION 
We now attempt to construct a general model which we will match to a set of 
empirical mergers, where the assumption is that there is some measure of uncertainty 
about the post-merger value of the merged entity. As in previous sections this uncertainty 
is modelled as the variance cr AB 2 of the probability distribution of the post-merger value 
of the combined company (viewed from the pre-merger perspective), and is assumed to 
be the same for both the target and the acquirer. Thi.s variance cannot be measured 
empirically for any single merger since a merger is a one-off event, and thus its 
estimation will be of importance in this section. We furthermore aim to show that by 
including an uncertainty term in the model we achieve an improvement in fit relative to 
the models in Chapter 2, as well as being able to obtain estimates of the amount of cash 
and the monetary value of shares exchanged in the actual transaction. This model will 
thus provide a deeper understanding of the negotiation process as it may occur in 
practice, as well as offering decision support as to the form of payment and the optimum 
amount of cash and shares which should be offered. 
The additive mean/variance utility function as used in this chapter (i.e. where the 
expected utility of the standardised net gain equals the expected standardised net gain less 
a risk penalty, for both parties) is simply the risk-adjusted analogue of the linear utility 
function used in Chapter 2 (in the case where CV AB 2 = 0, the expected utility using the 
additive mean/variance utility function is identical to the utility using the linear utility 
function) and so any global models constructed using the additive mean/variance utility 
function can be directly compared to models LUMl and LUM2. 
In §2.4.1 of Chapter 2 we constructed an overall model (assuming no uncertainty) 
which employed a linear utility model and involved only the single parameter y. We 
hypothesized that y was some simple function of the ratio PV A/PV B (as in (2.2a) or 
(2.2b)) which comprised of only two parameters, and we estimated these parameters 
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directly by using a least squares objective function. 1 In the current chapter we have so 
far examined mergers individually: we constructed the Nash-Kalai model (see (3.5)), 
examined the feasible range of solution points for the cash and share exchange portions 
of the payment, and then identified the optimal (in the Nash-Kalai sense) cash/share 
combination within this range. This analysis gave us a clearer understanding of the 
conditions under which a potential acquirer might employ cash or shares as a medium 
of payment, and the amount he should be prepared to offer, given the assumptions of the 
model, and as such may be used as an a priori decision support tool. However we have 
thus far not determined whether this model provides a better fit (i.e. simulates a situation 
closer to that actually observed in reality) than do models LUMl and LUM2. We now 
attempt to assemble a global model, based on the additive mean/variance utility functions 
for the target and the acquirer, which will allow us to determine whether the inclusion 
of an uncertainty term helps to provide a greater explanation of reality. 
The Nash-Kalai model constructed in §3.2 and solved in §3.3 is not in a 
practically operational form. While we have already chosen a simple additive 
mean/variance utility model2 we must still estimate the relative negotiating power 'Y and 
the risk/uncertainty parameters ~A and ~B of the acquirer and target, respectively, before 
the model can be used for practical decision support. We start by noting that observed 
values of Y, the proportion of the standardised net gains from merger ceded to the target, 
are of course available for each merger. We can thus calculate the values of 'Y for the 
risk-free case from (2.1), i.e. 'Y = 1 - Y for each merger. Whilst uncertainty may now be 
present'in the estimation of 0AB , a function of the form 
In ["(I (1 - y)] = a+~ In (PV A I PV8 ) (3.13) 
may be fitted to the observed values of y. It is thus assumed that the relative negotiating 
power y is independent of any post-merger effects, including the risk involved, and 
depends purely on the relative sizes of the bargaining companies. The estimated 
1 We used a similar methodology in §2.4.2 but employed a negative exponential utility 
model involving three parameters y, rA and r8 which, we hypothesized, were simple 
functions of the known values PV A• PV8 and PV AB (as in (2.7) to (2.9)). 
2 We return later to consider the case of an alternative form for the utility function. 
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regression parameters a and ~ may then be used, together with PV A• PV B and the 
relationship in (3.13) to supply estimates of y for any merger. 
The optimal value of ~s was given in (3.11) as 
A * _ kA _ ~A 
PS - -
(kA +kB) (~A +~B) 
and thus 
~S • _ kA _ ~A 
(1 - ~S *) - kB - ~B . 
We assume prima facie that the risk aversion coefficients are inversely related to the sizes 
of the respective companies. This assumption is based on the premise that all companies 
desire high rates of return, but dislike taking risk. Large companies are able to bear larger 
risks than small companies since they have a much larger asset-base. Thus the risk 
aversion coefficient of a large c_ompany would be expected to be small (close to 0) whilst 
the risk aversion coefficient of a small company would be expected to be large, and there 
appears to be no good reason why these risk aversions will be influenced by the role they 
play (i.e. whether they are the acquirer or the target). A simple model for the risk 
aversion coefficients might be 
for i =A or B. 
where p1 ;;?: 0 and p2 > 0. Then the ratio kA/kB can be written as 
kA P1 + P2/PV A - ------ (3.14) 
kB P1 + P2/PVB 
and thus the scaling of p1 and p2 is completely arbitrary. Let pfp1 = 't; we normalise 
(3.14) by 
= 
1 +'t/PV A 
1 +'t/ PVB 
(3.15) 
Since observed values of ~s are available for all mergers, the observed ~s/(1-~s) can be 
calculated (i.e. values of the ratio kA/kB), and so in principle it is possible to estimate the 
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value of the single parameter 't which best fits (3.15), using the known values of PV A 
and PVs.1 
So far we have estimated only the value of the ratio of the risk aversion 
parameters, kA/kB• but have paid no attention to the second component of uncertainty, 
i.e. the variance of the estimate of the post-merger company size, O' AB 2. The estimation 
of O' AB 2 (or equivalently, CV AB 2) is important as together with µAB it allows probability 
statements to be made about the true post-merger value of the company (as a worst case 
Chebyschev's Inequality may be invoked; stronger statements can be made if the true 
distribution of ti AB is known), as well as allowing the relative riskiness of mergers to 
be estimated. 
We make the simplifying assumption that the distribution of fI AB (about which 
we have so far made no assumptions) is such that CV AB is non-decreasing with 
increasing µAB. That is, the a priori uncertainty in the perception of the post-merger value 
of the company increases at as least as great a rate as µAB does. This assumption arises 
from the observation that there may be little uncertainty in predicting the true post-
merger value of a small combined company with limited operations and few assets, but 
as this true post-merger value increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to estimate, in 
part due to the difficulty in predicting the effect of the new business combination on the 
company's operations. Our assumption is that this uncertainty will increase faster than 
the expected mean µAB does. Two possible functions which might serve as 
approximations for the relationship between CV AB and µAB are: 
i.e. 
CV AB = crAB I µAB= '1>1 + '1>2 (In µAB) 
CV AB2 = ('1>1 + '!>2 (ln µAB))2, (3.16) 
1 A note on calculating the observed values of f3s and A.. By definition, A. = OJ/G where 
G = µAB-PV A-PVB and ro = nBz• where ns is the number of target shares outstanding, and z 
is the amount of cash paid for each target share. Now f3s is the proportion of the combined 
company paid to target shareholders as shares. The post-merger company value is (nA +knB) 
P AB where nA is the number of acquirer's shares outstanding, k is the number of acquirer's 
shares swapped for each target share and P AB is the share price of the merged company. So 




We will constrain the <l>i and <I>{ to non-negative values, which will ensure that CV AB will 
not be zero merely by virtue of <1>1 and <1>2 having opposite signs. The model based on 
(3.13), (3.15) and (3.16) is termed shared uncertainty model 1 (SUI), whilst the model 
based on (3.13), (3.15) and (3.17) is termed shared uncertainty model 2 (SU2). 
To see how well the Nash-Kalai models fit actual observed values of Ps and A., 
it will ~ necessary to estimate the vector 0 = [ :J (fOr model SUI) or 
e' = [ :}] (fOr model SU2). For 0 (or e') known, (3.16) (or (3.17)) and the 
infonnation vector x = [ :3 ] of ex post assumed known variables allows us to 
calculate CV AB 2• For empirical testing purposes, for µAB we will use the ex post 
observed values of IlAB, the post-merger value of the combined entity. Naturally, the 
quantity IlAB is not known with certainty to the players before the merger and any 
difference between the observed IlAB and the players' a priori perceptions of µAB will, 
of course, cause a residual between the model's results and reality. Knowledge of the 
estimated value of 't from (3.15) and x allows the determination of the ratio kA/kB, which 
will produce the model estimate of Ps· We call this estimate ~8(xi) , which is 
independent of the vector 0, i.e. ~5(xi) is independent of the uncertainty term, CV AB2. 
We now tum to the computation of a predicted value for A.. Recall that from (3.10) we 
had that 
So far we have estimated only the ratio kA/kB: kA and kB individually have not been 
explicitly determined. However from (3.14) any function of the form 
kA ( 1 + 't I PV A ) c' 
- ------...,. 
kB ( 1 + 't I PV B ) c' 
where c' is some constant, will provide an equally good fit. Thus we can assert that 
k/c' = l+t/PVi i =A or B (3.19) 
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We rewrite (3.18) as 
~ = c1 -y-c2 ~s +c} CV~ [r( :~ }s 2 -(!-"({ :~ )(! ~ g)2 ] c' (3.20) 
From (3.13) and x we can derive an estimate of y. From (3.16) or (3.17) we estimate the 
value of CV AB2• and kA/c' and k8/c' are defined in (3.19). Using the estimate ~5(xi) of 
~s we can compute a predicted value of A, which we call A. (xi ;0) , as a function of the 
unknown constant c'. A suitable objective, then, is 
Minimise ( L O., -~(x1 ;0) )2 ) . 
0 :<!O , c' >O l all mergers (3.21) 
where Ai is the observed value of the cash payment expressed as a fraction of the 
expected total net gain for merger i. Once the optimal value of c' is obtained we will be 
able to calculate individual values of kA and k8 from (3.19) for any pair of companies 
involved in merger. 
By definition the observed Ai;:::o, i.e. any cash payment is by the acquirer to the 
target. In fitting the model, it may occur that the predicted value of A(xi; e) is negative, 
especially if the observed Ai is zero. In such cases, for purposes of empirical testing, we 
have simply truncated A(xi;0) 
to zero, without attempting to , derive more . refined constrained estimates of the 
parameters. 
Empirical testing of the models was carried out using the same set of 24 mergers 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange as was used in §2.5 to allow model comparisons. 
Appendix 3.C contains relevant information. 
§3.6.2 MODEL RESULTS 
The fitted regression parameters-a and ~ based on (3.13), and where y is the 
obseroed risk-free relative negotiating power, were found to be a = 1.0500 and ~ = 
0.4376, with r=0.4252 (p=0.0384), which indicates a statistically significant linear 
relationship between In [y I (1-y)] and In (PV A I PV8 ). Thus for given values of PV A and 
PV8 , the observed value of y can be estimated from 
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2.8577 exp [ 0.4376 In ( PV A I PVB)] 
y = 
I + 2.8577 exp [ 0.4376 In ( PV A I PVB)] 
An estimated value of 't was 2655.532 which produced a residual sum of squares of 
0.2678 and a correlation of r = 0.94I2 (p < O.OOOI). Thus 
kA I +2655.532/PV A 
kB I + 2655.532 I PV B 
and then ~scan be estimated from ~s = I I (I +(kA/kB)-1) 
Within a suitable tolerance model SUI produced a solution vector of 
0 = [ g:~;~g] when c' was 0.008673, with a residual sum of squares for J.. and Jls 
of 0.5262 and 0.0456 respectively. The solution vector for model SU2 was 
0 = [ g::~~~] when c' took on the value 0.009859, with residual sum of squares for 
A and ~s of 0.4935 and 0.0456 respectively. Table 3. I provides the resulting values of 
the relative bargaining strength parameter y (which is independent of 0, and hence does 
not vary from model SUI to SU2), the risk aversion coefficients kA and kB for each of 
the models, as well as CV AB2 and the fitted values of crAB (in monetary terms) for both 
models. The parameter y varies between 0.7326 and 0.9574, covering approximately the 
same range as that over which the model FyM (full and shared information) showed 
virtually no loss in explanatory power when y was held constant (this range was shown 
to be (0.75 ; 0.90] in §2.5.2.2). 
We observe that the estimated risk aversion in model SUI drops very rapidly for 
a unit increase in company size for small companies (as company size increases from RS 
million to RI5 million there is a drop in risk aversion from 4.6I5 to 1.544 (66.5%)), but 
flattens out to drop far less rapidly for a similar increase in company size for large 
companies (an increase in company size from RIOO million to RI 10 million results in a 
decrease in risk aversion from 0.239 to 0.2I8 (8.8%)). For this model the risk aversion 
of acquiring companies in the sample ranges from O.OI56 for the largest acquirer to 
7.3226 for the smallest (and hence most risk-averse), and for target companies in the 
sample it ranges from 0.0538 for the largest target to 49.8603 for the smallest. For model 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The coefficient of variation, CV AB• measures the relative uncertainty of the 
merger, and we assumed that this increases as µAB increases. The results in Table 3.1 
show that the relative uncertainty of the merger in model SUI shows a fairly rapid 
increase for a given increase in µAB for small companies (as µAB increases from R5 
million to R15 million there is an increase in CV AB from 0.0788 to 0.0853 (8.35%)), 
whilst the increase is much more gradual for a similar increase in company size for large 
companies (an increase in µAB from RlOO million to Rl 10 million results in an increase 
in CV AB from 0.0967 to 0.0973 (0.59%)). The CV AB2 values in model SUI range from 
a low of 0.0061 (CV AB=0.0781) to a high of 0.0142 (CV AB=0.1192) for the sample at 
hand. This range of CV AB values is narrow due to the flattening effect of the logarithm 
used in (3.16) to estimate CV AB· The corresponding O'AB values range from R0.358 
million to R507.017 million. Model SU2 employs a square root function to estimate 
CV AB• and thus displays a much wider range in CV AB 2 (and hence O' AB) values than does 
model SUL The CV AB2 values range from 0.0030 (CV AB=0.0547) to 0.0519 
(CV AB=0.2278), and the corresponding cr AB values range from R0.253 million to 
R969.531 million for the sample. This knowledge of µAB and O'AB allows probability 
statements to be made about the true post-merger value of the merged company. 
Table 3.2 shows the estimated values of A(xi;0) for both models SUI and SU2, 
and the estimated values of ~ s (xi) , which is model-independent. Also presented are 
these amounts converted into monetary tenns, and the observed cash and share amounts 
for the 24 mergers in the sample. There is an extremely highly significant correlation 
between the estimated proportion of the value of the merged entity allocated to the target 
as shares, ~ 8 (xi) , and the observed value of ~s (r2 = 0.9447, p < 0.0001), indicating 
a model with excellent predictive power. Turning to the fraction of the synergistic gains 
paid as cash, A(xi;0) , we observe that both models SUI and SU2 indicate that cash 
should be used as a medium of payment in 10 mergers (in all of these cases a share 
transfer would also take place, as demonstrated in §3.3), whilst the observed data showed 
that in reality only 4 mergers made use of cash as a means of payment, and in two of 
these cases no share transfer took place. These 4 mergers (numbered 3, 5, 10 and 11) all 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to describe the bargaining process as it occured in reality fairly well. Of the 6 remaining 
mergers identified by the model for a cash payment, the monetary amounts were small 
(between R0.006 million and R0.903 million for model SUI), and these all translate into 
a relatively small proportion of the total payment (between 1.38% and I 1.76% for model 
SUI). In the 4 cases in which a cash payment was observed, a much larger amount of 
cash was actually paid than predicted by the model (at least twice as much in all cases). 
In absolute terms the amounts remain small, however. Whilst the reasons for this 
difference lie outside of the scope of the current modelling exercise, it is interesting to 
note that an often-quoted reason for merger is an excess of cash held by the acquirer: a 
cash purchase of some other company will reduce the acquirer's cash holdings and hence 
also their tax liability (Brealey and Myers (198I)). Such a motivation could well explain 
why the observed cash payments were much larger than those predicted by the model. 
The difference in the cash components predicted by models SUI and SU2 is seen to be 
v~ry small in all cases. Thus changing the functional form of the uncertainty component 
from (3.I6) to (3.I7) has not affected the estimate of the cash payment in any large way, 
and we conclude that the calculation of the uncertainty is fairly robust to changes in 
functional form, providing that the assumptions of the model (i.e. that CV AB is some 
non-decreasing function of the mean, µAB), are not violated. 
To be able to compare the fit of the models with shared uncertainty to those with 
full and shared information (Chapter 2) it is necessary to combine the estimated cash and 
share exchange payments into a single monetary value, the estimated total amount paid 
to the target, Q' . This can be transformed into a variable Y' which represents the 
proportion of the estimated net gain allocated to the target, i.e. 
Y' = 
Q'-PVB 
µAB -PV A -PV8 
where Q' = A(x1;0) (µAB -PV A-PVB) + Ps<x1) µAB. Thisisdirectlycomparable 
to the observed variable Y introduced in §2.2. Table 3.3 contains the values of the 
variables Y' and Y for all 24 mergers, as well as the residual for each case for both 
models SU 1 and SU2. 
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Table 3.3. Observed values of Y, estimated values of Y' and residuals for 
models SU 1 and SU2 
SUI SU2 
Merger Y(obs) Fitted Y residual Fitted Y residual 
1 .7079 .5642 .1437 .5642 .1437 
2 .0731 .5109 -.4378 .5109 -.4378 
3 .0977 .0382 .0595 .. .0382 .0595 
4 .0859 .1206 -.0347 .1206 -.0347 
5 .2774 .0740 .2034 .0741 .2033 
6 .2142 .1459 .0683 .1459 .0683 
7 .2829 .4943 -.2114 .4943 -.2114 
8 .0435 .5449 -.5014 .5449 -.5014 
9 .4873 .4437 .0436 .4437 .0436 
10 .0679 { .0828 -.0149 .0831 -.0152 
11 .2955 .0383 .2572 .0502 .2453 
12 .3358 .4118 -.0760 .4118 -.0760 
13 .0470 .0483 -.0013 .0491 -.0021 
14 .0483 .1663 -.1180 .1663 -.1180 
15 .1004 .2433 -.1429 .2433 -.1429 
16 .0064 .0587 -.0523 .0694 -.0630 
17 .5085 .3768 .1317 .2879 .2206 
18 .1469 .2252 -.0783 .2252 -.0783 
19 .1039 .1424 -.0385 .1424 -.0385 
20 .0341 .1482 -.1141 .1482 -.1141 
21 .0498 .0896 -.0398 .0915 -.0417 
22 .0240 .1157 -.0917 .1157 -.0917 
23 .6221 .4585 .1636 .4585 .1636 
24 .0508 .0780 -.0272 .0785 -.0277 
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A least squares regression of Yon Y' for model SUl is 
Y = o.0445 + o.6483 Y' 
with correlation r = 0.5917 (r2 = 0.3502. p < 0.0025), i.e. a very highly significant linear 
trend. Statistical tests on the regression coefficients show that the intercept is not 
significantly different from 0 (th = 0.798, p >0.2) although the slope is significantly 
0 
less than 1 (th = -1.8677 , p = 0.0376) . This may be expected, however: in fitting the 
I 
model we truncated negative values of A(xi;0) to zero. This implies an .overestimate. 
of A(xi;0) , and hence also of Y' in these cases. This in turn implies that the fitted 
regression line has a slope somewhat less than 1. Figure 3.10 shows a scatterplot of Y 
against Y' for this model, together with 95% and 99% confidence bands for the fitted 
regression line. Immediately noticeable from Figure 3.10 and Table 3.3 are the two 
outliers (points 2 and 8) which have residuals of as much as -0.4378 and -0.5014 
respectively. This model has 5 cases with absolute residual greater than 0.2 (in 2 cases 
it is greater than 0.4), whilst model LUMl has 8 cases with absolute residual greater than 
0.2 (in 2 cases it is greater than 0.3) and model LUM2 has 6 cases (in 2 cases it is 
greater than 0.3). After removal of the two outlying points the revised OLS regression 
line (based on 22 observations) for model SUI is 
Y = 0.0010 + 1.0016 Y' 
with r = 0.8153 (r2 = 0.6648, p < 0.0001). Clearly, hypothesis tests on the intercept and 
slope parameters show that they are not significantly different from 0 and 1 
respectively (th = 0.025 , p >0.2 ; th = 0.0101 , p >0.2 ) . Thus the smaller-than-o I 
expected slope parameter in model SUI (b1 = 0.6483) is largely attributable to the two 
outliers, and for 22 (out of 24) observations the fitted model SUI explains over 66% of 
the variability of the observed Y, indicating that the model is clearly an extremely good 
representation of reality for all but a small number of mergers. 
An OLS regression of Y on Y' for model SU2 yields 
Y = 0.0497 + o.6330 Y' 
with correlation r = 0.5687 (r2 = 0.3224). The regression parameters, correlation 
coefficient and outlying points of this model are very similar to those of model SUl, and 
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Figure 3.10. Scatterplot of actual Y against Y for model SUI together with the 
fitted regression line and 95% and 99% confidence bands 
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The current models with shared uncertainty are compared to several models with 
complete certainty from Chapter 2 in Table 3.4. We note that since SUI and SU2 make 
use of an additive mean/variance utility function they should, strictly speaking, be 
compared only to models LUMl and LUM2. Details of models FNEM and PyM (with 
'Y = 0.793) are included for interest The analogue of models SUI and SU2 with a 
negative exponential utility function is outlined in §3.7. 
Table 3.4. A comparison of models with shared uncertainty (SUI and SU2) 
with models with complete certainty (LUMl, LUM2, FNEM and 
PyM) 
Model SUI SU2 LUMl LUM2 FNEM FyM 
bo 0.0445 0.0497 0.0614 0.0074 0.0165 0.0113 
b1 0.6483 0.6330 0.7545 0.9683 0.9259 0.9687 
r 0.5917 0.5678 0.4511 0.4960 0.5725 0.5695 
r2 0.3502 0.3224 0.2035 0.2460 0.3277 0.3243 
p 0.0024 0.0038 0.0270 0.0138 0.0034 0.0036 
Model SUl represents a slight improvement over model SU2, so model SUl will be 
taken to be representative of the additive mean/variance utility model with shared 
uncertainty for future discussion. Model SUl offers a superior fit to all the other models 
if correlation (or r2) is taken as a measure of fit. Table 3.5 shows the percentage gain in 
explanatory power achieved by model SUI vis-a-vis the four other models. Model SUI 
has a vastly superior fit to either of the linear utility models with assumed certainty; this 
model explains 42.3% and 72.1 % more of the variation in the observed Y values than do 
models LUM2 and LUMl respectively. Model SUI is also slightly better at predicting 
the observed phenomenon than models FNEM and PyM (with y = 0.793), which employ 
(more realistic) negative exponential utility functions, but lack the enhancements of the 
explanation of (i) the uncertainty involved, and (ii) the split of cash and shares in the 
merger. A model similar to SUI (i.e. with shared uncertainty) but employing a more 
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realistic utility function may well improve the model fit still further (this model is 
outlined in §3.7). 
Table 3.5. Gain in explanatory power by model SUI relative to models with 
assumed certainty 
% gain % gain 
Model r by SUI i2 . by SUI 
SUI 0.59I7 - 0.3502 -
LUMI 0.45Il 31.I7 0.2035 72.09 
LUM2 0.4960 I9.29 0.2460 42.36 
FNEM 0.5725 3.35 0.3277 6.87 
FyM(y.=.0.793) 0.5695 3.90 0.3243 7.99 
§3.7 EXTENDING THE MODEL - A NEGATIVE EXPONENTIAL UTILITY 
MODEL 
So far in this chapter we have restricted ourselves to the simplest increasing utility 
function containing uncertainty. In §2.4.2 we argued that in practical settings a linear 
utility function may not be representative of reality, and that the utility function may be 
expected to show decreasing marginal returns to scale (i.e. to be concave). We were able 
to show that by using negative exponential utility functions of the form 
U A(') = I - e -r A ( ') , r A > 0 
Us(') = 1 - e -r8 (-) , rs >0 
for the acquiring and target companies respectively in the Nash-Kalai model we achieved 
a correlation between the observed and fitted proportions of the synergy gains paid to the 
target which was significantly larger than the equivalent correlation using a linear utility 
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function. We now briefly examine the implications of using this more realistic utility 
model in the context of shared uncertainty amongst the players. 
-rArA We let the utility to A for a standardised net gain of r A be 1 - e , which 
has expectation 1 - E(e -rA rA} . Now E(e -rA rA} is simply the moment generating 
function of the random variable r A• which depends only on the probability distribution 
of fiAB (since PV A• PVB, rA, y and Ps are assumed constant). If the actual functional 
00 
form f(rA) ofrA is known, then 1-E(e-rArA) = 1- f exp(-rArA)f(rA)drA . As 
-
a special case we assume that it is realistic that fiAB has an approximately normal 
distribution. Naturally if fiAB is approximated by a normal distribution the possibility 
arises that the value of the combined company might be negative. However it will be 
assumed here that cr AB 2 is small enough so as to make P( fi AB < 0) negligible. Then 
E[U A(r A)] = 1 -E(e -rArA) 
2 = 1 - exp [ -r A E ( r A) + r A Var ( r A)/ 2] 
= 1 -exp [ -r A (c1 -c2Ps -A.)] .exp [r 1 ( 1 -P8 ) 2 c22 CV k / 2] 
from (3.1), (3.2) and the moment generating function of the normal distribution. 
Similarly, 
E[UB(rB)] = 1 - E(e -rs rs) 
2 2 2 2 = 1-exp[-rB(c2 P8 -c1 +1+A.)] exp[rB P8 c2 CVAB/2] 
from (3.3), (3.4) and the m.g.f. of the normal distribution. 
The Nash-Kalai solution based on the above is the point (A.* ;p8 *) which maximises the 
function 
in the range A. ~ 0, 0 ~ Ps ~ 1. We have not succeeded in deriving explicit analytic 
\ 
expressions for the optimal values of A.* and Ps * from the above expression. Thus the 
model based on the negative exponential utility function lacks the analytical rigour of the 




In this chapter we have attempted to bring the concepts of uncertainty and risk 
aversion into the Nash-Kalai model. We assumed that the acquirer and target do not have 
certain knowledge of the post-merger value of the combined company, but rather estimate 
this value from some probability distribution, the mean and variance of which are 
symmetrically known to both companies. Naturally, the variance is merely a conceptual 
variance and it is thus not empirically measurable. Its estimation for each merger was one 
of the aims of the modelling process: a knowledge of the mean and variance of the 
distribution of merged company value allowed the decision-maker to make probability 
statements about the true post-merger value of the combined unit. 
Due to the presence of uncertainty this model was able to differentiate between 
and quantify the cash payment and the share exchange portion of the merger offer 
amount. It was shown that cash alone would optimally never be used to finance a merger 
since then all the risk associated with the merger falls on the shoulders of the acquiring 
company's shareholders, and that the amount of cash offered depended on the level of 
uncertainty present. The share exchange portion was independent of uncertainty. 
Furthermore the optimal share exchange portion depended only on the relative sizes of 
the companies' risk aversion coefficients (and not on negotiating power); the cash portion 
in the optimal offer depended in a complex way on risk aversion, negotiating power, 
uncertainty and company sizes. A study of an empirical example offered further insights 
as to how the form of payment was affected by the two companies' risk perceptions. 
Further empirical testing was carried out using an additive mean/variance utility 
function. This model provided a good description of the real-world decision-making 
process (the share exchange portion, in particular, was very accurately modelled) for all 
but a small number of observed mergers. Comparative emprical results show that the 
models of this chapter described the overall observed synergy gains to the target 
shareholders much better than do the models under assumed certainty, and this 
improvement can be directly attributed to the extra degree of freedom introduced in the 
form of the merger uncertainty. Due to the substantial improvement in explanatory power 
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by this model it is suggested that the incorporation of uncertainty is a necessary feature 
for any decision support tool of this kind. 
In the last section of the chapter we have proposed an extension to this model by 
considering the (more realistic) negative exponential utility function to replace the 
additive mean/variance utility function. We were unable to derive a closed-fonn 
analytical solution for the proportion of the post-merger company transferred to the target 
shareholders and the amount ·of cash paid. The similarity of the theoretical model, 
however, leads led to the conclusion that this model provides no additional insights into 
the bargaining process. 
Whilst the models considered in this chapter are merely simplifications of reality 
and do not consider many of the complex financial intricacies of a corporate merger, they 
do help to shed light and offer further understanding of aspects of'the bargaining process. 
Deviations from the observed real world situation will occur, largely because our 
perceptions of the values of the input variables (we used ex-post observed values in most 
cases) in all likelihood will differ from those perceived by the real-world decision-
makers. Whilst promoting understanding of the process, our simplifying assumptions 
relating to the fonn of the negotiating power, the risk aversion coefficients and the 
uncertainty terms might also contribute to this residual. 
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APPENDIX 3.A. Derivation of the roots and turning points for the equations 
detennining the feasible range for A. and ~s 
In (3.7) we had 
A.::; -(C22 ~A)~s2 + (2c22 ~A-c2)~s + C1 - C22 ~A 
The axis of symmetry is given by 
C2 -2 C22 ~A 
~s = = 1 - 1 
2c2~A -2 C22 ~A 
and the turning point is 
A. = ~ ( c/ ~A) (1 - 1 ~ ]2 + 
2c2 A 
The roots of the equation (at A.= 0) are 
and the A.-intercept is when A. = c1 - c2 
2 ~A· 
Similarly, (3.8) had 
A. ~ ( c2 2 ~B ) ~s 2 - c2 ~s + c1 - 1 
The axis of symmetry is 
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Since c2 > 0 and ;B > 0 (by definition) the axis of symmetry of this function always lies 
in the positive ~s range. The roots of the equation (at A.= 0) are 
and the A-intercept is when A. = c3. 
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APPENDIX 3.B. Derivation of the Nash-Kalai solution for A. and Ps 
The Nash-Kalai criterion in (3.5) can be written as 
(3.B.l) 
where 
Qi<Ps) = C1 - c2 Ps ~ C22 ;A 0-Ps)2 
and Q2<Ps) = C1 - 1 - c2 Ps + C22 ;B Ps2 
We first note that the Nash-Kalai criterion in (3.B.1) is undefined for A.> Q1(P8) 
or for A. < Q2(P8), since these correspond to cases in which at least one of the players is 
worse off than at the status quo. In fact we will assume here that there exist solutions 
which are strictly mutually advantageous, i.e. there exist solutions satisfying the condition 
(3.B.2) 
The Nash-Kalai criterion is to be maximised subject to A. ;;:: 0 and 0 ::;; Ps ::;; 1; if a non-
zero maximum exists (i.e. one other than A.=O, Ps=O) then it will satisfy (3.B.2). 
We start by investigating the unconstrained maximum of the Nash-Kalai criterion. 
N d. . " · d · f (3 a <I>(A.;Ps) -- o ecessary con 1tlons 1or an unconstrame maximum o .B.1) are 
a <I>(A.;Ps) a A. 
and a Ps = o . These partial derivatives yield the equations 
= (1-·o [Qi <Ps) -A. ]1 [A. -Q2<Ps)]-1 
- ·t( A. -Q2<Ps) r-r [Qi <Ps) -A. r-i = o 
and 
= "f [ Ql <Ps) -A. ] y- l [A - Q2<Ps) r-y Q: <Ps) 
- (1 -y) [A. -Q2<Ps)]-y [ Qi<Ps) -A. ]1 Qi <Ps) = 0 
We note immediately that if either A. = Q1 <Ps) or A. = Q2(p8), the derivatives are 
undefined (the slope is infinite) while the Nash-Kalai criterion itself takes on the 
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minimum defined value of zero. Thus any point corresponding to A. = QI <Ps) and/or A. 
= Q2(Ps) is neither a stationary point of the Nash-Kalai function nor a maximum 
(assuming that at least one solution satisfying (3.B.2) exists). Thus any stationary point 
satisfies the conditions 
and 
QI<Ps) - A.> o 
A. - Q1<Ps) > o .. 
We can thus factor out the term 




Now let (/\,*;p8*) be the unconstrained maximum of the Nash-Kalai criterion. The first 
necessary condition (3.B.3) implies that 
A.• = (1-y) QI <Ps *) + Y Q1<Ps *) 
= cI - Y- c2Ps* +elev AB2[ykB<Ps*)2 - (1-y)kAO-Ps*)2] 




Note that QI <Ps *) = Q2<Ps *) in (3.B.5) implies that /..,* = QI <Ps *) = Q2<Ps *), which we 
have already shown to be neither a stationary point nor a maximum of the Nash-Kalai 
function. The necessary condition for the unconstrained maximum from (3.B.7) is thus 
QI'<Ps*) - Q1'<Ps*) = O 
or equivalently 
-C2 + 2clkACV AB20-Ps*) = -C2 + 2c22kBCV AB2Ps* 
which has the unique solution 
(3.B.8) 
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The stationary point (A"' ;~5 "') can be shown to be a maximum as follows. For any 
given ~s· A = ( 1-y) Q1 (~5) + y Q2(~5) gives the maximum with respect to A. With this 
expression for A. in terms of ~s the Nash-Kalai criterion itself reduces to 
Cl>(A.;~s) = [y (Q1(~s) - Q2(~s))]'Y [(1-y) (Q1<~s) - Q1(~s))J 1 -r . 
i.e. a concave quadratic in ~s; the stationary point is thus a maximum. 
Note that since kA and ke are strictly positive, the constraint on ~s· (i.e. that 0 :s; 
~s :s; 1), is automatically satisfied. However (3.B.6) could be negative, thus violating the 
constraint on A.. The unconstrained solution in (3.B.6) and (3.B.8) is thus only the · 
solution to the constrained problem when A."'~o. If A.* <.O we determine the optimal 
constrained A. by setting up the Kuhn-Tucker conditions on A.. (Since ~s· in (3.B.8) was 
feasible we do not at this stage consider the constraint on ~s). The Kuhn-Tucker 
objective is then to maximise an extended objective of the form 
(3.B.9) 
under the condition that -MA.=O, where M is a Lagrange multiplier. Now let (A +;~s +) be 
the constrained maximum of the Nash-Kalai criterion when A.• <0. The case M=O in 
(3.B.9) produces the previous infeasible solution for A.. Thus in an optimal solution M 
can not equal 0, and by complimentarity we have that A.+ =O. We thus need to maximise 
<1>(0;~5) with respect to ~s subject to the condition 0 :s; ~s :s; 1. The relevant necessary 
condition is 
(3.B.10) 
or else ~s + must be at one of the boundaries of ~s (i.e. ~s=O or 1). Thus at most five 
possible solutions for ~s + emerge. 
Under the assumption that the expected total net gain from the merger is positive, 
i.e. µAB - PV A - PVe > 0, we observe that at (A=O, ~s=O) we have A.-Q2(~5) = -(ci-1) < 
0, and at (A=O, ~s=O we have Q1(~5)-A = ci-c2 < 0, i.e. the Nash-Kalai criterion is not 
defined at these two points, i.e. both are strictly worse than the status quo for one of the 
players. Neither is thus an optimal solution to the problem. If a feasible solution better 
than the status quo exists, it must therefore be the feasible root of (3.B.10) giving the 
largest value of cf>(0;~5). 
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APPENDIX 3.C. Observed values of ~s· A. and Y 
where 
Merger k z 
1 2.00 
2 0.80 
3 0.50 0.96 
4 0.75 




















observed payment - nB z 
~s (obs)= --------
( nA +knB)PAB 
A. (obs)= (nB z)/{µAB -PV A -PVB) 

























k =number of acquiring company's shares swapped per target share 
z = number of rands cash paid per target share 
PARTB 
NEGafIATION-BASED MODELS AND DECISION-SUPPORT 
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CHAPTER4 
A MERGER BARGAINING MODEL WITH FULL AND SYMMETRIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
§4.1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
In the two previous chapters we assumed that certain information relating to the 
merger was known to the respective parties involved in the bargaining process. In 
Chapter 2 it was assumed that all relevant information relating to the financial worths of 
the two companies as separate entities pre-merger and as a single combined unit post-
merger was known with certainty by both acquirer and target. Under this assumption we 
were able to construct and empirically test a series of descriptive models of the behaviour 
of an acquirer and a target during the negotiation phase, making use of Nash's solution 
to the generalised bargaining problem. In Chapter 3 we extended this model by assuming 
that .the a priori estimate of the post-merger value of the newly-merged company as 
perceived by the target and the acquirer was not known with certainty, but instead was 
assumed to be a random variable whose distributional characteristics were known to both 
parties. Thus while uncertainty exists, its extent is known to both parties in probabilistic 
terms, i.e. we have a case of shared uncertainty. An advantage of this more general 
model of the bargaining behaviour of the two parties was its ability to discriminate 
between the cash portion and the share exchange portion of the offer amount, as well as 
offering a more realistic model of the merger bargaining process. 
of 
In this chapter we will assume that each party forms its own subjective perception 
(1) its own reservation price1, and 
(2) the other company's reservation price (together with some measure of 
uncertainty associated with this perception) 
1 Recall that the acquirer's reservation price is the maximum amount that it would be 
prepared to offer for the target, and the target's reservation price is the minimum amount 
that it would be prepared to accept. 
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independently of the other party, and that the two companies do not share this 
information with one another. Unlike the models of the previous chapters, the zone of 
agreement within which the two competing parties might bargain and ultimately achieve 
agreement is therefore not completely known to either side. Each has knowledge (with 
certainty) of its own reservation price, which may describe one end-point of the zone of 
agreement, but has an uncertain (at best probabilistic) estimate of the other's reservation 
price, which might be used to ascertain the other end-point. We are thus dealing with the 
canonical case of distributive bargaining, and we will use a formulation structure similar 
to that of Harsanyi (1965). The overall aim of this chapter will be to describe a 
parsimonious model representation of this decision problem, and we will later implement 
this model in an attempt to identify possible optimal negotiating "strategies" for the target 
and the acquiring companies. Whilst in reality a strategy is a complicated synthesis of 
a large number of variables, we represent a strategy here by a particular combination of 
model input parameter values. The model will thus be normative in the sense that it will 
prescribe general approaches to the negotiations for the players that in the long run will 
give rise to outcomes having "optimum" properties, and so might fulfil the role of a 
decision support system .as it may be used by management of companies involved in 
merger in an attempt to isolate optimal (or near-optimal) strategies, or to investigate 
various possible bargaining strategies which might be under consideration. 
that 
Luce and Raiffa (1957) noted that a fundamental requirement of game theory is 
"each player .... is fully aware of the rules of the game and the utility 
functions of each of the players" 
and that 
"this is a serious idealization which only rarely is met in actual situations". 
We will therefore now assume that each party does not necessarily regard the other party 
as acting in accordance with the precepts of game-theoretic rationality (as we did in the 
previous two chapters). Whilst a great deal of theory has been developed for such games 
of "incomplete information" (e.g. Harsanyi (1968a,b,c), Chatterjee and Samuelson 
(1983)), most of it rests on the assumption that the rules (axioms) of the game and the 
utility functions are common knowledge in the sense of Aumann (1976), i.e. that each 
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player knows this information, knows that the other knows it, that the other knows that 
he knows it, and so on. Another analytical approach which de-emphasises the game-
theoretic solution concepts in a bargaining situation is negotiation analysis, which seeks 
to develop prescriptive theory and useful advice for negotiators and third parties given 
a (probabilistic) description of how others will behave. This fairly new approach is not 
an "alternative" to game-theory: Sebenius (1992) even offers that it might be called "non-
equilibrium game-theory with bounded rationality and without common knowledge". We 
wiil employ some simple ideas from negotiation analysis (such as those proposed by 
Raiffa (1982)) to construct a parsimonious model of the merger negotiation process. Note 
that we are now concerning ourselves with the dynamics of the consensus-seeking 
process, rather than attempting to simply identify static trade values as in Chapters 2 and 
3. The Nash Bargaining approach employed in these earlier chapters is thus no longer 
useful, and is replaced by a dynamic process model, following an approach similar to that 
of Balakrishnan and Eliashberg (1995), who conclude that this sort of approach to 
modelling the negotiation process can yield insights beyond those obtained by static 
outcome-oriented theories, by incorporating behavioural and economic aspects related to 
the negotiation. 
In §4.2 we discuss some commonly-used and -studied forms of bargaining, and 
show how the corporate merger negotiation problem differs from these, thus highlightin'g 
the need for a model describing this situation. In §4.3 we present an overview of such 
a model representation. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks about the use 
of this type of model as a decision support tool. 
§4.2 BARGAINING IN MERGERS AND ACQUISmONS 
There is a large variety of procedures in the literature whereby a prospective seller 
of a commodity and a group of prospective buyers can determine whether or not a deal 
will be clinched, and if so, who the buyer will be and what price the buyer will have to 
pay. For example, in a sealed bid procedure for selling a commodity, all bids by 
prospective buyers must be submitted by a certain date and remain concealed or 
confidential until they are all opened together. The seller's role is to choose a winning 
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bid from amongst those submitted. The winner may be the highest bidder who will have 
to pay his offer price, (i.e .. the highest price bid), or may be chosen by some other 
decision rule (for example, in a Vickrey-type sealed bid auction, the highest bidder wins 
at the second-highest price offered (Vickrey (1961))). Thus the bids are not public, and 
in general each bidder only submits a single bid. In contrast, in an open ascending 
auction, monotonically increasing bids are submitted at random times by the prospective 
buyers in a random sequence and they are always public. A bidder may make more than 
one bid if he so desires. The seller plays virtually no role at all: in general the seller will 
merely accept the final (highest) bid providing it exceeds his previously-determined 
reservation price (which may not have been publicly announced). Thus in this kind of 
bidding procedure all the bargaining effectively takes place between the prospective 
buyers to determine who will ultimately put forward the single price offer to the seller. 
Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) discuss various other forms of auctions and offer a critical 
analysis of the models available to aid in competitive bidding decision-making in real 
transactions. In a haggling procedure both seller and prospective buyers are active in 
setting price offers: a sequence of public offers and counter-offers may converge to some 
mutually acceptable point, at which point a deal will be concluded. In general the seller 
will negotiate with a single prospective buyer until either a deal is reached or negotiations 
break off; the process may then restart with another prospective buyer. 
The corporate merger bargaining process is unlike any of the procedures 
mentioned above. In Chapter 1 we argued that a merger or acquisition only takes place 
after some negotiating or bargaining between two or more parties, one of which is the 
target company and the others which are all prospective acquirers. Thus a merger can be 
seen as a multi-stage, multi-party bargaining game, where the parties are the target and 
all prospective acquirers, and the stages are each offer made by a prospective acquirer 
and the associated reaction from the target. In general, one of the prospective acquirers 
makes a price offer, acting independently of the target. If the target accepts the off er a 
transaction is concluded at the offer price. If the target rejects a prospective acquirer's 
offer at any stage, any of the prospective acquirers (including the one whose offer has 
most recently been rejected) may make a new offer (the next stage of the bargaining 
game). The offer process continues until either the target accepts an off er or the target 
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rejects all offers and/or the acquirers all do not proceed with further offers. Thus in some 
respects the merger bargaining procedure is similar to an open ascending auction in that 
all offers are public (allowing all interested parties access to complete information about 
the offer at each stage), they are therefore likely to be monotonically increasing, and each 
bidder is not restricted to a single offer. However the target plays a more active role in 
a corporate merger procedure than in a regular open ascending auction in that it 
undertakes activities designed to generate better offers (Roy (1989)), and is active during 
the bargaining process in accepting or rejecting the offer at each stage. At each stage the 
target company is faced with a dilemma similar to that in the well-known "secretary 
problem11 (see, for example, Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) and Stewart (1981)): although 
there may be several other prospective acquirers who have shown an interest in acquiring . 
the target and who may or may not have entered into the bargaining thus far, the target 
does not know with any degree of certainty whether or not there will be any further 
(larger) offers forthcoming if it rejects the current offer under consideration from one of 
the prospective acquirers. 
§4.3 A MULTI-STAGE MERGER BARGAINING MODEL UNDER FULL AND 
SYMMETRIC UNCERTAINTY 
Sycara (1990) states that 
"Negotiation is an ill-structured and complex process, that to date has 
defied all attempts at analysis. The outcome of the process depends on 
such intangibles as the negotiators' skills and experience, uncertain and 
changing information, the parties' perceptions and idiosyncratic behaviours 
and on the exhaustive and systematic analysis of the problem ....... There 
is no typical or model negotiator behaviour that can be codified and 
emulated." 
She further suggests that the negotiation process exhibits several characteristics that give 
rise to various requirements for any model of the process. These are 
· Parties to negotiation usually start having their goals far apart, and this distance is 
narrowed gradually in an iterative (rather than a one-shot) fashion. 
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· Each round of proposals effectively offers both negotiators feedback about the quality 
of its negotiation plan which they evaluate and use to modify their plan. 
· Negotiations take place in a dynamically changing world. During the course of 
negotiations conditions in the world that affect the parties' behaviour and goals might 
change. A model must have a reactive component which displays the negotiators' 
response to these changes. 
· Since final agreement is reached through narrowing the difference in the demands of 
the parties, a negotiation model must have a way of evaluating whether each new 
proposal indeed narrows these differences (this is trivial in the case of negotiations 
over a single issue, the level at which we will model the merger negotiations). 
We now consider a multi-stage bargaining model for negotiations between a target 
company and one or more prospective acquiring companies. In the model to be 
constructed in this chapter we will abstract key features of the bargaining process, 
bearing in mind Sycara's modelling requirements. The aim here will be to simulate the 
strategic and psychological processes which go into an acquirer's selection of an offer 
amount at each stage, and a target's decision of whether or not to accept the offer for any 
specific acquirer/target combination. We are implictly assuming that these processes have 
a generality which might be similar for all acquirer/target combinations. Thus the model 
we will develop will be in terms of a number of parameters, making the model of the 
bargaining process general to all mergers, and could thus lead to the selection of 
negotiating strategies for the parties which may be construed as being "good" in a variety 
of contexts. Furthermore, the way this abstraction is performed will effectively make the 
scenario of a single potential acquirer making multiple offers, and that of multiple 
potential acquirers each making one or more offers essentially equivalent as regards the 
bargaining mechanism, and thus we thus do not need to differentiate between them. Thus 
when we refer to "the acquiring company" it should be understood that we are in fact 
referring to the potential acquiring company in play at that stage of the bargaining 
process only; other potential acquirers may come into play at a later stage of the process. 
Figure 4.1 presents a simplified flow-diagram of the merger negotiation process in which 
multiple offers can occur, as described in Chapter 1 and §4.2. The left half of the figure 
Acquirer's actions 
a potential acquirer decides on an off er 
amount, based on it's known reservation price, 
it's perception of the target's reservation price 
and the value of the previous offer (if any) 
Yes 
the potential acquirer 
discloses the offer amount 
offer? 
No 
status quo position 
maintained; no merger 
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Target's actions 
the target decides on an acceptance level, based 
on it's known reservation price, it's perception 
of the acquirer's reservation price and the value 
of the previous off er (if any) 
No 
Yes 
offer accepted; merger 
at the off er price 
Figure 4.1. Simplified flow-diagram of the merger bargaining process 
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shows the acquirer's actions throughout this process, whilst the right half shows the 
target's actions. Several observations emerge from Figure 4.1: 
• the initial offer and acceptance stage can be differentiated from the group of 
subsequent off er and acceptance stages, since there is less information available for 
the formulation of the initial offer (by the acquirer) and the initial acceptance level 
(the minimum acceptable offer to the target) due to the absence of any previous public 
offer; 
• the acquirer publicly discloses its offer price at each stage, whilst the target does 
not in general disclose its acceptance level; 
• the target appears to play a much more passive role in the process than the 
acquirer does: the target merely accepts or rejects each offer made by the acquirer; 
• if an offer is accepted by the target, merger will take place at the offer price, no 
matter how much this is above the target's acceptance level for that round of 
bargaining; 
• both the acquirer's offer and the target's acceptance level may be revised after each 
round of bargaining, in the light of any further available information; 
• if all offers are rejected by the target, the status quo position is maintained for both 
companies, i.e. neither party gains or loses anything. (It might be argued here that 
costs were incurred by both parties in the negotiating process, in the form of time 
spent by experts and executives, consultation fees etc. Since these costs will vary 
considerably from one merger negotiating process to another, and should be small 
compared to the possible gains from merger, we will not consider them here.) 
In this section we will introduce a parsimonious representation of the merger 
bargaining process as depicted in Figure 4.1. We will explore how each party may use 
the knowledge (both certain and uncertain) at its disposal to formulate offers (by the 
acquirer) and responses to offers (by the target), and what other information might prove 
useful for this purpose. In practice, participating management teams may base their 
actions and reactions on different information (for example, the financial, structural and 
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operational characteristics of the two companies involved) after careful analysis by their 
own experts. Thus clearly the proposed model should be viewed only for what it is: a 
parsimonious mathematical representation of the real world, at a suitable level of detail, 
which serves the purpose of understanding and communicating the ideas contained in the 
negotiating process, and which allows inferences and conclusions to be drawn (Mtiller-
Merbach (1985,1987)) about the process. It should furthermore be borne in mind that the 
individual pre-merger perceptions of the two companies' managements are unlikely ever 
to be made public, even after a successful merger or acquisition, and thus this model 
cannot be tested directly against real empirical evidence. In principle, however, we should 
still be able to make testable statements on the basis of the model, and to this end we 
will describe and implement a Monte Carlo simulation incorporating the ideas and 
assumptions of this model and propose that it might prove to be a useful form of decision 
support tool to assist the management teams of acquiring and target companies when 
making inferences and decisions involved in merger negotiations. 
The zone of agreement for the negotiations associated with a particular merger 
is the region within which any negotiated agreement will lie. We assume that the 
acquiring company (which we term A) has some true reservation price, VA> which 
represents the upper bound on the monetary amount it is prepared to offer for the target 
under consideration. The acquirer, of course, knows its own true reservation price. Now 
VA is functionally dependent upon the acquirer's utility function, which is unknown to 
the target, resulting in the target having some uncertainty about the true value of VA- In 
similar spirit, the target knows its own true reservation price, VB, which is the lower 
bound on the monetary amount it would be prepared to accept from the acquirer and 
depends to some extent on its utility function. The acquirer, however, is uncertain of the 
true value of VB. 
Providing the actual value of VA exceeds the actual value of VB• a true zone of 
agreement exists, and is the interval from VB to VA· This true zone of agreement 
comprises of the set of all possible agreement points that, from the standpoint of each 
involved party, are better in value than no agreement at all. If the situation were to arise 
where VB > VA there would be no true zone of agreement and no amount of bargaining 
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would lead the parties to a point acceptable to both. If the true zone of agreement existed, 
and if the values of VB and VA were made public (i.e. there was complete certainty about 
their values, as we assumed in Chapters 2 and 3), bargaining would take place within the 
interval [VB; V Al and agreement would always be reached. However since the reservation 
prices are unknown to the other party, provided that for each party there is some non-
zero probability on the other's reservation price such that VA > VB, then a perceived 
zone of agreemen~ exists, and bargaining between the two parties may ensue, and 
possibly lead to a mutually acceptable agreement point. A particular negotiation between 
an acquirer and a target is thus in principle characterised by the parties' actual reservation 
prices VA and VB. 
It will be convenient to develop the model of the bargaining process in tenns of 
the difference in the two companies' reservation prices, ~AB =VA - VB, i.e. in terms of 
the magnitude of the true zone of agreement. For any given acquirer/target combination 
the value of ~AB will not be precisely known to either party. We will assume that in any 
given negotiation the two parties have similar knowledge about the riskiness of the 
market in which they are operating and about the expectations of differences in 
reservation prices which will tend to occur in practice. We then model any specific ~AB 
by means of a probability distribution, which represents the common knowledge of both 
players about the propensity for any given value of ~AB to occur. Specifically, for the 
analysis in this chapter we will assume that ~AB is normally distributed with mean µa 
and variance cr2µa 2, where the value of µa may be related to the reservation prices of the 
two companies. The choice of the normal distribution is arbitrary, but a priori it is 
reasonable to assume that the negotiators are equally likely to overestimate ~AB as they 
are to underestimate it. The general principles of the model will, however, continue to 
hold for any other continuous distribution. Thus ~AB = VA - VB - N(µa ; cr2µa2) for 
modelling purposes. Since we are modelling the difference between two reservation 
prices, the actual values of VA and VB are irrelevant. Furthermore, since µa is specific 
to any particular acquirer/target combination, we can normalise the scale so that µa = 
1, and then ~AB - N(l; cr2). 
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At an individual company level we need to model the subjective uncertainty of 
each party regarding the other's reservation price. These uncertainties are modelled as 
subjective probability distributions to each party. Since LiAB = VA - VB, the acquirer 
(party A) can be viewed as perceiving the value of VB as the known value (to A) of VA 
minus LiAB; for a specific quantity for VA (say v A) the expectation of N.s subjective 
probability distribution for VB (conditional on the known value to A of VA) is v A -
E(LiAB). Similarly, from the point of view of the target (party B), the acquirer's 
reservation price VA can be viewed as the known value (to B) of VB plus LiAB, and B's 
subjective probability distribution for VA (conditional on the known value to B of VB) 
has expectation vB + E(LiAB), where vB is a specific known value of VB. In what went 
before we assumed that both parties had the same expectation for LiAB, which in terms 
of the normalised scale was 1. Thus in the rescaled model, N. s expectation of VB is v A -
l, whilst B's expectation of VA is vB + 1. The variances of the parties' subjective 
conditional distributions on the other's reservation price will depend on what knowledge 
each is able to glean about the other. Thus these two variances (we term the acquirer's 
uncertainty about VB as GA2, and the target's uncertainty about VA as GB2) may not be 
the same, and they may not equal the variance of the distribution representing the 
propensity of any given value of LiAB to occur. Furthermore, since the parties' individual 
subjective conditional distributions are derived from the distribution on LiAB, which was 
assumed normal, these two distributions are also normal. Thus from the acquirer's 
perspective, 
VB - N(v A - l; GA2) 
and from the target's perspective 
VA - N(vB + 1; GB2), 
and the parties' bargaining strategies will be based in part upon their own subjective 
conditional distribution about the other's reservation price. Whilst it is possible that 
extreme measures (such as industrial espionage) might reveal information which would 
reduce GA2 or GB2 to below cr2, in the numerical simulation which follows in the next 
chapter we will restrict ourselves to the assumption that the players are entirely ethical, 
and that the parties' lack of full knowledge about the other's reservation price would 
contribute to an increase in the variance to <:J A 2 ~ cr2 and GB 2 ~ cr2. 
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Thus we explicitly recognise three separate distributions: two subjective 
conditional distributions which represent the parties' uncertainties about the other's 
reservation price, and a distribution which models the actual tendency for differences in 
the two reservation prices. 
In our parsimonious representation of this bargaining scenario we will draw a 
clear distinction between the acquiring company's initial offer and its set of subsequent 
offers (in the event of the initial offer being rejected). We conjecture that the initial offer 
will primarily be based on the acquirer's view of the "true" fair price within its perceived 
zone of agreement (assuming that this exists). This fair price (we call it FA) will lie 
between the acquirer's known reservation price v A and the acquirer's view of the target's 
reservation price (i.e. the end-points of the zone of agreement as viewed by the acquirer); 
the position of FA can be represented as ·a proportion of the distance between the 
perceived end points, the actual proportion being determined by some parameter which 
quantifies the acquirer's perception of its bargaining power relative to that of the target 
for the particular acquirer/target combination. We call this the relative dominance 
parameter of the acquirer, 8 A· The acquirer's perception of its relative dominance ranges 
between 0 and 1. The larger 8A is, the greater is the acquirer's perception of its 
bargaining strength relative to that of the particular target. Since acquirers usually (but 
not always) have larger market values than the relevant target companies and often have 
greater access to resources, they might be inclined to perceive themselves to be dominant 
over the target in question. However the requirement that the target, too, must be satisfied 
to ensure a successful merger, and the presence in the market-place of other potential 
acquirers will ensure a downward pressure on an acquirer's perceived value of 8A 
towards 0. Thus the relative dominance parameter describes the acquirer's perceived 
dominance at the negotiating table and may have little to do with any superiority enjoyed 
by the acquirer due to its physical or operational characteristics. 
Since the acquirer's uncertainty in VB is described by a probability distribution, 
it implies that the acquirer's uncertainty regarding a fair price can also be modelled by 
means of a probability distribution with mean E(F A) and variance Var(F A). We will 
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represent FA as a linear combination of its own known reservation price and its 
perception of the target's reservation price. From the acquirer's perspective 
FA = (1 - SA) VA + SA VB 
= v A - SA (v A - VB) 
where VB - N(v A - 1 ; a A 2). This has expectation to the acquirer of 
E (FA)= VA - SA (vA - E(VB)) 
= v A - SA 
and variance to the acquirer of 
Var (FA) = SA2 aA2. 
Since vB· is normally distributed from the acquirer's perspective, the fair price is 
distributed according to the normal distribution N(v A - SA; SA2 aA2). We will model the 
acquirer's policy for selecting an initial offer as being the choice of a particular quantile 
of the above distribution on fair price resulting from the perceived dominance and the 
uncertainty in VB. We will term the quantile chosen by the acquirer to determine its 
initial offer strategy its initial strategic concession parameter, indicating that its choice 
will determine whether the acquirer will make a hard-line offer in the hope of acquiring 
the target at a "bargain" price (i.e. below its perception of an expected fair price) or a 
generous offer (above its perception of an expected fair price). Thus for the purposes of 
analysing strategies in a generic sense we will define a policy parameter ~Al such that. 
the initial offer (which· we term 0 1) is the 100.~Al th percentile of the acquirer's 
distribution of fair price, i.(e~~~ :(::;e]n so that 
Cl> =~Al 
Jvar(FA) 
where 4> is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal random variable. 
By the definition above, ~Al can range between 0 and 1; a value of ~Al > 0.5 implies 
an initial offer greater than E(F A), and a value of ~AI < 0.5 implies an initial off er less 
than E(FA). 
Since from the acquirer's perspective the fair price is distributed according to 
N(v A - oA ; oA 2 aA2), the initial offer will be modelled as 
0 1 = E (FA) + J Var (FA) . 4>-1(~Al) 
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= vA - 0A + oA a A <ll" 1 (~A1) 
= vA - oA (1 - a A <ll-1(~A1)) (4.1) 
provided that this amount is less than or equal to the acquirer's own known value of it.s 
reservation price, v A' If 0 1 exceeds v A we will simply assume that 0 1 = v A' Thus the 
acquirer's initial offer is based on the two policy parameters oA (the acquirer's perception 
of it.s relative d~minance) and ~Al (a parameter describing the acquirer's concessions 
made as part of it.s bargaining strategy), it.s own known reservation price v A and the 
acquirer's uncertainty in its estimation of the targefs reservation price. The construction 
of a typi~al initial offer is shown in Figure 4.2. 
Acquirer's distribution of fair price 
N (VA - OA; oA2aA2) 
Figure 4.2. The construction of a typical initial offer when P Al < 0.5 
We will handle the target's choice of some acceptance level for the initial offer 
in a symmetrical way to the acquirer's choice of initial offer. We therefore assume that 
the target's decision to accept or reject the acquirer's initial offer will be based upon it's 
own perception of the fair price within it.s perceived zone of agreement. In the same spirit 
as before the target's perception of a fair price (denoted by F8 ) can be represented as a 
weighted average of it.s own known reservation price v8 and it.s expectation of VA• the 
weights being determined by the relative dominance of the two companies as viewed by 
the target. The target's view of its relative dominance is represented by Os· with 0 s 8s 
s 1. Despite the target's apparent inferior bargaining position in many cases due to it.s 
smaller size, the contribution of the target to the bargaining game is of paramount 
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importance, since if it does not accept the offer no agreement will be reached and neither 
party will partake of the merger gains. This knowledge, and the demand shown by other 
potential acquirers would help to ensure upward -pressure on ~ towards 1. From the 
above discussion it should be clear that in any given case it is unlikely that either oA or 
Os will be close to the end points of their respective ranges, 0 and 1. Now the probability 
distribution on VA implies a probability distribution on fair price, FB, which has mean 
E(FB) and variance Var(FB). The distribution on FB from the target's standpoint will, of 
course, not necessarily be the same as that as seen from the acquirer's standpoint. From 
the target's perspective, 
FB = 0s VA + ( 1 - ~) VB 
= VB + 0s (VA - VB) 
. where VA - N(vB + 1 ; crB 2). This has expectation to the target of 
E (FB) = VB + ~ (E(V A) - VB) 
=VB+~ 
and variance to the target of 
Var (FB) = Os 2 O'B~· 
Thus viewed by the target the fair price is distributed according to N(vB + ~ ; ~ 2 crB 2). 
The target's policy for selecting an initial acceptance level (the level below which the 
initial offer will be rejected) will again be modelled in terms of a particular quantile (the 
target's strategic concession) of the resulting distribution on fair price, which can be 
interpreted in the same way as for the acquirer. 
Depending on the strategy decided upon by the target, the target's initial 
acceptance level (termed Ai) may be above or below its expectation of a fair price, 
E(FB). To quantify Ai we define a policy parameter ~B for the target such that Ai is the 
100.~ th percentile of the target's distribution of fair price, i.e. A1 is chosen so that 
We term ~B the target's strategic concession parameter. A target strategy of starting 
with a high initial acceptance level would be modelled by~> 0.5. Now since from the 
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target's point of view the fair price is distributed according to N(vB +Sn ; Sn 2. crB 2), the 
initial acceptance level will be 
Ai = E (FB) + Jvar (~B) . <ll-1(13s) 
= VB r+ 0n + 0n <1a <1>-l(i3s) 
= va + Os (1 + aa <ll-i(i3s)) (4.2) 
provided that A1 is greater than or equal to the target's own known value of its 
reservation price, vB. If not, we will assume Ai = va. Thus the target's initial acceptance 
level is based, like the acquirer's formulation of an initial offer, upon a perception 
parameter (Os) and a strategy parameter (13s), as well as its own known reservation price 
va and the target's uncertainty in the estimation of the acquirer's reservation price. The 
construction of a typical initial acceptance level is shown in Figure 4.3. 
Target's distribution of fair price 
~·-- N (Va +Os ; 0a2aa2) 
Figure 4.3. The construction of a typical initial acceptance level when ~a > 0.5 
The acquirer's initial offer, 0 1, and the target's initial acceptance level, A1, are 
assumed to be arrived at by both parties concerned independently of one another. The 
acquirer discloses its initial offer to the target, either directly or through a negotiating 
agent. In general the target does not disclose its initial acceptance level. Agreement 
between the two parties will be reached if 0 1 > A1• If 0 1 :::; Ai the offer will be rejected. 
The target gains further information from this rejected offer: it learns that the acquirer's 
reservation price is at least as great as the initial offer value. The acquirer only learns that 
its offer is somewhat less than the target's initial acceptance level! This information 
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accruing from the initial bargaining stage may be incorporated into a subsequent (larger) 
offer by the acquirer (if it desires to make another offer), and into a revised acceptance 
level by the target (if another offer is forthcoming). · 
If the initial offer is rejected, the acquirer will decide whether or not to make one 
or more further offers. If it decides to do so, any further offer will be bounded below by 
the previous off er. We assume that the series of all possible non-initial offers by the 
acquirer is monotonically increasing, with the initial offer as the lower bound for the first 
such non-initial offer. Furthermore, the series is finite, and terminates in a final (largest) 
offer which has as upper bound the acquirer's true reservation price. That is, 
0 1 ~ all possible non-initial offers ~ v A' 
This model thus allows for the situation in which the final (largest) possible offer 
tendered by the acquirer is less than the acquirer's a priori reservation price, v A' 
If a further offer (beyond the first) is forthcoming, the target company will 
necessarily have to accept or reject this offer. This decision may be based on a revised 
acceptance level (RAL), which takes into account all public knowledge (i.e. the previous 
offer), and the target's private bargaining knowledge (i.e. it's previous acceptance level), 
and indicates a concession that the target is prepared to make to meet the acquirer's offer. 
Thus the revised acceptance level at any stage is assumed to be always less than or equal 
to the acceptance level at the previous stage. If convergence is reached (i.e. a non-initial 
offer exceeds the target's (revised) acceptance level) at any stage, agreement is reached 
at the offer price. If the offer falls short of the acceptance level for that stage, the offer 
is rejected. 
Thus in practice the negotiating "game" is dynamic. That is, each party will 
respond to the new information being made public at each stage of the process. We 
would like to model the cumulative effect of the acquirer's bargaining strategy, but 
naturally do not know a priori exactly when an acquirer might terminate its sequence of 
offers (assuming that none of them are accepted). Thus in our model we assume that a 
component of the acquirer's strategy would include its degree of persistence, the 
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implication of which would be the number of non-initial offers made. In reality the 
decision to make a further offer if the most recent one was rejected is a complex one, but 
we will parameterise this aspect of the acquirer's strategy by a single probability p that 
a rejected off er is not followed up. Thus if p is large there is little persistence on the part 
of the acquirer. We will further assume that the events (i.e. the making of offers) are 
independent of one another. Then the cumulative effect of the acquirer's bargaining 
strategy may be modelled by a geometric probability distribution on N, the number of 
non-initial offers made by the acquirer. That is, the probability that the acquirer makes 
exactly n non-initial offers is given by 
P(N =n) = p(l -p) 0 
=0 
n = 0, 1 , 2, 3 , .... 
otherwise 
where p is the probability of termination at any stage. Our model will offer decision 
support by evaluating the strategies or policies ~hich are defined by the resulting 
distribution on N (for a chosen p). 
The number of non-initial offers n could be 0 (one offer only; initial offer= final 
offer), 1 (initial offer and a final offer only) etc. For modelling purposes, the acquirer's 
n non-initial offers will be generated on the interval [01; OJ, where OL is the value of 
the (n+l)th (i.e. final) offer. Clearly OL ~ 0 1 and OL ~ v A• and OL can be generically 
characterised by some strategy parameter ~AV which we call the acquirer's final 
strategic concession parameter. In similar spirit to the composition of the initial offer, 
and since the acquirer's perceived fair price is distributed as N(vA - BA; BA crA2), the 
final (greatest) possible offer may be expressed as 
OL = VA - ()A (1 - cr A cl>-l(~AJ) (4.3) 
where cl> is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal random variable. 
Since we assume that the offers are monotonically increasing we have that ~AL~ ~Al; 
the equality only holds if all possible offers subsequent to the initial offer are exactly 
equal to the initial offer, which is unlikely in practice in corporate merger negotiations1. 
1 The strategy of making a reasonable opening offer and holding firm is known as the 
Boulware strategy after Lemuel Boulware, former vice-president of the General Electric 
Company, who invariably used this strategy in wage negotiations. 
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The set of n+ 1 ordered offers represent the universe of possible offers that might be put 
forward by an acquirer in negotiations with a given target Note that the model generates 
all offers which would be made conditional on no acceptance; the process of course 
terminates on acceptance, in which case one or more of the potential offers may go 
unused. 
We now consider the modelling of the target's reaction to each non-initial offer 
0 2, 0 3, .... , On SOL. The acquirer's concessions in the case of a rejected offer occurred 
in the form of a monotonically increasing series of offers. In our model representation 
we will assume that at each stage of the bargaining process beyond the first, the target's 
revised acceptance level (RAL) is positioned somewhere between its acceptance level at 
the previous stage and the acquirer's (now public) offer at the previous stage, i.e. the 
target yields decrementally from its previous position. The position of the RAL at the jth 
offer stage within this interval may be expressed in the form 
~ = (1 - y) ~-1 + Y oj-1 (4.4) 
where y is defined as the target's yield decrement, 0 Sy S 1, which characterizes the 
RAL and indicates the target's willingness to give up part of the merger profits to the 
acquirer in the bargaining process. Note that ~ must exceed the target's known 
reservation price, vB. If not, we will assume that~ = vB. The closer y is to 1, the more 
the target is prepared to concede at each stage. If y = 1 then the target effectively reduces 
its acceptance level to the value of the acquirer's previous offer, i.e.~ = Oj-l (providing 
that this is greater than vB). The implication of this is that provided a second offer 0 2 
is forthcoming, it will be at least as great as 0 1 and will automatically be accepted. On 
the other hand, a value of y = 0 implies that the target is not prepared to concede at all, 
i.e. ~ = ~-I· The target's role is fairly passive: it merely accepts or rejects any offer 
from the acquirer. Thus the target's RAL continues as long as the acquirer's offer stream 
continues. 
Given that the acquirer's offers are monotonically increasing, and that the target's 
acceptance levels are monotonically decreasing, the two will converge if the bargaining 
continues for long enough. The process of offers and responses continues until either an 
offer exceeds the target's acceptance level at that stage, and agreement is reached at the 
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off er price, or no further offers are forthcoming from the acquirer, i.e. the status quo 
position holds and both parties withdraw from the bargaining process. 
The parameters of the bargaining model fall into two distinct categories: 
(1) Contextual parameters 
These describe the structure or environment within which the bargaining takes place, and 
are perceptions from the viewpoints of the two participating parties. This category 
includes the perceived uncertainties crA and crB, as well as the perceived dominances 8A 
and Bs· Furthermore, the players' fundamental propensity to identify the true difference 
in their reservation prices, cr, also falls into this category. Whilst each of these parameters 
are fixed a priori in any given case, their actual levels will play a prominent role in the 
outcome of the bargaining. 
(2) Strategy parameters 
The bargaining parties will face a choice from a range of values for each of their strategy 
parameters. Under individual or collective rationality the combination of values chosen 
for the strategy parameters will be those which the parties believe will offer the most 
acceptable agreement point. Thus the values of the strategy parameters are not fixed a 
priori, and their choice offers scope for optimisation (in some sense) of an agreement 
point. 
The model we have defined characterizes the player's bargaining strategies in a 
generic parsimonious manner for the purposes of examining the general structure of 
"good" strategies. The acquirer's strategy can be divided into two distinct parts: one part 
which defines the, initial offer, and a second part which defines the series of non-initial 
offers. The initial offer 0 1 is parameterised by ~AI• whilst the non-initial offers 0 2, 0 3, ... , 
OL are parameterised by p and ~AV We can thus represent the acquirer's bargaining 
strategy as 
The target's bargaining strategy can also be divided into two component parts: a part 
which defines the initial acceptance level (parameterised by ~B), and a part which defines 
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the revised acceptance level (parameterised by y). We can write the target's bargaining 
strategy as 
We assume that since both parties are in essence "competing" against one another 
(the acquirer to get an agreement on merger at as low a value as possible, and the target 
to get an agreement at as high a value as possible), they will attempt to keep their true 
bargaining strategies secret from one another. Even if the target does know the true value 
of A it will not know the acquirer's reservation price and thus 0 1 and OL cannot be 
estimated with any certainty. Furthermore the target will not be able to determine at what 
stage in the offer process the acquirer will make its final offer. In similar spirit, even if 
-
the acquirer knows the true B , it will not know the target's reservation price and thus 
A1 remains uncertain to the acquirer, as do future values of ~· Thus neither party will 
be able to predict the other's exact action or reaction at any stage in the negotiation 
process. 
§4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This negotiation model follows an entirely different approach to that presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3. The models in those chapters were based entirely on the utilities (or 
expected utilities) of the two opposing players, and were symmetrically prescriptive in 
the sense that they 
"examine what ultra-smart, impeccably rational super-people should do in . 
competitive situations. They are not interested in the way that erring folks 
like you and me actually behave, but in how we should behave if we were 
smarter, thought harder, were more consistent, were all knowing. Advice 
is given symmetrically to all parties about how to play the game" (Raiffa 
(1982)). 
The resulting game-theoretic optimal solution is thus not a prediction of what actually 
happens in real-world bargains (the positive argument), but is merely a "fair" division 
of the merger synergy, reflecting the reasonable expectations of rational bargaining 
parties (the normative argument). These models are thus a description of the position 
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that the players should assume if expected utility gains alone were important, and says 
nothing of the multitude of other issues which should be considered in a complex 
transaction such as a corporate merger. Thus these fundamental analytical models, whilst 
offering a good degree of fit when compared to real empirical data, might be construed 
as being unrealistic and unbending representations of the real world. 
The dynamic negotiation analysis model, on the other hand, focuses away from 
the game-theoretic idea of a static equilibrium solution, and is based on the players' 
perceptions of the zone of agreement and behavioural properties of the negotiating 
players. Several reasons exist for this approach. Firstly, whilst people might be construed 
to exhibit intelligent purposive behaviour in a negotiation situation, there are often 
important deviations from the "imaginary, idealised, super-rational people without 
psyches" (Bell, Raiffa and Tversky (1988)) needed by expected utility maximisers for a 
game-theoretic approach. Secondly, the negotiation's rules, structure and possible moves 
are often not common knowledge (in the sense of Aumann (1976)) to both parties. Whilst 
these reasons do not necessarily invalidate the game-theoretic models of the previous 
chapters, the model in the current chapter seeks to off er prescriptive advice to one of the 
players on likely Pareto-optimal bargaining strategies given a (probabilistic) description 
of how the other party will behave, which is in line with the general decision analytic 
approach. In the process we will assume that each party views the opposing party as 
intelligent and goal-seeking, but not necessarily fully rational in the game-theoretic sense 
(Sebenius (1992) p. 20). 
The model satisfies all of Sycara's requirements for a "negotiation model". It 
makes no use of measurable data, such as the market values of the participating 
companies, and thus cannot be tested against real empirical data, as could the models of 
the previous chapters. Instead, the nature of the data employed in this model is entirely 
judgemental, subjective and intangible, and is thus unlikely to be documented in any 
company records or financial data-base. Whilst the negotiators may closely scrutinise 
publicly-available accounting- and market-related statistics to aid them in the bargaining 
process, the corresponding levels of the parameters of our model in any given instance 
may be arrived at in the negotiator's minds in a wholly unstructured way, and thus may 
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be very different for two apparently similar negotiating pairs. This is part of the reason 
why real-world negotiators often show deviations from the behaviour of the "ideal 
rational decision-maker". 
In the next chapter we will describe and construct a Monte Carlo simulation to 
implement this model representation. We will report and discuss the simulation results 
for a wide range of values for the players' contextual and strategy parameters, and we 
will use thes~ results to give general insights into possible solutions to the merger 
bargaining problem, and to help identify possible optimal negotiating strategies. 
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CHAPTERS 
A MONTE CARLO STh'IULATION OF THE MULTI-STAGE MERGER 
BARGAINING MODEL WITH FULL AND SYMMETRIC UNCERTAINTY 
§5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Any rational bargaining party may be expected to attempt to negotiate a deal 
which is optimal for the company it represents, i.e. offers the maximum expected net gain 
to the company (Jones (1980) p. 78). It is thus important that the parties are sufficiently 
well-informed of which bargaining strategies will offer the greatest possible expected gain 
to each. This is especially true in merger negotiations, since the decision is a one-time 
decision for both parties, and will not be repeated for the same two parties under 
identical circumstances. Furthermore, the consequences of the decision will be far-
reaching: millions of rands and thousands of investors (shareholders) may be involved. 
A way of investigating merger strategies, and of using the model to off er decision 
support, is to construct a Monte Carlo simulation of the behaviour of each of the players 
under various scenarios (described by the contextual parameters) and for various discrete 
combinations of the bargaining strategies· of both parties. Simulation involves the 
modelling of a process in such a way that the model mimics the response of the actual 
system to events that take place over time (Schriber (1987)), and can be used to 
experimentally evaluate various strategies for the operation of the process (Pegden, 
Shannon and Sadowski (1990)). A single replication of this simulation will effectively 
represent a typical observation of a negotiation between an acquirer and a target. 
Averaging over repeated replications of the simulation might yield information to the 
negotiators as to how successful they might expect merger negotiations to be for any 
particular bargaining strategy, and at what monetary amount they might expect the 
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merger transaction to occur (in the case of a successful merger) together with some idea 
of how far any particular transaction might vary from this amount. This sort of 
infonnation would be useful to negotiators: both parties, being rational, would like to 
choose a strategy which is likely to maximise the probability of a successful merger, and 
each would like to ensure that the expected transaction value maximises their net gain. 
Brown (1951) p. 374 supports this sort of approach when he comments 
"The iterative method ... can be loosely characterized by the fact that it 
rests on the traditional statistician's philosophy of basing future decisions 
on the relevant past history. Visualize two statisticians, perhaps ignorant 
of min-max theory, playing many plays of the same discrete ... game. One 
might naturally expect a statistician to keep track of the opponent's past 
plays and, in the absence of a more sophisticated calculation, perhaps to 
choose at each play the optimum pure strategy against the mixture 
represented by all the opponent's past plays." 
Luce and Raiffa (1957) p. 84 comment further that 
" ... if one wants to find the solution of a game which is to be played but 
once, he can set up two fictitious players, generate a fictitious iteration of 
games with the players behaving as naive statisticians, and observe the 
outcomes which generate a solution." 
In this chapter we will construct and implement a Monte Carlo simulation of the 
multi-stage merger bargaining model developed in Chapter 4. In §5.2 we describe the 
construction of the simulation procedure and examine the ranges of values we will use 
for each of the input parameters. The results and some general observations from an 
initial simulation run are contained in §5.3. In this section we also attempt to identify 
strategies which could be construed as "optimal" to the players for this situation, using 
both conventional game-theoretic solution concepts as well as a softer, more subjective 
Bayesian decision-making approach. In §5.4 we compare the "optimal" solutions 
identified in the previous section, and we conclude the chapter with some possible 
implications of using this type of model for decision support. 
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§5.2 CONSTRUCTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A MONTE CARLO 
SIMULATION PROCEDURE 
§5.2.1 THE MONTE CARLO SIMULATION PROCEDURE 
A single replication of the simulation of the negotiating process will represent a 
typical negotiation between an acquirer and a target But what is "typicaln? Every 
prospective acquirer expects the value of the re-scaled difference between the two 
companies' reservation prices to be 1, and bases its initial offer (and, subsequently, its 
set of possible non-initial offers) partly on this expectation. The true difference VA - VB, 
however, is likely to differ from 1 (VA - VB has variance a2), and this will vary from 
one acquirer/target combination to another. We are interested in long-run outcomes of the 
negotiating process, and the simulation procedure will therefore have to capture the effect 
of the differences between the estimated value of .L\AB and the true value across all 
possible acquirer/target combinations. Thus the crucial element of the simulation will 
necessarily be a stochastic randomising term which is included to model the effect of the 
different initial and final possible offers for each acquirer on the negotiation process. 
A single replication of the simulation procedure will effectively model the 
negotiations taking place within a single acquirer/target pair. Recall that the difference 
in re-scaled reservation price for an acquirer/target combination is assumed to be a 
random variable with probability distribution given by 
.L\AB = VA - VB - N(l;a2). 
From the point of view of the acquirer, VA is known (with value v A) and VB is a random 
variable which has expectation v A- 1. Similarly, from the target's point of view, VB is 
known (with value vB) and VA is a random variable with expectation vB + 1. The origin 
of the scale on which these variables are measured is irrelevant since we are dealing with 
the difference between two quantities. For simulation purposes, however, we will need 
an origin as reference point. To this end we will arbitrarily view the position from the 
target's perspective, and will standardize the target's reservation price to vB = 0. Thus 
in the simulation we will fix one party's reservation price, and model the effect of the 
negotiating pair's uncertainty regarding the true difference in their reservation prices (and 
hence the parties' offers and acceptance levels) by means of the random variable .L\AB. 
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The first stage of each replication of the simulation procedure deals with the 
initial offer and acceptance level. In the previous chapter we made the modelling 
assumption that the acquirer's initial offer be given by 
01 = v A - SA (1 - (JA <1>- 1 <~A1)) . 
This (if accepted) will result in a net gain to the acquirer of 
VA - 01 =SA (1- (JA <1>- 1 <~A1)). 
Using the target's reservation price as origin, the initial offer is 
01 = 11k -SA (1 - (J A <1>- 1 <~A1)) 
where 11k is the value of ~AB in the ith replication of the simulation. Since 11k is 
chosen randomly, it is necessary to check that the ith initial offer does not exceed the 
acquirer's own reservation price, since by individual rationality the acquirer would not 
be prepared to offer more than this. The acquirer's initial offer will be above its own 
reservation price if 
01 = 11k -SA (1 - (JA <1>- 1 <~A1)) > v A= 11k 
or equivalently, if 
1 - (JA <l>-l(~Al) < 0 
. i.e. <J A <l>-1(~ Al) > 1 . 
In this case we will truncate the initial off er to 11 k 
We previously assumed that the target's initial acceptance level is given by 
Al =VB + ~ (1 + <JB <l>-1(~)) 
which, expressed on the scale with origin at vB = 0, is 
~ (1 + <JB <l>-1(~)) . 
In a precisely symmetric manner as before it is necessary to ensure that the target's 
acceptance level is above its reservation price. A1 will fall below the target's reservation 
price if 
or equivalently, if 
1 + <JB <l>-1(~) < 0 
i.e. <JB <l>-1(~) < -1 . 
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In this case we will truncate the initial acceptance level to 0. Note that in the simulation 
procedure the quantity A1 remains constant for a given set of parameter values from one 
replication to another. The acquirer's initial offer will be accepted provided that 0 1 > A1, 
i.e. provided that 
nk -oA 0 - crA <I>- 1 <~A1)) > Os 0 + crs <1>" 1(~)). 
The target's gain from accepting the initial offer is measured relative to its reservation 
price vs = 0. Thus the target's simulated gain in the ith replication of the simulation will 
be simply 
nk -OA (1 - crA <l>" 1 (~A1)) - Vs= nk -OA (1 - crA <I>" 1 (~A1)) 
since vs = 0. In the case of an accepted initial offer in replication i the simulation 
procedure records 
(1) that the offer was accepted; and 
(2) the offer value at which agreement was reached, 
and proceeds with the (i+l)th replication of the simulation (i.e. the bargaining process of 
the (i+l)th acquirer/target combination using identical strategies). 
In the event of a rejected initial offer in the ith replication we need to simulate the 
acquirer's set of possible non-initial offers. In any replication all possible non-initial 
offers will lie between the initial offer, 0 1, and the simulated largest possible offer, OL, 
where 
OL = T\~ -oA(l - crA <l>" 1 (~AJ) 
which contains the same stochastic term nk as the initial offer, since a replication 
describes the behaviour of a single acquirer, whose known value of v A remains constant 
throughout the bargaining process. Thus the interval [01; OJ is of constant length for 
any given set of parameter values for all replications; only the interval [VA; Vs] varies 
in length across the replications. Since OL > 0 1 (since ~AL > ~Al by definition) it is 
necessary to check that~ does not exceed the acquirer's own reservation price. If~ 
>VA= T\k , then as before we will take this to imply that~= T\k . The number 
of non-initial offers in the ith replication of the simulation is a random variable N and is 
characterised by a probability (p, ~ay) that the acquirer te~inates the bargaining process 
at any stage after the initial offer. The parameter p is one of the acquirer's strategy 
parameters. We use the geometric distribution to model the exact number of non-initial 
offers in replication i, and thus 
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D· P(N = n) = p(l -p) • 
=0 
ni = 0, 1, 2, ..... 
otherwise 
The case ni = 0 implies that the offer stream terminates after the initial (rejected) offer, 
and the simulation proceeds with the (i+ l)th replication. In all other cases the procedure 
chooses (nr 1) non-initial offers uniformly from the interval [01 ; OJ (we assume that 
offers are eqitally likely to be positioned anywhere in this interval), orders them from 
smallest to largest, adds the ~th (largest possible) non-initial offer, OL, and stores the 
resultant vector of length ~- This ni-vector constitutes the ith acquirer's non-initial offer 
stream. The bargaining beyond the initial stage can now be simulated for replication i. 
The target's revised acceptance level for the jth offer stage of the bargaining was given 
in the previous chapter as 
~ = o -Y) ~-1 + 'Y oj-1 j = 2, ..... ,ni 
provided that it is at least as large as vB = 0, the lower bound on the target's acceptance 
level at any stage. The Jh offer is accepted if the stored Oj > ~· in which case the 
simulation procedure records 
( 1) that agreement was reached; and 
(2) the off er value Oj at which agreement was reached, 
and then continues with replication (i+l). If agreement is not reached, acceptance level 
~+l is generated and compared to the (stored) offer Oj+l• and the procedure continues 
in this way to test whether an offer is successful or not until either (1) agreement is 
eventually reached at some stage j, j=2, .... , ni, or (2) the set of non-initial offers is 
exhausted, in which case the procedure continues with replication (i+l). 
The simulation procedure may be repeated for a large number (say M) of 
replications of the process for given values of the contextual and strategy parameters. 
This approach effectively ensures that any concluding analysis will be based on the 
outcomes of a large number of independent acquirer/target negotiations, with the players 
using the same bargaining strategies each time, and will indicate how the players' 
uncertainty about the other's reservation price is transformed into useful decision-making 
measures for each acquirer/target bargaining strategy. 
For each combination of contextual parameter values and player's bargaining 
strategies A and B (which together form a bargaining strategy pair ( A ; B ) ) the 
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simulation procedure records the frequency of agreement, k, over all M replications. We 
can thus estimate the probability of merger occurring for the given combination of 
model parameters from 
number of mergers occurring k 
P(merger occurring) = - -
total number of replications M 
Furthermore the simulation procedure records the offer value at which agreement was 
reached, otherwise called the transaction value, Th , h = 1, 2, ... , k in all k cases in 
which agreement was indeed reached, and hence we may calculate the average 
transaction value in successful mergers, Ave, from 
average transaction value L (recorded traded values) = .!_ ~ Th 
(Ave)=-------~~ Lt 
(successful mergers) (number of successful trades) k h=l 
The variance of the achieved transaction values can be calculated to indicate how far any 
arbitrary transaction value might lie from this average. The acquirer's expected gain 
- -from merger for any given set of values for the bargaining strategies A and B is 
denoted by E(Gacq) and is given by 
k 
E(Gacq) = P(merger occurring) . .!.. L (11~ - Th) (5.1) 
k h=l 
k 
since .!.. L ( 11~ -Th) is the acquirer's average gain in successful mergers (i.e. 
k h=l 
measured relative to the acquirer's simulated reservation price). In the same way, the 
target's expected gain is denoted by E(Gtar) and is given by 
E(Gtar) = P(merger occurring). Ave (5.2) 
since the average transaction value (Ave) is the target's average gain in successful 
mergers, i.e. an amount measured relative to the target company's reservation price 
(which was standardised to 0). Note that E(Gacq) and E(Gtar) always lie in the unit 
interval, and we will assume that these quantities represent the two parties' expected 
gains from arriving at a negotiated settlement using the particular combination of strategy 
parameters in question. If the simulation procedure is performed for a wide range of 
combinations of the parameter values, a bimatrix game representation of the negotiating 
process may be built up, where the two matrix entries in each cell are the expected gains 
to the target and the acquirer for any specific bargaining strategy pair ( A ; B ) and for 
any combination of the contextual parameters. The game is two-person and non-constant 
.. 
(non-zero) sum. By identifying and analysing equilibrium points (if any exist) for the 
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bimatrix game (whose outcome in bimatrix form is available to both parties for a wide 
range of possible choices of bargaining strategies for the acquirer and the target) the 
merger participants may be able to establish strategies for themselves which are Pareto 
optimal, possibly under the assumption that the other party is doing the same. Thus to 
be a useful decision-tool, a simulation using this model will have to be run for a range 
- -
of values for the acquirer's and target's bargaining strategies A and B which is wide 
enough to cover all reasonable bargaining strategies that may be used by the two sides, 
and would allow inferences to be made about the consequences of possible bargaining 
strategies. 
The simulation procedure of the model as discussed above is diagrammatically 
described in the flow-diagram presented in Figure 5.1. The following symbols are used 
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Figure 5.1. Flow-diagram of the simulation procedure 
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Figure 5.1. Flow-diagram of the simulation procedure (continued) 
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Figure 5.1. Flow-diagram of the simulation procedure (continued) 
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Calculate target's revised 
acceptance level scheme (RAL) 








Figure 5.1. Flow-diagram of the simulation procedure (continued) 
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§5.2.2 INPUT DATA RANGES 
To be a useful decision aid the simulation of the negotiating process must 
- -
consider ranges of values for the strategy parameters contained in A and B and for the 
contextual parameters which are wide enough to cover all realistic bargaining scenarios 
that may arise, and all reasonable strategies that may be played by the two sides. In this 
section we describe the ranges we will consider for each model parameter in the 
implementation of the simulation. 
We note first that all ten model parameters are continuous in nature; more 
specifically, the players' strategy sets are all real numbers in the closed interval from 0 
to I, i.e. 
and thus in effect both players have strategy sets which are infinite in size. The expected 
gains to the acquirer and to the target should thus in actual fact be represented as a 
double response surface in five-dimensional unit space for any combination of the 
contextual parameters. Unfortunately no general characterisation of the optimal strategies 
for games with continuous payoffs over the unit square exists (let alone the unit interval 
in R.5!); we will resort to drawing conclusions about the merger game from the simulated 
negotiations. The expected gain to each party is a complex function of the bargaining 
strategy parameters of both of the parties. If the functional form of both of these 
multivariate relationships were known, the equilibrium points for the game (if any 
existed) could be identified analytically. Since the functional forms are not known we are 
restricted, without loss of generality, to numerical evaluation of the expected gains to the 
parties (by using our simulation procedure) over some five-dimensional finite grid 
consisting of discrete values of each of the parameters. The fineness of the grid depends 
largely on computer time; since ours is a pragmatic solution to a complex problem we 
will begin with a discrete, fairly coarse grid. We will term these discrete combinations 
of strategy parameter values for the two players their discrete strategy scenarios. 
Evaluating the expected gains to the two players over a finite grid can approximate a 
continuous mixture of the discrete strategy scenarios providing that we make the 
assumption that the response surfaces of the players' expected gains are continuous. 
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(1) Strategy parameters 
The acquirer's strategic concession parameters PAi and PAL can range between 
0 (a hard-line strategy for the offer(s)) and 1 (a generous strategy). We will examine the 
simulated merger outcomes when ~Al is set to 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. We will use the 
same set of discrete values for PAL as for P Al, noting, however, that by definition the 
offer stream is monotonically increasing and so PAL ~ PAt· The target's strategic 
concession parameter PB is defined in exactly the same way as PAt• and thus we will 
compute the merger outcomes for the same set of discrete values for~· 
The probability p that an acquirer terminates the bargaining at any stage after the 
initial off er could be any value in the unit interval. However, the smaller p is, the larger 
is the expected number of possible offers in the offer stream, as well as the probability 
of a large number of possible offers. For example, if p = 0.1 then the expected number 
of possible offers in the offer stream is 10, and the probability that there could be at least 
eight offers is 
P(at least 8 possible offers) = P(at least 7 possible non-initial offers) 
6 
= 1 - E 0.1 <0.9) 0 = o.5206 • 
n=O 
i.e. if a company pursuing a policy of growth through frequent merger activity always 
plays a strategy in which p is as low as 0.1, then approximately every second negotiation 
in which that acquirer is involved could last as long as eight rounds. Such strategies 
where the bargaining drags on over many offers (referred to by Roy (1989) as minimal 
concession strategies) are not generally observed in practice in the marketplace (Roy 
(1989) p. 597). We will thus restrict p to the values 0.3 (i.e. the expected number of 
offers is 3.33, and the probability of multiple offers in the offer stream is fairly large), 
0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 (i.e. the expected number of offers is 1.11, and the probability of more 
than just 2 or 3 possible offers in the offer stream is extremely small). 
The target's yield decrement, y, ranges between 0 (no concessions are made at all) 
and 1 (the target capitulates completely). Since values near both extremes are possible 
in practice, we will consider y at the discrete values 0.05, 0.35, 0.65 and 0.95. 
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Thus we will restrict ourselves to considering ( t N). 4 = 60 discrete 
N=l 
acquirer's strategies and (5)(4) = 20 discrete target's strategies. 
(2) Contextual parameters 
The relative dominance parameters, BA and Be. range between 0 and 1. It was 
argued that an acquirer may be inclined to perceive itself dominant over the target due 
to its (usually) larger market value and greater access to resources. However the target 
must also be satisfied with the outcome of the merger, and the presence of other potential 
acquirers will ensure downward pressure on BA. By a symmetrical argument, there is 
upward pressure on Os· For simplicity we will initially consider both BA and ~ set to 
0.5, and later vary each of them down to 0.3 and up to 0.7. 
On an individual company level we conjectured that it would be most likely that 
the acquirer and the target would each lack full knowledge in the estimation of the 
other's reservation price, and thus cr A and crB would be at least as great as cr. Thus we 
will investigate the simulated merger outcomes when cr A and crB are separately set equal 
to cr, 1.5cr, 2cr and 2.5cr when cr = 0.1. 
In the simulation model the negotiating pair expects the difference in their 
reservation prices to be 1. However the actual value of this difference is unknown to the 
players, and the degree of uncertainty of this difference is likely to play a role in the 
outcome of a negotiation. We will initially set cr to 0.25, and later vary cr to as low as 
0.1 (representing a small degree of uncertainty in the true magnitude of the zone of 
agreement) and as high as 0.5 (a large degree of uncertainty), keeping crA = crB set to cr 
and 1.5cr. 
Since the contextual parameters essentially describe the negotiating environment 
(the "playing field") as viewed by the two parties, they are effectively known a priori, 
and the players are likely to have at least fairly good estimates as to their v3.Iues before 
any bargaining begins. The negotiators are thus likely to focus more of their attention on 
choosing a bargaining strategy which maximises their expected gain conditional on the 
given set of contextual parameters. Thus initially we will run the simulation and discuss 
the results for the "median" case, i.e. the case where the contextual parameters are all set 
to values which are median in the set of values we have chosen to consider for those 
parameters. 
§5.3 INITIAL SIMULATION RESULTS AND IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE 
"OPTIMAL" STRATEGIES 
§5.3.1 INITIAL SIMULATION RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
In this section we will report the results of the simulation for the case where the 
contextual parameters are set to the following values: 
CJ= (JA = (JB = 0.25 
OA = ~ = 0.5 
Appendix 5.A displays the simulated expected gains to the target (above) and to the 
acquirer (below) for each of the (discrete) strategies under consideration for M = 5000 
replications of the process.1 The 20 x 60 bimatrix presented in Appendix 5.A extends 
over four pages, and as such is extremely cumbersome to assimilate. In a first attempt 
at making general observations about the expected gains to the two parties we will select 
a subsample of the acquirer's and the target's discrete strategies, and examine the 
resulting submatrix of expected gains to the parties. Later we will compare the relevant 
results from this submatrix to those gleaned from the entire 20 x 60 bimatrix in 
Appendix 5.A. 
Assume that the set of the acquirer's discrete strategies is A= {a1, a2, ..... , a60} 
(in the same column order as in Appendix 5.A), and that the set of the target's discrete 
strategies is B = {b1, b2, ..... , b20} (in the same row order as in Appendix 5.A). We will 
choose arbitrarily to select 8 of the acquirer's strategies from A using random systematic 
sampling (i.e. one strategy is randomly chosen from each successive group of 8 
strategies) to ensure a roughly even spread of acquirer's strategies across the columns in 
Appendix 5.A. Similarly, we choose to select 7 of the target strategies from B using 1-in-
1 The generation of the 20 x 60 bimatrix in Appendix 5.A (with M=5000 replications) 
took over 6.5 hours of CPU time on a MicroVax 3100-90 mainframe computer. This 
justifies our use of a fairly coarse grid over which to evaluate the players' expected gains. 
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3 systematic sampling, which ensures an even spread of the target strategies across the 
rows in Appendix 5.A. The resulting 7 x 8 submatrix of expected gains is presented in 
Table 5.1, and is of a size which can be easily assimilated. Specifically, by using the 
above sampling plan we have restricted ourselves at this stage to the subset of acquirer's 
discrete strategies A'= {32. a13, 324, a30, a33, a42, '1st• 359 } and to the subset of target's 
discrete strategies B' = {b1, b4, b7, b10, b13, b16, b19}. Note that the sampling procedure 
has succeeded in selecting strategies in such a way that each of the discrete values for 
each of the strategy parameters is represented in roughly equal proportions, ensuring a 
wide range of different negotiating strategies for the two parties. 
For the subsets A' c A and B' c B of strategies the ranges of the expected gains 
to the target and to the acquirer (and the strategies which give rise to them) are laid out 
in Table 5.2. Immediately apparent is that the target's maximum possible expected gain 
is over 20% greater than that of the acquirer. Similarly, for this wide set of strategies the · 
target's minimum possible expected gain is some 32% greater than that of the acquirer. 
Whilst this does not imply that the target's expected gain is greater than that of the 
acquirer for all strategies, it does indicate that over the long term possible opportunities 
may exist for target companies to earn a greater share of the expected synergistic gains 
from merger than acquiring companies. Further to this, the target's maximum possible 
expected gain is significantly greater than 0.5, 1 whilst that of the acquirer is only 
marginally greater than 0.5. 
It will be noted that both parties' maximum possible expected gain occurs when 
the target invokes the strategy B ( 0.1 ; 0.95) . This strategy is one which represents the 
target setting a very low initial acceptance level (that is, be prepared to accept a very low 
initial offer, i.e. one which is well below the target's perception of the expected fair 
price), and in any event rapidly capitulating and accepting a second offer (if it is 
forthcoming) provided that it is at least a little greater than the initial offer. Such a target 
strategy will certainly ensure a large probability of merger occurring, which is an 
important component of both companies' expected gain (see (5.1) and (5.2)). At this 
target strategy the acquirer achieves its maximum expected gain when it invokes the 
1 Remember that the perceived zone of agreement was scaled to [0; l], and thus a party 
employing a strategy with expected gain greater than 0.5 effectively expects to get more 
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Table 5.2. Minimum and maximum expected gains for targets and acquirers over 
the subsets of strategies A' c A and B' c B 
E(gain) to target 
Corresponding E(gain) to acquirer 
At strategy pair 
E(gain) to acquirer 
Corresponding E(gain) to target 




A(0.1; 0.5, 0.7) 
B (0.9; 0.35) 
0.1066 
0.1476 
~(0.3; 0.3 '0.9) 








~(0.1; 0.3 '0.3) 
B(0.1; 0.95) 
strategy A ( 0.1 ; 0.3 , 0.3) . This strategy indicates that the acquirer makes as low an 
initial offer as it deems reasonable, but would be prepared to negotiate upwards up to a 
point below its perceived expected fair price for the target. The acquirer would be 
prepared to negotiate fairly persistently within this range, i.e. there is a fairly high 
probability (probability = 0.7) that a rejected offer at any stage will be followed by a 
further (increased) offer. This combination of acquirer and target strategies (very low 
initial offer by the acquirer and very low initial acceptance level followed by virtual 
capitulation by the target) would clearly lead to a rapid acceptance of a low offer. Thus 
the probability of merger actually occurring is high with a low average transaction value, 
a combination clearly favouring the acquiring company. Table 5.3 shows the probability 
of agreement being reached (above), the average transaction value in, successful mergers 
(middle) and the standard deviation of the transaction values in successful mergers 
(below) in the implemented simulation for the subsets of acquirer and target strategies 
A' and B'. (The complete 20 x 60 matrix of these three variables for the full strategy sets 
A and B can be found in Appendix 5.B). For this strategy combination we observe that 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the lowest in Table 5.3).1 The target's maximum expected gain occurs if the acquirer 
invokes A(0.9; 0.9, 0.5) simultaneously with the target playing its abovementioned 
strategy. This strategy represents the acquirer making a very high initial offer (well above 
its perception of the expected fair price for the target), and then remaining firm (i.e. it 
may make a number of further offers at exactly the same offer level). Since the target's 
strategy is to accept even a low initial offer, the probability of the negotiations being 
successful will be tend to be very high, and the average transaction value will be high, 
a combination thus favouring the target company. From Table 5.3 we observe that 
P(merger occurring)= 0.9006 here, with an average transaction value of 0.6982 (which 
is well above 0.5). 
Both parties achieve their minimum expected gains when the target invokes the 
strategy B ( 0.9 ; 0.35) (i.e. when the target will only accept an initial offer well above 
its expectation of a fair price, and will only gradually back down from this position). At 
this target strategy the acquirer will achieve its minimum expected gain if it implements 
the strategy A ( 0.3 ; 0.3 , 0.9) (i.e. when the acquirer makes a low initial offer and may 
repeat the offer with little persistence, but not increase it). Clearly this combination of 
stubborn strategies is unlikely to result in a successful merger. We observe from Table 
5.3 that P(merger occurring) = 0.1864 for this combination of strategies. The target's 
-
minimum expected gain occurs when the acquirer invokes A ( 0.1 ; 0.5 , 0. 7) , i.e. when 
the acquirer makes a very low initial offer, but is prepared to negotiate (with little 
persistence) upwards to its perception of a fair price. Again P(merger occurring) < 0.2 
here. 
Several further general observations can be made from an examination of Tables 
5.1 and 5.3. 
1 By definition of the expected gains to the players given in (5.1) and (5.2), 
E(Gtar) = P(merger occurring) x (average transaction value) 
= 0.8178 x 0.4196 = 0.3431 here. 
Similarly, 
E(Gacq) = P(merger occurring) x (1/k) L (11AB h - Th) 
= 0.8178 x (Ilk) L 11AB h - 0.4196 = 0.5227 here. 
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(1) The sum of the expected gains to the two negotiating parties always lies in the 
range 
0 < E(gain to acquirer) + E(gain to target) < I 
For the range of parameter values under consideration here the two parties expect that 
their combined gains will have a minimum of 0.1429 and a maximum of 0.9450. In other 
words, the negotiating pair expect that any strategy played will have some possible joint 
gains "left on the table". 
(2) The targeCs expected gain exceeds that of the acquirer for over 78% of the 
strategy pairs considered.1 This offers further support to the conjecture that over the long 
term opportunities may exist for target companies to earn a greater share of the expected 
merger gains than acquiring companies. 
Acquiring companies in general achieve greater expected gains than do target 
companies when their strategy is one of starting with an initial offer as far as possible 
below their perception of a fair price for the target, and are prepared to negotiate upwards 
to a point on or just below the perceived fair price, i.e. A ( 0.1 ; -0.3 , p). Target 
companies' expected gains tend to be greater than acquirer companies' expected gains 
when the target's strategy is one of starting with an initial acceptance· level well above 
its perception of a fair price, followed by fairly rapid capitualtion if it rejects the initial 
offer, i.e. B ( ~ 0. 7 ; ~ 0.35). It is worth noting here that so far we have concentrated on 
maximising the players' expected gains. But with human nature being what it is, we 
should ask ourselves whether' or not expected gain is the only realistic criterion to 
consider. It is possible that sorµe target companies may accept a somewhat lower 
expectation to get a higher conditional gain (conditional on successful agreement), or 
even consider a combination of maximising expected gains and conditional gains (i.e. a 
bi-criterion game). For the purposes of this study we will limit our analysis to the 
assumption that the players are expected value maximisers and base their strategy 
decisions solely on this. Thus an objective of merely attempting to earn greater expected 
gains than the other party would not be expected from a rational player in the merger 
1 The acquirer's expected gain exceeded the target's expected gain for 44 of the 56 
strategy pairs under consideration here. 
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conflict: it is unlikely that the two parties are in total conflict, and their primary objective 
would more likely be to maximise their own individual expected gain. A player's 
secondary objective might take into account the other party's expected gain, but not at 
the expense of reducing its own expected gain by too much. 
(3) In an attempt to understand the trends and tendencies in the expected gains to the 
players as their strategies vary, it is useful to examine the trends and tendencies of their 
two major component parts, i.e. the average transaction value in successful agreements 
(Ave) and the probability that merger agreement will be reached. The average transaction 
value in successful agreements ranges from 0.4196 to 0.8384, and lies above 0.5 for 
almost 93% of all strategy pairs considered. This result implies that if both sides were 
to choose their strategies randomly from those here, in the case of a successful merger 
the target more often than not would achieve a greater share of the expected merger gains 
than the acquirer would.1 The probability that merger agreement will eventually be 
reached ranges from 0.1868 to 0.9006. 
In general the more the target capitulates at each stage, the less the average 
transaction value in successful agreements tends to be, but the greater the chance of 
agreement being reached, all other things being equal. Al~o, the greater the probability 
that the acquirer terminates the off er stream at any stage, the greater the average 
transaction value in successful mergers, but the less the chances of successful agreement 
are, providing that all other strategy parameters are held constant. The rates at which 
these variables change, however, vary with the individual strategic concession parameters 
employed by both players. Furthermore, as the target's initial concession parameter 
increases, the average transaction value increases whilst the probability of successful 
1 This appears to be in line with the empirical findings of Malatesta (1983) who reported 
that target companies earned on average approximately 58% (i.e. more than halO of the 
gains in equity value in successful mergers, with a standard deviation, s, of 10%. 
Halpern (1973), however, found that targets gained on average only 46% of the total 
gain in equity value (s = 14%), whilst Chattergee (1986) and Smale (1986) found that 
they gained 40% (s = 4%) and 39% (s = 2%) respectively. All of these studies show, 
however, that the target's proportion of equity gain is very variable. An interpretation of 
these empirical results viz a vis our simulated results is that the Malatesta study indicates 
that strategies tend to be chosen at random from the overall strategy sets we consider. 
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agreement decreases. (These trends are, however, more clearly observed by examining 
the matrix in Appendix 5.B). 
From the above it will be realised that the trends in E(gain to target) and E(gain 
to acquirer) depend on the players' strategies in a complex manner, and generalisations 
about such trends can not easily be made . 
. ( 4) The standard deviation of the transaction value in the case of successful merger 
agreements is fairly large in all cases, ranging from a low of 0.0996 to a high of 0.2221, 
indicating that the actual transaction value achieved may differ markedly from one 
negotiation to another under identical conditions and strategies. This result is attributable 
to the structure of the model, which may be seen as representing the way that different 
individual negotiating parties deal with the various uncertainties during the course of 
negotiations. 
A further observation that can be made from the full bimatrix of expected gains 
in Appendix 5.A (but not from the submatrix in Table 5.1) is that an acquirer strategy 
of making an opening offer and then remaining firm (i.e. ~Al = ~AL; all future offers are 
effectively at exactly the same level as the opening offer) is always inferior (in terms of 
the expected gains to both parties) to a strategy involving at least some concessions after 
the opening offer, no matter what strategy the target plays. In practice this so-called 
Boulware strategy of forcing the target to make all the concessions would more often 
than not antagonise the target (Raiffa (1982) p. 48); whilst we have not explicitly 
modelled this kind of target response, Appendix 5.B shows that for these acquirer 
strategies the probability of a successful agreement is always considerably lower than if 
some concessions are made. 
How closely do the characteristics investigated above on the 7 x 8 submatrix of 
strategies compare to those measured on the full 20 x 60 bimatrix in Appendices 5.A and 
5.B? Table 5.4 contains the relevant values for both matrices. A glance at Table 5.4 
shows that for the characteristics considered here there is very little difference between 
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Table 5.4. A comparison of characteristics measured on both the full matrix of 
expected gains and on the 7 x 8 submatrix 
Characteristic 
target: min E(gain) 
max E(gain) 
acquirer: min E(gain) 
max E(gain) 
l: E(gains): min 
max 
E(gain to target) > 
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the full matrix and its sampled submatrix. the only substantial differences occurring in 
the minimum possible expected gains to the two players and in the minimum probability 
of a merger (which are not altogether vital in strategy decision-making). It thus appears 
satisfactory to draw conclusions about various aspects of the merger bargaining process 
on the basis of a (carefully sampled) relatively sparse submatrix of the much larger 
bimatrix representation of expected gains. This adds further justification to our initial use 
of a fairly coarse grid over which to evaluate the expected gains, since the 20 x 60 
bimatrix shown in Appendix 5.A is in itself merely a finite subset of the continuous set 
of double response surfaces in five-dimensional Urtit space, and we thus conjecture that, 
in the same way. it will offer a good approximation to this continuous set. For future use 
as a decision aid, careful sampling of a finite subset of acquirer and target strategies thus 
serves at least three purposes: 
(i) it affords a much more manageable matrix of expected gains by reducing the 
sheer size of the matrix. and 
(ii) it vastly reduces computational resources, 
whilst still 
(iii) offering a good approximation to the general structure of the continuous merger 
bargaining problem. 
§5.3.2 IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 
We now tum to an examination of the bimatrix representation of this non-strictly 
competitive (i.e. non-zero sum) merger game in an attempt to identify strategies which 
might prove Pareto-optimal for each of the parties. By the "optimal" strategies we mean 
here the strategy (out of all of those considered) that each party would play to maximise 
its expected gain in the full knowledge that the other party is doing the same. 
We will assume for the moment that both parties are able to generate the game 
matrix for the discrete strategies in Table 5.1. We call this matrix of expected gains G0', 
with 
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the set of the acquirer's possible strategies, and 
B' = {b1, b4, b7, b10, b13, b16, b19} 
the set of the target's possible strategies. In the previous section we surmised that we can 
approximate a continuous mixture of the strategies by a finite submatrix (together with 
a continuity assumption); we will thus assume that both parties know that they will 
restrict their attention to the discrete strategy sets A' and B' in G0'. Now certain of each 
party's strategies may be dominated by others. The acquirer's dominated strategies in 
A' are those strategies ~ e A' for which there exists at least one other strategy '1j e A' 
such that E(gain to acquirer) is never worse under ~ than under ~· no matter what 
strategy bk e B' the target chooses to play, and is better for at least one target strategy; 
the target's dominated strategies bj e B' are defined analogously. Thus in actual fact the 
acquirer need only consider the subset A'(l) of A, where A'(l) consists of the set of its 
undominated strategies. The set A'(l) c A' is called a minimal complete class of 
strategies of A' relative to B' (Luce and Raiffa (1957), p. 108). Similarly, the target need 
only consider a minimal complete class of strategies B'(l) c B' relative to A' without any 
loss to itself. In general this will effect a reduction of the number of strategies under 
consideration. Thus if (A', B': G0 ') denotes the non-cooperative merger game with 
strategy sets A' and B' and expected gains to the parties given in G0', then the associated 
reduced game is_ defined to be (A'(t)• B'c1>: G1 ') where G1' is the submatrix of G0' 
formed by eliminating the rows and columns of G0' not in A'(l) and B'cl)· In other words, 
it is the same game except that the players confine themselves to their minimal complete 
classes. Close scrutiny of Table 5.1 shows that, based on the simulation, the acquirer 
would be prepared to eliminate 6 of the initial possible strategies in A', and the target 5 
of its strategies, leaving the minimal complete classes of strategies (relative to A' and B') 
as 
A'(l) = {~. ~} 
B'(l) = {b1, b16}. 
The associated reduced game has G1' as shown in Table 5.5. 
The conventional game-theoretic approach to selecting final strategies for the two 
parties from G1' is to persist with the concept of eliminating dominated strategies. Thus 
starting from the reduced matrix G1', we note that since the players have nothing to lose 
by confining themselves to the strategy sets A'(l) and B'(t)• we may be tempted to define 
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Table 5.5. The associated reduced game matrix, Gi' 
ai ai4 -
A(.1;.1,.3) A(.3; .9,.5) 
bi 
- 0.3073 0.4296 
B (.1; .05) 0.3920 0.4168 
-
b16 0.3431 0.4381 B (.1; .95) 
0.5227 0.4431 
the set A'c2) as the minimal complete class for A'cl) relative to B'cl)• and the set B'c2) as 
the minimal complete class for B'cl) relative to A'(l)• and to argue that the players should 
only consider a choice of strategy from A'(2) and B'c2). Since G1' consists of only two 
possible strategies for each of the players in the present case, obviously each player can 
eliminate at most one further strategy here. It is necessary to note that from the target's 
point of view, choosing from B'(2) is, however, only advisable if it can be assumed that 
the acquirer will confine itself to A'(l)· If the acquirer does not restrict its strategy choice 
to the set A'(l) (which appears irrational, but is plausible), then the target may actually 
suffer a disadvantage by restricting itself to B'c2). A symmetrical argument holds for the 
acquirer. On the assumption that both players are individually rational, calculating cµid 
forward-thinking, we will accept that both players will confine themselves to the game 
(A'(2)· B'c2): G' 2). For the simulated game, the step from B'(l) to B'(2) eliminates one of 
the two target strategies (namely b1); from A'cl) to A'c2) neither strategy is eliminated. 
The resulting minimal complete classes of strategies relative to A'(l) and B'cl) are thus 
A'(2) = {a2, a14} 
B'c2) = {b16} 
resulting in the associated reduced game matrix G2' presented in Table 5.6. 












The target has effectively located its optimal strategy; the solution to the game 
depends only on the acquirer's choice between its two strategies in G2'. Since it clearly 
would prefer strategy a2 to a24 (since 0.5227 > 0.4431) the "optimal solution" is the 
strategy pair <ai, b16>. At this combination of strategies the acquirer can expect to gain 
considerably more of the expected synergy gains than the target; indeed this gain happens 
to be the acquirer's maximum possible expected gain. The target on the other hand 
expects to gain no more than 40% of the expected synergy gains, and this constitutes less 
than 55% of its maximum possible expected gain from the game. 
The method of eliminating dominated strategies assumes hyper-rationality on the 
part of both players, i.e. both are able to identify and eliminate their own dominated 
strategies and those of their opponent, and continue through several rounds in this way 
until further reduction is no longer possible. If hyper-rationality of the players is 
questionable, an alternative means of identifying optimal strategies from G1' is to follow 
a Bayesian decision-making approach to the analysis of games (such as that suggested 
by Kadane and Larkey (1982)). In this approach each player might assign some 
subjective probability distribution to the opponent's choice of strategies, and then choose 
the strategy which maximises the expectation of its expected gains. That is, the acquirer 
I 
would choose its strategy j which maximises .E Pi E(Gij) where Pi (i = l, ... ,I) is the 
i=l 
acquirer's subjective probability of the target choosing strategy i, and E(Gij) is the 
acquirer's expected gain from playing strategy j when the target plays strategy i. A 
symmetrical argument holds for the target's choice of strategy. The assignment of 
subjective probabilities to an opponent's strategy set represents the player's own 
judgement of the likelihood that each particular opponent strategy will be played, and 
will be based on the player's own beliefs, cognitive processes and interpretation of 
information (DeGroot (1975)). On this point, Young (1975) comments that 
" ... this problem (of assigning subjective probabilities) can be handled by 
introducing new assumptions (or empirical premises) about such things as 
the personality traits of the players. But such a course would carry the 
analyst far outside the basic structure of the theory of games, requiring a 
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fundamental revision of the basic perspective of game theory." 1 
In the absence of such cognitive infonnation, the simplest subjective probability 
distribution that can be. placed on the opponent's strategy set is a discrete uniform 
distribution, i.e. one in which each player assumes that the opposing player is equally 
likely to play each of its possible strategies. In this case the expectation to the acquirer 
(over all possible strategies that the target might play) of its expected gains for each of 
its possible strategies is 
E(a2) = (0.3920) (0.5) + (0.5227) (0.5) = 0.4574 
and E(a24) = 0.4300. 
Similarly, the expectation to the target (over all possible acquirer strategies) of its 
expected gains for each of its two possible strategies is 
E(b1) = (0.3073) (0.5) + (0.4296) (0.5) = 0.3685 
and E(b 16) = 0.3906. 
(Since b16 so obviously dominates b1 here, it is trivial to conclude that E(b16) > E(b1)). 
Thus the acquirer would necessarily choose strategy ai. the target would choose strategy 
b16, and the strategy pair <a2, b16> would be the "solution" to the game, which happens · 
to be the same solution as identified by the more conventional game-theoretic approach. 
Note that players using the Bayesian approach to strategy choice in games act 
independently of their opponent, and thus do not necessarily concern themselves with 
their opponents' expectations or strategy choice. 
We now return to the full matrix of expected gains (as in Appendix 5.A), which 
we will call G0, and investigate optimal solution concepts on the game (A, B: G0).
2 As 
before each party may eliminate its dominated strategies and arrive at a minimal 
complete class of its entire strategy set relative to the other party's entire strategy set 
The associated reduced game for G0 is <Aci)• B(l): G1) and is given in Table 5.7. 
1 For a detailed overview of the role of cognitive processes in the assessment of 
subjective probability distributions, see Hogarth (1975). 
2 The prime (') notation refers to the submatrix fonned by sampling from the players' 
strategies. Thus A' c A, B' c B and G0' c G0• 
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Table 5.7. The associated reduced game matrix, G1 
a2 a3 a4 as as ~ au 
A(.l;.3,.3) A(.1;.5,.3) A(.1 ;.7,.3) A(.1;.9,.3) A(.3;.7,.3) A(.3; .9,.3) A(.5;.7,.3) 
bl B(.l ;.05) 
0.3073 0.3446 0.3627 0.4006 0.4193 0.4520 0.4652 
0.3920 0.4363 0.4381 0.4523 0.4242 0.4464 0.3971 
b6 B(.1; .35) 
0.3390 0.3645 0.3753 0.4003 0.4406 0.4535 0.4780 
0.4637 0.4934 0.4889 0.4800 0.4643 0.4581 0.4191 
b1 B(.3;.35) 
0.3056 0.3403 0.3787 0.4047 0.4207 0.4484 0.4562 
0.3819 0.4151 0.4341 0.4152 0.4084 0.4108 0.3722 
bg B(.5;.35) 
0.2787 0.3232 0.3653 0.4154 0.4015 0.4458 0.4138 
0.3281 0.3641 0.3842 0.3836 0.3650 0.3743 0.3358 ' 
bu B(.l;.65) 
0.3474 0.3543 0.3766 0.3881 0.4418 0.4515 0.4914 
0.5096 0.5084 0.5064 0.4880 0.4801 0.4699 0.4412 
b 16 B(.1;.95) 
0.3431 . 0.3526 0.3586 0.3866 0.4355 ·0.4499 0.4881 
0.5227 0.5235 0.5068 0.5013 0.4812 0.4750 0.4505 
b11 B(.3 ;.95) 
0.3328 0.3475 0.3619 0.3924 0.4281 0.4442 0.4803 
0.4987 0.4808 0.4697 0.4558 0.4524 0.4355 0.4293 
Proceeding along the lines of the Bayesian decision-making approach, the expectations 
to the two players (over all possible strategies of the opponent, all assumed equally 
likely) of their expected gains, for each possible strategy are as in Table 5.8. The best-
choice strategy for the acquirer is a4, while strategies b6 and b11 both offer the target the 
same maximum expectation of its expected gains. Thus, strictly speaking, either of the 
strategy pairs .<a4, b6> and <a4, bu> would be optimal for Bayesian game players. If, 
however, the target knew that the acquirer was also approaching the game as a Bayesian 
player (and thus would choose strategy a4) it would observe that <a4, bu> jointly 
dominates <a4, b6>, i.e. the strategy <a4, bu> is preferable for both players (assuming 
that they are expected utility maximisers), and this is then the Bayesian optimal strategy 
pair for the merger game G0• 
Examination of the game matrix G1 reveals that it, too, has dominated target (row) 
_and acquirer (column) strategies when measured relative to the strategy sets ~l) and B(l) 
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Table 5.8. Players' expectations of their expected gains for the reduced game G1 
Strategy Expectation 














in G1 respectively. Assuming that both players are individually rational, we will accept 
that each will confine its strategy choice to its minimal complete class relative to their 
opponent's (reduced) strategy set. This process of reducing the strategy sets for each 
player may continue, i.e. A(n) is the minimal complete class for Acn-l) relative to Ben-I) 
and B(n) is the minimal complete class for B(n-l) relative to A(n-l)• and is a safe strategic 
move only as long as each player feels confident that the other is doing likewise. If both 
target and acquirer continue reducing their strategy spaces, the process will eventually 
terminate, in the sense that there is some integer N such that AcN) = A(N+I) and B{N) = 
B(N+l)• i.e. no further reduction of the strategy sets is possible. When this occurs A(N) and 
B(N) are called completely reduced strategy sets and (A(N)• B(N): GN) the completely 
reduced game associated with (A, B: G0)
1. In the simulation of the negotiation process 
1 For early game theoretic discussions on the elimination of dominated strategies and 
thereby a reduction in the game matrix see, for example, Gale, Kuhn and Tucker (1950), 
Luce and Raiffa (1957) and Shapley (1964). Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel (1990) showed that 
in the case of finite games, providing that the dominances between the strategies are 
strict, the completely reduced game matrix is unique, regardless 'of the order of 
elimination of the dominated strategies. (A strictly dominated strategy for a player A is 
a strategy ~ for which there exists at least one other strategy '1j such that the payoff to 
A is always strictly greater under ai than under~ no matter what strategy the opposing 
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here we observe that there is no further reduction of strategies after (A(3)• B(3): 0 3), 
where 
A(3) = {a2, a3, a4, els} 
B(3) = {b1, b6, b7, b8, bu} 
i.e. N = 3, and G3 (shown in Table 5.9) is the completely reduced game matrix. 
Table 5.9. The completely reduced game matrix, G3 
ai a3 a4 as 
A(.1; .3, .3) A(.1 ;.5,.3) A(.t;.7,.3) A(.1; .9, .3) 
b1 B(.1; .05) 
0.3073 0.3446 0.3627 0.4006 
0.3920 0.4363 0.4381 0.4523 
b6 B(.1;.35) 
0.3390 0.3645 0.3753 0.4003 
0.4637 0.4934 0.4889 0.4800 
b1 B(.3; .35) 
0.3056 0.3403 0.3787 0.4047 
0.3819 0.4151 0.4341 0.4152 
bg B(.5;.35) 0.2787 0.3232 0.3653 0.4154 
0.3281 0.3641 0.3842 0.3836 
bu B(.1;.65) 
0.3474 0.3543 0.3766 0.3881 
0.5096 0.5084 0.5064 0.4880 
The acquirer's set A(3) corresponds to an initial offer as low as is reasonable to 
the acquirer (in any event well below the acquirer's perceived fair price for the target), 
but to be prepared to persistently negotiate upwards to varying final offer levels, the 
largest of which is as high as the acquirer would find reasonable. The target's set B(3) 
contains a variety of strategies, including to start with an initial acceptance level as low 
as is reasonable to the target and then give up ground at varying rates, or to start with 
an acceptance level which is closer to the target's perception of a fair price and give up 
ground fairly slowly. 
player chooses to play). This condition holds for our game {A, B: G0). Furthermore, 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1982) have studied equilibrium' solutions to the game that are 
invariant under successive elimination of dominated strategies. 
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The parties may now establish if one or more equilibrium points exist on the 
completely reduced game 1• An equilibrium point in this context is a pair of strategies 
{~. bj), ai e AcN)• bj e B(N) such that 
(1) E(gain to target) for acquirer strategy ~ e A(N) is maximised over all given 
target strategies, and 
(2) E(gain to acquirer) for target strategy bj e B(N) is maximised over all given 
acquirer strategies. 
For any strategy pair satisfying conditions (1) and (2) above, this acquirer strategy is 
better than any other acquirer strategy for the given target strategy, and analogously for 
the target strategy. The simulation of the negotiation process produces three such 
equilibrium points in the discrete strategies on G3, given in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10. Equilibrium points in the completely reduced game matrix, G3 
Equilibrium points 
1 2 3 
Acquirer strategy · ~= A(.1; .3,.3) a3: A< .1 ; .5,.3) a4: A(.1;.7,.3) 
Turget strategy b11: B(.1;.65) b6: B(.1; .35) b7: B(.3;.35) 
E(gain to acquirer) 0.5096 0.4934 0.4341 
E(gain to target) 0.3474 0.3645 0.3787 
We note that the target's preference ordering increases with a move from 
equilibrium point 1 towards point 3 (a more preferred outcome has a higher expected 
gain), whilst the acquirer's preference ordering increases from point 3 towards point 1. 
Thus whilst the progression from (A, B: G0) to <Ac3), B(3): G3) has rationally focused the 
players' strategy choice, it has not uniquely solved the problem. Any solution concept to 
the merger game should provide the two competing players with expectations of their 
1 Nash (1951) showed that any non-cooperative game with finite sets of discrete 
strategies (as we have here) has at least one mixed strategy equilibrium pair. For the 
present discussion we are restricting ourselves to an examination of the equilibrium points 
amongst pure (discrete) strategies. 
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gains from negotiating under the solution strategy pair, and an examination of matrix G3 
indicates more than one such solution. 
Since both parties are able to generate the matrix G3 and are acting rationally, any 
attempt to maximise their own expected gains should of necessity consider the other 
party's expected actions as well. Thus the players will at once realise that any strategy 
pair ('\. bj) in G3 for which the expected gains are inferior for both parties compared to 
those of some other attainable strategy pair in G3 are jointly inadmissible. In G3 only 
the outcomes pertaining to acquirer strategy as (for all target strategies) and target 
strategy b11 (for all acquirer strategies) are jointly admissible, and equilibrium point 1 is 
the only equilibrium point in this set of strategy pairs { <a5, bj>} U { <ai, bu>}. This 
appears to suggest that this point could be the solution to the game. For this strategy pair 
the sum of the expected gains is 0.8570, which is close to the maximum total expected 
gains (i.e. the players appear to be exhibiting a large degree of group rationality), and 
thus not a lot of the value which may possibly be created from merger will be left on the 
table. A way of choosing amongst multiple equilibrium points is to compare them to 
obvious status quo points. In this respect we could consider as status quo points the 
origin (0,0) (i.e. the negotiations are broken off entirely), and (0.347 4, 0.3842) (i.e. the 
player's security levels in pure strategies, which is the expected gain which each player 
can guarantee to itself from playing the game). In both cases equilibrium point 1 proves 
superior to both of the others. 
Equilibrium point 2, although join~y inadmissible, appears to offer a good 
alternative solution to point 1, in the sense that the relative loss in expected gains to the 
acquirer in moving from point 1 to point 2 (3.18%) is less than the relative gain in 
expected gains to the target (4.92% ), i.e. the joint "cost" of the move is less than the joint 
"benefit". (The same can not be said of equilibrium point 3: the relative loss to the 
acquirer in moving from equilibrium point 1 (14.82%) is considerably greater than the 
relative gain to the target (9.01 % ) ). Furthermore equilibrium point 2 offers larger 
maximum total expected gains (0.8579). 
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Whilst we have suggested that equilibrium point 1 could be the solution to the 
game, the existence of multiple equilibrium points might cause difficulties in the sense 
of creating a conflict of interest amongst rational negotiators. The rational acquirer would 
play strategy a2, and the rational target would play strategy I>,. leading to an expected 
gain to the target of 0.3056 and to the acquirer of 0.3819, i.e. both expect to be very 
much worse off than at any of the three equilibrium points! Thus being strictly 
competitive in the presence of multiple equilibria appears to be a distinct disadvantage 
here1. Noting that this is inevitable, one or both of the players may prefer to play the 
strategy that will lead to the other's preferred equilibrium point (under the assumption, 
of course, that the other remains a rational utility maximiser). Note that this does not 
imply pre-negotiation communication and agreement between the players: one or both 
merely deviate from their strictly competitive strategies to ensure a larger expected gain 
to themselves, given the knowledge of the game matrix G3 and thus their opponent's 
preferred equilibrium strategy. Parties which alter their strategies in this way are thus in 
a sense acting in a cooperative manner. Thus if both play their cooperative strategies, 
the acquirer will play its best strategy against b7, i.e. a4, and the target will play its best 
strategy against Cli· i.e. b11• This joint choice leads to an expected gain to the target of 
0.3766 (only 0.55% below the target's expected gain at its preferred equilibrium point 
(a4, b7)) and to the acquirer of 0.5064 (only 0.63% below the acquirer's expected gain 
at its preferred equilibrium point (a2, bu)). Since both players give up very small 
proportions of what they could expect to achieve at their own pref erred equilibrium 
points, the cooperative strategy pair (a4, bu) appears to offer a very satisfactory and safe 
compromise to both negotiating parties. This point is furthermore an element of the 
jointly admissable set. 
At (a4, b11) either party can improve its own expected gain slightly by reverting 
back to its utility-maximising strategy (the "double-cross" strategy). If only one party 
does so the game reverts to one of the equilibrium points; if both do so the game reverts 
to <ai. b7) which is extremely disagreeable to both. This threat alone would be inclined 
1 This situation is similar, but not identical, to the "Battle of the Sexes" described by 
Luce and Raiffa (1957), p. 90-94. Our jointly cooperative strategy produces payoffs that 
are much more favourable to both players than the traditional Battle of the Sexes does. 
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to ensure that both players play their cooperative strategies. Furthermore, each player 
notices that by unilaterally playing its own cooperative strategy it can improve its own 
expected gain, as well as that of the other player, quite considerably relative to the 
expected gains achievable with its strictly competitive strategy, and hence the strategy 
of both players playing their cooperative strategies appears a likely choice. Thus whilst 
game theory dictates that it would be folly to deviate from a single equilibrium strategy 
pair, the existence of multiple equilibrium strategies here produces a situation in which 
the strictly cooperative strategies are superior to the strictly competitive strategies. 
The negotiators are furthermore frustrated by a Prisoner's Dilemma-type 
problem: examination of Tables 5.9 and 5.1 shows that each of the three equilibrium 
points is jointly dominated by at least one point occurring in a strictly dominated strategy 
of at least one of the players (i.e. a point in G0 outside of G3). To illustrate, we observe 
that equilibrium point 1 is jointly dominated by (a3, b1J and equilibrium points 2 and 3 
are jointly dominated by (85. b16), where b16 is a dominated target strategy. Furthermore 
equilibrium point 3 is also jointly dominated by a large number of the discrete strategy 
pairs, one of which is (89. b16) which consists of strictly dominated strategies for both 
players. Since one or both of the negotiating parties will rationally not even consider the 
relevant strategy in each of the above cases, the rational-conforming players will miss the 
opportunity of taking advantage of these improved expected gains. Thus the ideal strategy 
choice remains somewhat elusive since there exist strategy pairs both inside and outside 
of G3 offering greater expected gains to both players than do any of the equilibrium 
points1, although no one strategy pair jointly dominates all the others. This indicates a 
temptation for the players to act "irrationally" and to move away from the equilibrium 
points; if the negotiations were held in a fully cooperative environment (i.e. in which pre-
negotiation communication between the players was allowed) and supposing that the 
players agree that the payoff matrix G0 remains invariant, it is possible (and indeed 
likely) that some non-equilibrium strategy pair would be jointly decided upon. This 
attraction to deviate from "optimality" (i.e. a solution given by an equilibrium point) 
1 We have noted that the joint cooperative strategy pair (a4, b11) in G3, whilst being 
"irrational" in terms of strict game theoretic mores, does jointly dominate equilibrium 
points 2 and 3, and hence warrants the attention of the negotiating parties. 
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might help to explain why several empirical studies (for example, those of Halpern 
(1973), Malatesta (1983), Chattergee (1986) and Smale (1986)) have produced fairly large 
standard deviations in the estimation of the percentage split of the equity gains accruing 
to the target company. 
In reality the equilibrium points and the cooperati~e strategy pair (a4, b11) offer 
very similar expected gains to the two players, although the strategies used by the players 
vary considerably from one point to another. In all these cases, however, the acquirer 
comes off best, both in absolute terms and relative to the parties' maximum expected 
gains. Table 5.11 shows the expected gains to the parties a~ all three equilibrium points 
and at the cooperative strategy pair. 
Table 5.11. Comparison of selected strategies 
Strategy choice 
(a2,bu) (a3,b~ (a4,b7) ~bu) 
E(gain to acquirer) 0.5096 0.4934 0.4;341 0.5064 
% of max E(gain to acquirer) 97.3 94.3 82.9 96.7 
E(gain to target) 0.3478 0.3645 0.3787 0.3766 
% of max E(gain to target) 54.8 . 57.4 59.7 59.3 
Clearly the acquirer can expect to achieve a considerably greater share of the 
expected merger gains than can the target, and this amount is very close to its maximum 
expected gain at these strategy pairs, whilst the target can expect to gain little over half 
of its maximum expected gain at these strategy pairs. In absolute terms the target can 
expect to achieve around 40% - 45% of the expected combined merger gains, a figure 
which correlates well with the empirical observations of Halpern (1973), Chattergee 
(1986) and Smale (1986). We conjecture that this was no chance event, but is instead 
directly attributable to the bargaining strategy employed by the negotiators involved. The 
implication is that the samples of acquiring and target companies selected in the above 
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empirical studies were, in the mean, all acting close to their "optimal" bargaining 
strategies. Halpern (1973) recognised this when he concluded 
" .... the (choice of) bargaining strategies will determine the split of the 
gains." 
§5.4 A COMPARISON OF THE PARETO-OPTIMAL STRATEGIES ON THE FULL 
MATRIX G0 AND THE SUBMATRIX G0' 
Table 5.12 consolidates all the optimal strategy pairs previously derived for both 
the Bayesian decision-making approach (BDM) and the more traditional elimination of 
dominated strategies (EDS) on the full matrix G0 and its submatrix G0'. From Table 5.12 
we observe that no single strategy for either the acquirer or the target predominates. 
Amongst the eight strategy pairs there are three different acquirer strategies which might 
be considered as "optimal" (~. a3, a4). These collectively correspond to the scenario of 
an acquirer making a very low initial offer (~Al = 0.1), and in the event of a rejection 
negotiating fairly persistently (p = 0.3) up to a final offer which varies from somewhat . 
below the acquirer's perception of a fair price for the target up to a value somewhat 
above this fair price perception (~AL = 0.3, 0.5 or 0. 7). The four different target strategies 
which might be considered in a sense optimal (b6, b7, b11 and b16) all correspond to the 
scenario of the target setting an initial acceptance level far below its perception of a fair 
price (~ = 0.1 or 0.3), and then decreasing this demand towards the acquirer's price 
· offer in various decrements (y = 0.35, 0.65 or 0.95). The rational acquirer's strategy 
choice is thus limited to a choice of value for the final strategic concession parameter, 
~AL• and its optimal bargaining strategy can be represented as 
A (0.1; ~AL,0.3) ~AL= 0.3, 0.5, 0.7. 
Clearly then, a good acquirer strategy is characterised by an extreme initial position, 
followed by a willingness to engage in.vigorous upward negotiation. In similar spirit, the 
rational target's optimal bargaining strategy can be represented as 
-
B (0.1 ; y) 'Y = 0.35, 0.65, 0.95 
-and B (0.3; 0.35) . 
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Solutions on the completely 
reduced matrix (EDS) 
(E(gain to acquirer) ; 
E(gain to target)) 
<a2, bi6> 
(0.5227 ; 0.3431) 
<a2, bu> 
(0.5096 ; 0.3474) 
(Equilibrium point 1) 
<a3, b6> 
(0.4934 ; 0.3645) 
(Equilibrium point 2) 
<a4. b1> 
(0.4341 ; 0.3787) 
(Equilibrium point 3) 
<a4. bu> 
(0.5064 ; 0.3766) 
(Cooperative solution) 
Solutions using the BDM 
approach 
(E(gain to acquirer) ; 
E(gain to target)) 
<a2, bi6> 
(0.5227 ; 0.3431) 
<a4, bu> 
(0.5064 ; 0.3766) 
<a4. b6> 
(0.4889 ; 0.3753) 
The submatrix of expected gains G0' produced a single optimal strategy pair for 
both the BDM and EDS approaches to the analysis. In sharp contrast the solution to the 
full game matrix G0 was somewhat more complex: the BDM approach yielded two 
solutions and EDS provided no less than three equilibrium points, as well as a possible 
cooperative solution (which was the same as one of the BDM solutions). We conclude 
from this observation that the finer the grid of strategies in the original matrix of 
expected gains, the richer the matrix is, and the more complex it is for decision-makers 
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and negotiators in tenns of locating optimal bargaining strategies.1 An analogy can be 
drawn with two sieves of differing mesh-widths: the sieve with coarser mesh (cf. G0 ') 
allows all except a small number of large particles to pass through, whilst that with the 
finer mesh (cf. G0) captures a large number of particles, both large and not so large. In 
effect the five-dimensional double response surface of expected gains has a large number 
of local maxima, and the finer the strategy-grid, the more of these local maxima are 
"caught" or identified as "optimal". We extrapolate this to argue that the set of expected 
gains defined on the five-dimensional product space of continuous strategies (of which 
G0 is a finite subset) would have a much larger number of equilibrium points (and other 
points which might be construed as "optimal"), which of necessity adds more confusion 
and fuzziness to the decision of strategy choice. Clearly then from a decision-support 
point of view, to prove useful, a model such as the one used in this chapter should 
comprise of finite strategy sets for each of the negotiating players which are "small 
enough" to produce a manageable number of possible solutions, yet large enough to give 
a fairly wide coverage to all parameters and hence contain the vital information as 
regards the general structure of the merger bargaining problem. It appears that a matrix 
with dimensions approximately the same as G0' might not be too far off the mark. 
Before proceeding further we should ask ourselves whether the optimal solutions 
identified on G0 and on G0' are, from a negotiator's point of view, discernably different 
from one another at all. In the first place, the model parameters are merely abstractions 
of reality, useful for modelling purposes, and as such have little or no physical meaning 
to the negotiators. The parameters as they stand are certainly undocumented and 
intangible, to the extent that it is unlikely that a negotiator would be able to positively 
differentiate between two fairly closely-spaced values of each of the parameters. For 
example, a negotiating party asked to allocate a value to its initial strategic concession 
parameter, ~Al• would almost certainly be able to respond that it feels that this parameter 
has, say, a "low" value, but would have little grasp or "feeling" for the difference 
between ~Al = 0.1 and ~Al = 0.2. For the purposes of selecting strategies, it is 
1 This increasing complexity of the matrix as the strategy-grid is made finer is not 
restricted to the quantity of optimal strategy pairs. Other game-theoretic phenomena, such 
as Prisoner's Dilemma and a cooperative bargaining solution were evident in G0 but not 
in G0', and they, too, further serve to add confusion to the strategy choice decision. 
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unreasonable to differentiate between players' expected gains that differ by very small 
amounts when there exists such a large degree of fuzziness in the estimation of parameter 
values in the first place. From Table 5.12 we note that for the optimal points considered 
here, the maximum difference in expected gain for the target is only 0.0356 and for the 
acquirer it is 0.0338 if equilibrium point 3 is ignored (if not, it is 0.0886). Further to this 
we have pointed out that the "optimal" strategies for each player are all fairly similar, in 
the sense that only one or two of the parameters vary within a fairly narrow range (i.e. 
they are all physically fairly close to one another in matrix G0). In the light of the above 
we advocate that, for the purposes of selecting an "optimal" strategy from amongst those 
proposed here, there is little to choose between the strategies at hand. We contend that 
all off er sound guidance to negotiating parties. 
Throughout the above discussion we should not lose sight of the fact that G0' is 
merely a subset of G0• The strategies A' c A and B' c B were selected using statistical 
sampling methods to achieve an even spread of selected strategies across the rows and 
columns of G0, and it was for this reason that the general characteristics of G0' were very 
similar to those of G0 (see Table 5.4). Moreover, the statistical sampling of strategies 
ensured that the "optimal" strategies for the two parties were similar on G0 and G0', and 
offered similar expected gains to each player. If the sampling had not ensured an even 
spread of A' and B' across A and B respectively, it is probable (and indeed likely) that 
the general characteristics and optimal solution(s) would not have resembled those of G0 
as closely as those of G0' did. The implication of this could be far-reaching, as we 
illustrate by means of an example. Assume that Player A chooses to base its analysis and 
strategy-choice on the game matrix G;(A) of expected gains, with discrete strategy 
sets Ac~> c A and B (~) c B, on the assumption that Player B is doing exactly the 
same. Player B, ignorant of Player Ns choice of G;(A) , may choose some differently-
selected game submatrix G ;(B) of G0 as the basis for strategy choice, with A~) c A 
and Be~> c B, and (incorrectly) assume that Player A will also employ Go.(B) in 
determining its choice of strategy. Thus the two parties will, in effect, be playing 
different games, i.e. the assumption of players' "complete information" is clearly violated 
in this case. This is furthermore not a problem of decision-making under uncertainty 
either, in the sense of the participants being aware that their information is incomplete. 
The situation in which the two players have different perceptions of the game is known 
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as a two-player hypergame, which is characterised by each player's perceptions of (1) 
its own and its opponent's finite strategy sets, and (2) its own and its opponent's utilities 
defined over the product space of players' strategies (in the merger game the utilities are 
merely the expected gains to the two players). Hypergames are discussed by Bennett 
(1977 and 1980), and have been used extensively in the literature in' an attempt to explain 
why certain military confrontations and other conflict situations (such as business and 
environmental conflicts) have produced surprising and ~nexpected outcomes (to one 
party, at least).1 In the illustration at hand, Player A might, on the basis of 
game (A(~)' Be~>: o;(A)), arrive at an optimal strategy pair <ai, bi>. This is P:s 
perception of what the two players should do. Likewise, Player B may locate its 
perceived optimal strategy pair <ap• bq> on the basis of the game (A~>. B ~): o;(B)). 
where i -:1: p and j -:1: q. Thus A would go ahead and play ~· and B would play bq. The 
expected gains to the players at <ai, bq>, however, may leave both players far worse off 
than if they had settled on either <ai, b? or <ap, bq> ! A numerical example of this using 
G0 as starting point can be found in Appendix 5.C. On the other hand, if one player can 
anticipate that the other has different perceptions of the game being played, and can 
guess which strategies the opponent is basing his analysis on, the player might well be 
able to turn this situation to its strategic advantage. 
§5.5 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION SUPPORT 
The model described in Chapter 4 and implemented here yielded several 
interesting findings which might have implications for decision-support. 
Firstly, the use of a fairly coarse grid of strategy parameter values in the matrix 
of players' expected gains appears an adequate approximation of the game with players' 
continuous strategy sets. As such it is suitable aS an aid to merger negotiators who 
require an understanding of the general structure of the expected gains to the players for 
various strategies they might choose to play. This also drastically limits computational 
1 For military applications see Bennett and Dando (1979), Said and Hartley (1982), 
Shupe, Wright, Hipel and Fraser (1980), Takahashi, Fraser and Hipel (1984), Hipel, Wang 
and Fraser (1988), Fraser, Wang and Hipel (1990) and Geldenhuys (1991). For business 
applications see Giesen and Bennett (1979), Bennett, Huxham and Dando (1981) and 
Stokes and Hipel (1983). 
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intensity, and approximates the main features of the continuous game by affording a 
matrix of more manageable dimensions. Assimilation by decision-makers will be 
simplified and human judgement will be clarified. Furthermore, an expected gains matrix 
with a coarse strategy-grid also appears to be suitable for choosing Pareto-optimal 
strategies, since it identifies only a very small number of "optimal" strategy pairs 
(possibly just one), which are not discemably different from those identified using a finer 
strategy-grid. This would greatly simplify a decision-maker's task of choosing a 
negotiating strategy. Care should, however, be taken to ensure that the players' strategy 
sets are chosen in such a way that an even spread of strategies across all those possible 
is achieved. 
In Chapter 6 we will continue the simulations, focusing our investigations now 
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0.3312 0.4119 0.4232 0.4451 0.4279 0.3705 0.4185 Q.4317 0.42111 0.38113 0.40111 
0.3 0.2094 0.2735 0.302!! 0.3316 0.3833 0.31"8 0.3535 0.38111 0.42411 0.3021 Q.4372 
O.Zi117 0.316' 0.3473 0.35611 0.3528 0.21131 0.3307 0.3528 0.3701 0.3028 0.3451 
0.5 0.16119 0.2333 0.2741 0.3121 0.3539 O.l!IMl7 0.3174 0.35611 0.4010 0.3483 0.3982 
0.17211 0.2521 0.28113 0.3057 0.3027 0.2243 0.27113 0.30lll 0.3233 0.:1533 0.21152 
0.7 0.1332 0.2024 0.2375 o.2923 0.3344 0.2224 0.27113 0.3334 0.3710 0.2851 0.34°21 
0.1253 0.2027 0.2297 0.2903 0.2170 0.1781 0.22115 0.- 0.2718 0.1952 0.2433 
0.9 0.0790 0.139!1 0.1910 0.1!$34 0.3096 0.1474 0.20ll1 o.zw.z 0.3l!llll 0.2IOll 0.2746 
o.oeeo 0.1255 0.11143 0.1977 UD42 0.105ll 0.1537 0.1llOD o.21oe 0.1328 0.1771 
O.llS 0.1 0.21158 0.3242 0.3371 0.350e 0.31171 0.37111 0.4118 0.4232 0.4338 0.4447 0.4758 
0.3247 0."80 0.4531 0.4520 0.42118 0.3899 0.4309 o.- 0.4340 0.3703 0.41511 
0.3 0.2128 0.2971 0.3227 0.33541 0.3849 0.31U 0.31122 0.3027 0.4133 0.3042 O • .W19 
0.2315 0.3752 0.3923 0.3808 0.3885 0.2\IOll 0.37!l0 0.3827 0.37M 0.3028 0.38G3 
0.5 0.1879 0.1!684 0.2983 0.325$ 0.3468 0.2742 0.3408 0.3775 0.4114 0.3475 0.41118 
0.1~ 0.3230 0.3400 0.3432 0.3197 0.22114 0.3204 o~ 0.3422 0.2111 0.32111 
0.7 o.1m 0.2539 0.21111 0.3091 0.3468 0.2134 0.3234 0.3ll05 0.3912 0.21138 0.3823 
0.1210 0.2899 0.3089 0.3064 0.21114 0.1885 0.2870 0.3105 0.3004 O.i'IOOD 0.2870 
0.9 0.0797 0.2090 0.2$82 0.- 0.3l'l96 0.1422 o.2820 0.320ll 0.3834 O.'J!J77 0.32117 
0.0675 0.2243 0.2570 0.2829 0.2433 0.1027 0.2187 0.2172 0.2<1D7 0.1317 0.2339 
0.95 0.1 0.2674 0.32211 0.3350 0.33e7 0.3566 0.3666 0.41113 0.4215 0.43111 o.- 0.4837 
0.3304 0.4811 0.4602 0.4482 0.4278 0.3851 0.4522 0.4498 0.4431 0.3897 0.4313 
0.3 0.2032 0.2993 0.3180 0.3307 0.3520 0.3148 0.3852 0.3934 0.41611 0.3024 0.4649 
0.2220 0.4'110 0.39118 0.3925 0.3698 0.2816 0.4021 0.3832 0.3155 0.29!16 0.3071 
0.5 0.1735 0.<!IH 0.2977 0.3145 0.3518 0.2649 0.3700 0.37115 0.4089 0.3377 0.439!1 
0.17158 0.31121 0.3844 0.350D 0.33115 0.2228 0.3772 0.3815 0.34611 0.2475 0.-
0.7 0.1324 0.27:18 0.21185 0.3044 0.3260 0.2091 0.3442 0.37Qll 0.3783 0.2118Q 0.4129 
0.1<00 0.3595 0.3359 0.3235 O.:!l!U 0.11148 0.3415 0.3413 0.30llD o.aoa 0.3349 
0.9 0.0827 0.2387 o.:ieoo 0.2850 0.3143 0.1405 0.3082 0.3228 0.3862 0.2077 o.-



































































































































Acquirer's strategy parameters 
0.7 
~B 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 u 
'Y 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.3 o.s 0.1 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 o.9 0.9 
0.05 0.1 0.2716 0.2807 0.3003 0.3143 o.33l0 0.3759 0.36211 o.- 0.4127 0.4'W3 0.4800 0.4753 0.520!! 0.53U 0.8275 
0.3309 0.3508 0.370. 0.374<4 0.3725 0.34111 0.3784 0.385S 0.311112 0.3879 0.3858 O.a30 0.35711 0.3679 0.3154 
0.3 0.2102 0.2334 0.2471 0.2119!1 0.;>!16 0.3207 0.3315 0.3521 0.- 0.»18 0.414<4 Q.42113 0.4&1a 0.4910 0.5937 
0.2314 0.:2582 0.2693 0.2llOll 0.2765 0.2574 0.298& 0.31llll 0.3170 0.3023 0.31(111 o.3273 0.3141 0.3189 0.2857 
0.5 0.1678 0.1945 O.l!074 0.237& 0.2607 0.2518 0.2849 0.3110 0.3aie 0.34211 0.3937 0.3050 0.4282 0.4550 0.5670 
0.1710 0.1989 0.2069 0.22:32 0.2259 0.2120 0.2433 0.2915 0.2537 0.2492 0.2eee 0.2801 0.2934 0.2812 0.2MI 
0.7 0.1282 0.1464 0.1748 0.1163 0.2314 0.21&5 0.2300 0.25SO 0.1111111 O.m55 0.3124 0.3448 0.3791 0.4188 0.5118 
0.1205 0.1395 0.1516 0.1698 0.1731 0.1717 0.1915 0.1Mlll 0.2118 0.1168 0.2153 O.l!ZIO 0.2194 0.24211 0.2302 
Q.9 0.0767 0.0985 0.11llO 0.1351 0.1783 0.1471 0.1ea5 0.11116 o.21ea o.:ioae 0.2303 0.2855 0.2819 0.3152 0.4179 
0.0649 0.0840 0.09!;8 0.1010 0.1143 0.1060 0.1214 0.1:2117 0.1390 0.1325 0.1457 G.15illl 0.1534 0.170ll 0.1791 
0.35 0.1 0.2700 0.:1931 0.3183 0.31&5 0.3315 0.3737 0.3Q54 0.31197 0.4117 0.4536 0.4541 0.4731 0.1121)5 0.5388 0.611119 
0.3300 0.3707 0.39'9 0.3639 0.3716 0.3850 0.3044 0.31151 0.4024 0.3739 0.3831 0.3960 0.3613 0.3713 0.3189 
0.3 0.2085 0.2504 0.2701 0.2842 0.2119$ 0.3190 0.3372 0.311l!D 0.3733 0.»13 0.4130 0.'404 0.4776 0.4929 0.5892 
0.2316 0.21114 0.3195 0.3014 0.2033 0.2841 0.3103 0.311119 0.3243 0.3032 0.3230 0.3369 0.3008 0.3214 0.284<4 
0.11 0.1729 0.2094 0.2338 0.24114 0.21125 0.21146 0.2S46 0.3151 0.3470 o.3S23 0.3752 0.3975 0.4<411 G.4657 0.5el2 
0.1767 0.2196 O.ZlSS 0.2312 0.2447 0.2225 0.2423 0.211111 0.2775 0.2558 0.%1&!5 0.2840 0.2718 0.2118e Q.2832 
0.7 0.125<1 0.1594 0.1879 0.2353 o.- 0.22119 0.2455 0.2725 0.31<48 O.IO!ll19 0.3250 0.3809 0.31113 0.4124 O.ll058 
0.1195 0.1549 0.1747 0.20&1 0.1010 0.1707 0.1078 0.2142 O.:tlll3 0.1- 0.2252 O.Zlllll 0.2241 0.241111 0.22!!0 
0.11 0.07$1 0.1137 0.1•14 0.17211 G.2235 0.1<485 0.171111 O.»te 0.2521 o.:2099 0.2383 0.21153 0.2921 0.3341 0.4183 
0.06!!8 0.0082 0.1160 0.1313 0.14<40 0.1084 0.1217 0.1454 0.1!lllO 0.1333 0.1511 0.1723 0.159; 0.1814 0.1792 
0.65 0.1 0.2703 0.3031 0.3113 0.3198 0.3264 0.3770 0.3llll0 0.4061 0.4101 0.4554 0.- 0.4782 0.5213 0.5400 0,8278 
0.3352 0.3173 0.3(1113 0.3975 0.3781 0.3707 0.4073 0.411111 0.405!5 0.3778 0.3005 0.4015 0.35113 0.3771 0.3140 
0.3 0.2166 0.::1646 0.2850 0.2931 0.3098 0.3153 0.3SM 0.357 0.31138 O.lllllO 0.4310 0.4<427 0.4653 0.5081 0.5856 
0.2398 0.3113 0.3297 0.3210 0.3086 0.2832 0.3351 0.34511 0.3379 0.3042 0.3433 0.3454 0.3149 0.3342 0.21l46 
0.5 0.1699 0.2294 0.25<11 0.265e 0.211&7 0.21118 0.3213 0.3377 0.34114 0.3527 0.31152 0.4132 0.4310 0.4765 0.5644 
0.1738 0.2123 0.2140 0.2687 0.2580 0.2194 O.l!ll3e 0.111133 0.2842 0.2553 0.111194 0.3030 0.2952 0.3010 0.211:211 
0.7 0.1256 0.1878 0,22Qll 0.2394 0.2650 0.2204 0.21118 0.3075 0.3242 0.3012 0.3473 0.3707 0.3807 0.4378 0.5135 
0.11!!0 0.11157 o.= 0.2250 0.2122 0.1731 0.21113 0.25211 0.2<1411 0.t/l)55 0.2473 0.25911 0.2232 0.2823 0.2311 
OJI 0.0779 0.1529 0.1770 0.2166 0.2377 0.1478 0.1llllO 0.25211 0.2700 0.2049 0.2754 0.32112 0.2863 0.3699 0.4231 
0.0683 0.1474 0.1837 0.1817 0.1872 0.1063 0.1541 0.1toe 0.1973 0.12911 0.1522 0.20$3 0.1579 0.20&2 0.1811 
0.115 0.1 0.2718 0.3052 0.3152 0.3259 0.3317 0.3737 0.4082 0.4066 0.4125 0.4531 0.4659 0.4701 0.5214 0.5396 0.6229 
0.3336 0.410. 0.4083 0.4048 0.3900 0.365e 0.4211 0.41113 0.4078 0.3738 0.4030 0.39113 0.3574 0.3789 0.3138 
0.3 0.2089 0.2715 0.2837 0.265e 0.3095 0.3252 0.3822 0.3735 0.31118 0.36119 0.4270 0.4402 Q.4841 O.ll023 0.5941 
0.2282 0.3423 0.3345 0.3198 0.3147 0.2ll02 0.3$52 o.35411 0.3360 0.3010 0.3515 0.3459 0.3132 0.33611 0.2575 
0.5 0.1643 0.2438 0.2517 0.2803 0.2828 0.2745 0.3312 0.3035 0.3512 0.3457 0.4031 0.41!;0 0.4249 o.4781 0.5543 
0.1879 0.2964 0.2&33 0.2712 0.2590 0.22114 0.3149 0.3041 0.12111111 0.252!1 0.3196 0.3075 0.:21110 0.3057 0.2600 
0.7 0.1325 0.2179 0.226& 0.24211 Cl.2602 0.2187 0.111184 0.3001 0.311111 O.ZllJ7 0.31117 0.3737 0.370!! 0.4427 0.5156 
0.1239 0.2800 0.2459 Cl.2375 0.2183 0.1712 0.2788 0.211<43 0.2495 0.2051 0.2790 0.2618 0.2179 0.2738 0.2322 
0.0 0.0743 0.1795 0.1918 0.2160 0,2353 0.1512 0.250!! 0.:1115S 0.2827 0.2121 o.2113e 0.3384 0.21187 0.3832 0.4215 
0.0834 0.2141 0.2005 Cl.1925 0.1731 0.1088 0.22119 0.2182 0.1- 0.1335 o.2197 0.21!!0 0.11130 o.:2224 0.1820 
5-48 
Acquirer's strategy parameters 
0.9 
~B 
0.1 0.3 0.5 
'Y 
0.1 0.3 M 0.7 O.t 0.3 0.5 0.1 O.t 0.5 0.7 
0.05 0.1 0.2648 0.2BOQ 0.21142 0.2830 0.21111 0.3770 0.31111 o.aee& 0.31151 0."502 0.-
0.3252 0.3425 0.3474 0.34:511 0.3488 0.3704 0.37111l 0.31132 0.37115 0.3721 0.3e115 
0.3 0.2149 0.2204 0.22311 0.2311 0.2425 0.3124 o.3210 0.32111 0.3380 0.3ll40 0.38113 
0.2345 0.2425 0.2436 0.2482 0.2511 0.271le 0.21110 0.21170 o.21158 0.3023 0.3044 
0.5 0.1747 0.1110 0.1il<O 0.1927 0.1991 0.28(17 0.2742 0.2!04 O.l!llOll 0.3447 o.3487 
0.1764 0.1747 0.11149 0.1905 0.1872 0.2240 0.2333 0.2353 0.2307 0.250ll 0.2515 
0.7 0.1269 0.13&4 0.1371 0.1S04 O.Hl50 0.2140 0.2212 0.22114 0.2307 o.aeao 0.-
0.1212 0.1312 0.1273 0.13!18 0.1392 0.1!1113 0.1810 0.1710 0.1708 0.1971 0.3»1 
0.9 0.0799 0.0849 0.0880 0.0976 0.1100 0.1346 0.14113 0.1805 0.170ll 0.2103 0.2217 
0.0680 0.0725 0.0745 0.0763 0.0603 0.0974 0.1075 0.1152 0.1111 0.1330 0.1403 
0.35 0.1 0.2738 0.2754 0.2791 0.2834 0.2993 0.3763 0.3748 o.seoo 0.31174 0.4<ll!O 0.4571 
o.3353 0.3413 0.3451 0.3453 0.3522 0.3668 o.- 0.3704 0.3801 0.30ll3 0.341()3 
0.3 0.2134 0.2279 0.2290 0.2374 0.2487 0.33)7 0.3293 0.3310 0.3344 0.31144 0.405t 
o.2315 0.2517 0.2511 0.2548 0.2563 0.3"e 0.21137 0.:21183 0.211911 0.3008 0.3134 
0.5 0.1643 0.1781 0.1901 0.1081 0.2108 0.:!6711 0.2758 o.l!IM1 0.211M 0.3487 0.3517 
0.11178 0.1821 0.1903 0.1D5e 0.1973 0.2247 0.2339 o~ 0.2431 0.2531 0.2540 
0.7 0.1315 0.1441 0.15111 0.1565 0.17!4 0.2177 0.:2Zla 0.2341 0.2540 0.:11171 0.3040 
0.1243 0.1371 0.1407 0.14311 0.1479 0.1724 0.1772 o.1aae o.19'0 OJ!D3e 0.2105 
0.9 0.0750 0.0930 0.0973 0.1019 O.l:lee 0.1470 0.14711 0.11141 0.1111 0.2111 G.2210 
0.0643 0.07!l!i 0.0812 0.01115 o.09211 0.1oell 0.10llll 0.111111 0.1221 0.13311 0.1&7 
0.85 0.1 0.2718 o.:!803 0.21158 0.:21172 0.:2941 0.3757 0.3895 0.3907 0.31172 O.AS07 0.4509 
0.3338 0.3499 0.3538 0.34&7 0.3523 0.36611 0.31124 0.38511 om 0.3714 0.31113 
0.3 0.2113 0.2325 0.2321 0.239e 0.2440 0.31411 0.33Sll 0.3337 0.3350 0.3575 0.4082 
0.2305 0.2598 0.2!!01 0.:21111 0.2524 0.21149 0.3051 0.3024 0.29811 0.21175 0.318! 
0.5 0.16811 0.1817 0.111153 0.2096 0.2200 o.2111e o.m1 O.ZIU 0.3000 0.3441 0.35113 
0.1703 0.1901 0.2032 0.2103 0.2075 O.Z!01 0.2303 0.2135 0.24111 o.2490 0.3540 
0.7 0.1332 0.1'80 0.1597 0.1624 0.1897 0.2109 0.2311 0.2475 0.25119 O.l!IM1 0.3030 
0.1251 0.1425 0.1552 0.1514 0.14511 0.1080 0.1918 0.1082 0.111113 o.2000 0.2103 
0.9 0.0837 O.o993 0.111' 0.1239 0.1278 0.1445 0.10:211 0.1775 0.1043 0.211111 0.2211 
0.0718 0.0874 0.0973 0.1027 0.0936 0.1048 0.1192 0.12112 0.1331 0.13115 0.14511 
0.95 0.1 0.2693 a.me 0.:21124 0.2515 0.3010 0.3723 0.37611 0.31143 0.3892 ·o.44!l4 0.4552 
0.32118 0.352:1 0.3518 0.3439 0.3819 0.38:211 0.3791 0.31122 0.3775 0.374.2 0.3839 
0.3 0.2084 0.;!:348 0.2376 0.2311 0.2438 0.322> 0.3250 0.33811 0.3413 0.4030 0.3993 
0.2279 0.270<0 0.21536 0.25211 0.2171 0.2873 0.3001 0.3078 0.3048 0.30M 0.31311 
0.5 0.1893 0.1006 0.1959 0.2015 0.2045 0.2687 0.2943 0.211211 0.30211 0.3487 0.3aaa 
0.1738 0.2079 0.2072 0.2022 0.1937 0.2241 0.2170 0.2512 0.2117 0.2501 0.2148 
0.7 0.1283 0. 1113' 0.1838 0.1707 0.1750 0.2192 o.2445 0.2433 0.2170 0.1!1144 0.3162 
0.122> 0.1731 0.1627 0.1920 0.1513 0.1732 0.ll)89 0.1978 0.1973 0J1D1a 0.22511 
o.s O.On4 0.1126 0.1242 0.1194 0.1273 0.1390 0.1835 0.1172 0.1903 0.2152 0.2453 







































































































































0.05 0.1 0.4878 o.eoe2 
O.S378 0.5069 
0.1499 0.1502 
0.3 0.3489 0.4600 
0.8094 0.51194 
0.1329 0.1329 
o.s 0.25411 0.3e2S 
0.94!le 0.9183 
0.1181 0.1182 
0.7 0.1818 0.2728 
o.~ 0.11583 
0.10$2 0.10S3 
0.9 0.1032 0.1972 
o.mo 0.7403 
0.0945 0.0891 
0.3$ 0.1 0.4928 0.7::!64 
O.S409 0.4687 
0.1495 0.1743 
0.3 0.3544 0.6088 
0.8021 0.5019. 
0.1321 0.1680 
0.5 0.2010 0.5282 
M448 0.5275 
0.1205 0.1555 
0.7 0.1804 0.4300 
0.6991 0.5578 
0.1102 0.1742 
0.9 0.0992 Q.32l!ll 
o.m1 0.5912 
0.0955 0.1570 
o.65 0.1 0.5034 0.8030 
0.5340 0.4328 
0.1488 0.1929 
0.3 0.3646 0.7282 
0.8030 0.4541 
0.1289 0.1930 
o.s 0.2566 0.1700 
0.8515 0.4717 
0.1217 0.1079 
0.7 0.1930 o.e2S8 
0.9970 0.47&9 
0.1104 0.2033 
0.9 0.1032 0.5558 
0.7830 0.4847 
0.0967 0.2138 
0.95 0.1 0.5074 0.8178 
0.5361 0.41!le 
0.1503 0.2060 
0.3 0.3472 0.7920 
0.5972 0.4202 
0.1405 0.2078 
0.5 0.2634 0.73&<1 
0.8395 0.4310 
0.1279 0.2128 
0.7 0.2080 0.7228 
0.8754 0.4310 
0.1369 0.2221 




Probability of agreement (above), average transaction value in 
successful agreements (middle) and standard deviation of 
transaction values in successful agreements (below) 
Acquirer's strategy parameters 
0.3 o.s 0.1 o.9 
0.5 0.7 O.Q 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.11 0.5 0.1 O.D 0.7 O.Q O.Q 
D.ell52 0.7275 0.7034 0.11518 0.7204 0.7722 OJl404 0.7414 0.711611 o.ee1e 0.11194 0.8740 0.8D5' 
0.41l5! 0.4\lM 0.504Q 0.5750 O.!JlllQ 0.5430 0.6353 0.8033 0.5840 o.seoa 0.9407 0.8232 0.8937 
0.144<1 0.14411 0.1427 0.11135 0.1878 0.1172 0.1!!0.1 0.1722 0.1787 0.1915 0.1807 0.1910 0.1890 
0.5$411 o.eise 0.7080 0.4080 0.51112 0.0604 0.731111 0!11174 0.17ZI 0.7940 0.7052 0.7894 0.8170 
0.55e7 0.5549 0.5949 0.8313 0.8103 0.5971 0.581111 0.8675 0.8341 OJl193 0.1111'2 0.11597 0.730!! 
0.1:153 0.1191 0.1Zl6 0.1419 0.14llO 0.1- 0.1393 0.1558 0.1594 0.1549 0.1823 o.1ee1 0.15611 
0.4418 0.5348 0.9240 0,4012 0.47N OM92 O.M78 0.5028 0.5744 o.ea1t1 o.eo1a 0.7030 0.7328 
O.ll073 0.5992 0.8073 0.88112 0.9478 0.9327 0.8311 O.eal58 0.e&77 O.ll530 0.7155 0.11&<7 0.75112 
0.1148 o.1oee 0.1088 0.12111 0.1335 0.1334 0.1239 0.1389 0.1417 0.1407 0.1471 0.141111 0.1535 
0.351!!1 0.4312 0.5458 0.28$4 Q.3730 0.- OJ17llO 0.4014 0.4838 0.5934 0.5048 0.8130 0.8450 
0.11518 O.ll530 o.eeoa 0.7201 o.mii 0.9$17 0.1723 0.73e5 0.70l'l1 0.111133 0.75114 0.7&'114 O.?Me 
O.CJG63 0.0073 0.1013 0.11llO 0.1Zlll 0.1152 0.10ll8 0.121111 0.1:11111 0.1Zlll 0.1324 0.1360 0.1370 
0.228e 0.29se 0.4340 0.1844 0.2334 0.3104 0.- 0.- 0.3379 0.4440 0.3488 0.4774 o.sosa 
0.7323 0.7277 0.7381 0.71184 0.7&20 0.7480 0.7.&Se O.eoel 0.7743 0.7572 0.811111 0.7817 O.elaS 
0.0$42 0.0823 0.0005 0.0081 0.1007 0.0032 O.Gll32 0.1044 0.1048 0,0978 0.10flll 0.1008 0.1112 
o.eo20 Q.8202 0.8408 0.11549 0.7944 0.8500 0.11772 0.7480 0.!4Sll O.ll014 0.11272 0.9270 0.8G52 
0.4545 0.4578 0.4782 0.5795 0.52113 0.11147 0.5170 0.6113 0.51151 0.55Q7 0.8307 0.80211 0.7019 
0.1725 0.1709 0.1877 0.1172 0.111112 0.11151 0.1842 0.17211 0.111211 0.11121 0.1818 0.:2027 0.1595 
0.81134 0.7832 0.78:211 O • .W18 0.9792 o.7119<1 0.8Z2ll o.e100 0.7MO 0.8434 0.70141 0.8444 0.1202 
0.4ll07 0.41182 0.5170 OJl338 0.l5e12 o.- OJl450 O.ee55 O.eo311 Oll048 OJl842 0.41321 0.7257 
0.1513 0.15:111 0.1803 O.l<&Se 0.1705 o.11e1 0.1873 0.1522 0.17117 0.1744 0.1515 0.1870 0.16811 
0.8218 o.5'172 0.7592 O.lllOO 0.59211 o.- 0.71'52 0.5018 o.eesa 0.711&< 0,11()98 0.7048 0.1•12 
0.5198 0.52311 0.5472 0.1751 0.8032 0.11751 OJl750 O.et7ll 0.12118 O.llOllO 0.7233 0.6604 0.7565 
0.1555 0.1919 0.1802 0.1325 0.1960 0.1eell o.1ee2 0.1388 0.1872 0.1704 0.1488 0.1714 0.1535 
0.!5072 0.8441) 0.7180 0.3014 0.5070 o.e202 0.7270 o~ 0.$936 0.7252 o.eo20 0.7270 0.8402 
0.5490 0.5508 0.570!) 0.71118 0.52119 0.1191111 O.llOllO 0.73113 O.M02 0.0331 0.7515 0.1779 0.7954 
0.111118 0.1868 0.1573 0.1202 0.1842 0.1Slle o.1m 0.12118 0.1!!30 0.1804 0.1297 0.1687 0.1373 
0.4S80 0.5522 0.11538 0.1774 0.3770 0.11115 o.- 0.25211 0.4ee4 0.9408 0.3S38 o.e1119 0.4924 
0.5537 0.51145 0.1117 0.7ll07 O.llG!IO 0.8415 0.11457 0.!!078 0.7044 O.l708 0.5218 0.7203 0.8363 
0.1849 0.175'1 0.1813 0.1020 0.1724 0.111113 0.1818 0.1042 0.11111 0.1!!30 0.1085 0.15811 0.112• 
0.5242 0.11436 0.8478 0.8432 0.11594 0.111148 0Jl014 0.7340 0.81132 0.9190 o.8178 0.11394 0.8998 
0.4298 0.4465 0.4579 Q.5730 0.5031 0.- OJ!Oe!I 0.11103 0.!!502 0.5'511 0.5402 0.5936 O.!la58 
0.1577 O.leell 0.1791 0.1019 0.2040 0.2031 0.1019 0.1780 0.2052 0.Z)41 0.171111 0.20GS 0.1010 
0.7758 0.7684 0.8078 0.5015 0.7754 0.1121111 OJISIO 0.6140 OAl2Q5 O.ll7N o.elleO 0.5922 0.8098 
0.4598 0.4933 0.4038 0.82ee o.5178 0.11194 0.52117 0.8687 Q.68110 0.5611 OJl840 0.8115 0.730ll 
0.1868 0.19211 0.1847 0.14.36 0.11181 o.101e O.la53 0.15211 O.l!Ol!I 0.1908 0.1ll3ll O.lm 0.16llO 
0.7428 0.7584 0.7674 0.3074 0.7250 0.7815 OJI074 OA11511 0.7802 OJl500 0.5048 0.1)582 0.7408 
0.4725 0.4792 0.5107 0.5774 0.5353 O.ll30ll O.s504 o.- 0.5787 O.SllOO 0.7137 0.0298 0.75117 
0.1863 0.1925 0.1874 0.13:211 0.111117 0.1911 0.1aa!i 0.1408 0.2015 0.1019 0.1470 0.1G62 Q.1532 
O.GllOll o.7420 o.7534 0.2970 o.ee1e 0.7432 0.7IMMI 0.3!lll0 0.7il52 0.80211 0.4\l5! 0.8108 0.11522 
0.4&55 0.4928 0.52&& o.1ro1 o.- 0.5447 o.sen 0.7438 o.eo10 oaee 0.75114 0.8474 0.7873 
0.1980 0.1G67 o.:2005 0.1181 o.ro11 0.2001 0.1925 0.1270 0.2003 0.1904 0.1305 0.1921 0.1362 
0.6606 0.7015 0.7230 0.1702 o.584& 0.61l58 0.7412 o.2S112 0.8434 o.7440 0.3522 0.7418 0.$084 
0.5020 0.5142 0.5544 0.7953 0.5734 0.5710 0.5075 0.804$ 0.8224 0.8171 0.11174 0.6003 0.11387 
0.2074 o.2083 0.212• 0.1013 0.2130 0.19118 0.2008 0.1059 o.2033 0.111611 0.1060 O.l!le2 0.1136 
0.640a 0.11354 0.85:111 0.8494 0.8750 0.87112 O.llll36 0.7444 0.9008 0.9148 0.8210 0.9440 0.11()54 
0.411)5 0.•293 0.4533 0.5748 0.41151 0.4953 o.5035 O.eo311 0.5368 0.5413 0.84l!ll 0.51113 0.1!1172 
0.2007 0.1940 0.1913 0.1840 0.2105 0.3)49 0.111&3 0.1727 0.2159 0.2084 0.1819 0.2158 0.1912 
0.78112 0.7994 0.8088 0.5128 0.8342 0.11452 0.8484 0.5G64 0.8742 0.117~ 0.7004 0.9020 0.8028 
0.4409 0.4527 0.41152 0.8258 0.5009 0.5065 0.5248 o.ase2 0.5404 0.!5010 0.1.1782 0.6002 0.7217 
0.20211 0.2019 0.11168 0.1477 0.2110 0.2093 0,11184 0.1572 0.2139 o.ro70 0.1- 0.2102 0.1695 
0.7630 0.7612 0.7702 o.3970 0.78111! o.eoee OJ11llO 0.5052 0.9404 0.8420 0.5QllO 0.81114 0.7380 
0.4405 0.4804 0.5018 0.11665 o.4m 0.5149 0.5352 O.ee92 O.t\534 0.51111 0.7145 0.5137 0.7555 
0.2078 0.2100 o.ro12 0.1324 0.2200 0.20$7 0.20!ll 0.1405 0.2111$ 0.2059 0.14118 0.2114 0.1535 
0.7458 0.7521) 0.7566 0.3010 0.7780 0.7840 0.7818 0.403ll O.l!OQ5 0.8104 0.5092 0.8448 0.8452 
0.4533 0.4859 0.!1()11$ 0.7157 0.5030 0.5297 0.54!6 0.73411 0.5595 0.5828 0.7- 0.5219 0.7959 
0.2187 0.2169 0.2193 0.1254 0.2233 0.2139 0.20ll0 0.1344 0.2210 0.20GS 0.1375 0.2125 o.138$ 
0.7144 0.7130 0.72114 0.1892 0.7448 0.7524 0.7532 O.l!l!ll4 0.7782 0.7814 0.3558 0.8066 0.5004 
0.4472 0.4872 0.5225 o.m• 0.5015 o.5228 0.5578 0.7951 0.!5557 O.SG17 0.8136 0.5211<1 0.8373 





Acquirer's strategy parameters 
a.5 
a.1 a.3 a.5 
y ~B a.1 a.3 0.5 a.1 a.9 a.3 a.5 a.7 a.9 a.5 a.7 
a.a5 a.1 a.•998 a.58211 a.e3311 a.8588 a.1112 a.8498 a.11178 a.73ae a.1aoa a.n<e a.1aee 
a.5392 a.5185 a.51 .. a.5120 a.5187 a.5784 a.5557 a.5'88 a.5502 a.ao.o a.5905 
a.1465 a.1506 a.1487 a.14211 a.1381 a.1535 a.1849 a.1827 a.1815 a.111a a.1na 
a.3 a.3402 a.4288 a.4998 a.5480 a.soeo a.soaa a.5578 a.8022 a.eaee a.e122 a.esea 
a.5999 a.5805 a.51185 a.5715 a.5881 a.8344 a.8173 a.8032 a.8021 a.8548 a.IMOe 
a.1293 a.1295 a.1205 a.1225 a.1212 a.1'52 a.148' a.1412 a.1391 a.1505 a.1574 
a.5 a.21134 a.3446 a.3968 a ... 30 a.5118 a.3Dea a.4Ma a.6228 a.5842 a.so22 a.5482 
a.8520 a.62119 a.8191 a.8204 a.8347 a.8781 a.8572 a.84311 a.8407 a.1111114 a.88211 
a.1214 a.1196 a.1138 a.1a1a a.10D7 a.1335 a.1321 a.1278 a.1203 a.1388 a.1454 
a.7 a.1n4 a.2488 a.3014 a.3888 a.4382 a.3018 a.35311 a.4082 a.4832 a.3808 a.4598 
a.7054 a.8781 a.eaa7 a.8898 a.8821 a.7225 a.701a a.eaea a.111119 a.73211 a.7178 
a.1139 a.10DD a.OD9' a.OD42 a.ages a.1193 a.111111 a.11211 a.1093 a.1240 a.12112 
a.9 a.0954 a.1538 a.1888 a.2382 a.3184 a.1n4 a.ma a.2882 a.3111a a.2590 a.3044 
a.m1 a.7497 a.7481 a.7474 a.7842 a.7855 a.n19 a.780D a.7840 a.80llO a.711311 
a.0979 a.0879 a.0811 a.oaoo a.0918 a.097a a.1a21 a.ooe2 a.Oll24 a.1oea a.1040 
a.35 a.1 a.5012 a.11398 a.eaoo a.7378 a.7504 a.8532 a.74211 a.7884 a.8114 a.7352 a.8084 
a.5371 a.4988 a.4822 a.4873 a.4980 a.5788 a.541111 a.53311 a.53911 a.llOIM a.8854 
a.1'58 a.1808 a.1571 a. 155-4 a.1517 a.1847 a.1737 a.1748 a.1720 a.1715 a.1ae1 
a.3 a.34eQ a.4972 a.5730 a.8228 a.8588 a.4988 a.5938 a.85511 a.7288 a.8024 a.1111114 
a.8052 a.5501 a.5285 a.5329 a.5514 a.11311 a.59511 a.8820 a.8848 a.es1a a.8278 
a.1311 a.1465 a.1487 a.1'57 a.14n a.1439 a.1584 a.1so2 a.1575 a.1511 0.1855 
a.5 a.21118 a.4004 a.4808 a.5484 a.eooo a.3950 a.5034 a.8814 a.ee12 a.5030 a.51178 
a.11458 a.ea28 a.57a2 a.5891 a.5811 a.8752 a.ll305 a.e111 a.8078 a.eaes a.ee211 
a.1163 a.1395 a.1403 a.1435 a.1463 a.12111 a.14211 a.1511 a.1498 a.13114 a.1522 
a.7 a.1892 a.3248 a.3946 a.4858 a.5390 a.3098 a.4132 a.5092 a.sn4 a.311511 a.4950 
a.7a39 a.8232 a.8019 a.8018 a.8205 a.71113 a.8780 a.8548 a.8421 a.73111 a.118211 
a.1090 a.1389 a.1380 a.1430 a.14n a.1190 a.1340 a.1411 a.1 .. 1 a.1288 a.13114 
a.9 a.1a24 a.2034 a.2908 a.3884 a.4640 a.1852 a.2798 a.3544 a.4780 a.21118 a.31120 
a.n15 a.eaeo a.8571 a.8557 a.een a.7958 a.7370 a.7033 a.8907 a.aas1 a.7590 
a.0930 a.1327 a.1448 a.1502 a.1578 a.1009 a.1313 a.1353 a.1423 a.1030 a.1248 
a.85 a.1 a.4918 a.7034 a.7324 a.7506 a.7434 a.8524 a.n20 a.e1eo a.e208 a.7358 a.631111 
a.5407 a.481a a.4803 a.4872 a.4938 a.5804 a.5335 a.a1ae a.62117 a.- a.8871 
a.1'58 a.1858 a.1795 a.1747 a.1889 a.1871 a.1921 a.1879 a.1782 a.1731 a.11138 
a.3 a.3504 a.5984 a.6542 a.8842 a.6838 a.4946 a.5808 a.7212 a.74211 a.8020 a.7450 
a.8073 a.4965 a.4932 a.5050 a.5338 a.8355 a.5815 a.5445 a.ssee a.8548 a.6932 
a.133< a.1788 a.1794 a.1787 a.1880 a.1488 a.1850 a.1814 a.1722 a.1519 a.1838 
a.5 a.2561! a.521a a.5838 a.8258 a.8280 a.4022 a.58« a.8842 a.7042 a.4978 a.8729 
a.8538 a.5180 a.5111 a.5209 a.55-41 a.8817 a.sa211 a.158114 a.5842 a.89114 a.82311 
a.1207 a.1785 a.1834 a.1818 a.1na a.1351 a.1787 a.17113 a.1704 a.1395 a.1m 
a.7 a.1830 a.4754 a.5404 a.5762 a.6038 a.21188 a.5268 a.l!Oll4 a.11434 a.3980 a.5924 
a.1a20 a.5341 a.5313 a.5384 a.5779 a.7195 a.8140 a.51118 a.eoeo a.7378 a.11453 
a.1082 a.1901 a.1858 a.1919 a.1654 a.11113 a.1793 a.18113 a.1n2 a.121a a.1801 
a.9 a.1a18 a.3742 a.4872 a.521a a.5502 a.1798 a.0098 a.5182 a.5738 a.zsaa a.4880 
a.7829 a.5584 a.5528 a.8854 a.5990 a.7908 a.8393 a.e191 a.11332 a.8024 a.8743 
a.0983 a.1992 a.1938 a.1943 a.2048 a.0994 a.1852 a.1914 a.1851 a.1043 a.11135 
a.95 a.1 a.5002 a.7222 a.7400 a.7418 a.7340 a.11448 a.8108 a.e234 a.8322 a.7382 a.e100 
a.5348 a ... 1a a.4527 a.4881 a.4859 a.5887 a.5181 a.6119 a.62114 a.6038 a.6559 
a.1472 a.1971 a.1845 a.1788 a.1708 a.1632 a.2020 a.1948 a.1895 a.1733 a.2087 
a.3 a.3382 a.6582 a.8590 a.8762 a.6720 a.41168 a.7308 a.7358 a.7518 a.6952 a.8076 
a.8043 a.4881 a.4795 a.4891 a.52311 a.11332 a.5271 a.11348 a.5571 a.8592 a.5755 
a.12118 a.1997 a.1989 a.1894 a.1792 a.1481 a.20211 a.1983 a.1830 a.15211 a.2053 
a.5 a.2672 a.8188 a.817a a.8220 a.8382 a.3929 a.8914 a.889' a.7048 a.4920 a.7478 
a.8495 a.4859 a.4824 a.5057 a.551a a.8747 a.5352 a.5490 a.5n4 a.eaa3 a.5882 
a.1204 a.2103 a.2015 a.1DD2 a.1918 a.1314 a.2124 a.1ggg a.1aes a.1348 a.2085 
a.7 a.1898 a.5880 a.5790 a.5888 a.8850 a.2898 a.8308 a.8602 a.8382 a.4018 a.8940 
a.89n a.4835 a.4983 a.517a a.5572 a.7222 a.5457 a.8812 a.5897 a.7371 a.5949 
a.1128 a.2220 a.2159 a.2078 a.2089 a.120& a.21aa a.20DD a.1942 a.1214 a.2181 
a.9 a.1080 a.5208 a.5398 a.5460 a.5476 a.1782 a.5760 a.5762 a.6052 a.2178 a.8198 
a.7655 a.4583 a.4818 a.5220 a.5739 a.7887 a.5333 a.8802 a.8084 a.8058 a.5915 






























































































































































































Acquirer's strategy parameters 
0.7 
0.1 0.3 0.5 
y Ps 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.3 o.s 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.7 
0.05 0.1 0.5009 0.5370 0.5711<1 O.i!IM!O 0.8208 o.&514 o.&874 0.7104 0.72112 0.7322 0.711811 
0.5423 0.5221 0.5210 0.5255 0.5300 o.sn1 0.57311 0.5e211 o.- o.eoea o.5917 
0.1403 0.14Q7 0.1471 0.14511 0.1414 0.1&34 0.1701 0.1&41 0.1913 0.170fl 0.1755 
0.3 0.3500 0.3'17• 0.42&4 0.4ll06 0.41154 o.soee 0.5302 0.571tl 0.$978 o.eooo O.tl:llM 
o.6006 0.5873 0.5711& 0.5852 0.5917 0.9330 O.f252 0.8158 0.f1&$ 0.&$81 0.8481 
0.12117 0.1319 0.1230 0.1234 0.1249 0.1481 0.1478 0.144-4 0.1409 0.1547 0.1582 
0.5 0.25.'12 0.3079 0.32ll!I 0.3742 0.4048 0.3740 0.4320 0.4752 0.4872 0.41130 0.5328 
0.6501 0.9318 0.9312 0.8350 0.6439 0.8733 0.- 0.11548 O.llll80 0.- 0.88i111 
0.1208 0.11SI 0.11311 0.1100 0.1103 0.1295 0.1320 0.12!5 0.1249 0.131111 0.1407 
0.1 0.1822 0.21&11 0.2578 0.2858 0.3308 0.3022 0.32211 o.~ 0.4150 0.38112 0.4312 
0.7034 o.&780 0.8780 0.8873 0.9111111 0.7183 0.71211 0.1020 0.7027 0.7331 0.724$ 
0.1119 0.1013 o.- 0.0994 0.1049 0.1181 0.1187 0.1150 0.1104 0.1:143 0.1248 
0.9 0.0978 0.130!! 0.151111 0.1792 0.2308 0.18$8 0.2192 0.2354 0.2!!04 0.2e10 0.2908 
0.78'0 0.7541 0.7$37 0.7580 o.n33 o.n11 0.7792 0.7721 o.n30 0.71191 0.71110 
0.1013 0.0907 O.oee-1 o.oaas o.oose 0.1002 0.1000 0.0973 0.0931 0.1018 0.1083 
0.35 0.1 0.4111le 0.570!! 0.920!! 0.8219 0.8378 0.&439 0.7024 0.7192 0.7484 0.74211 0.7878 
0.5405 0.5134 0.5099 0.!5()92 O.Sl!OO 0.5804 0.5e29 O.S558 0.5815 o.81oe 0.51114 
0.1472 0.1•97 0.1541 0.1532 0.1470 0.1831 0.1872 0.1712 0.16&2 0.1780 0.17W 
0.3 0.3509 o.437e 0.4802 0.5020 0.5248 0.$012 O.M32 0.9042 0.8209 O.ll024 O.eGe 
0.5948 0.5723 0.5625 0.5662 0.5711 0.6348 0.80llll 0.5'1'112 0.8018 o.- 0.8357 
0.1247 0.1398 0.1369 0.13'13 0.1371 0.1489 0.1479 0.14'111 0.1502 0.1532 0.1548 
o.s 0.21174 o.3424 0.3889 0.4132 0.4804 0.3912 0.432e 0.4910 0.5432 0.5079 0.5550 
0.&411<1 o.9116 0.8019 0.9012 0.8137 o.6no o.ase1 0.&417 o.- 0.$40 0-8781 
0.1197 0.12111 0.1290 0.1315 0.1437 0.1331 0.1379 0.1419 0.1380 0.13119 0.1481 
0.7 0.1904 0.2438 O.l?910 0.388& 0.31148 0.3182 0.35«) 0.311112 0.48511 0.3842 0.4530 
0.6!l<9 0.11543 0.11<157 0.11<114 0.&411$ 0.72211 0.9934 0.9827 0.8780 0.7408 0.7174 
0.1096 0.1109 0.1215 0.12911 0.1327 0.1207 0.1227 0.1311 0.1213 0.131S 0.1315 
0.0 0.1010 0.15$15 0.1999 0.2474 0.3180 0.1- 0.2252 0.2780 0-3444 0.2820 0.3042 
o.n31 0.7305 0.70IM 0.0985 o.7072 0.7f41 o.1m 0.7413 0.7320 0.8013 0.7833 
0.0898 0.1039 0.1113 0.1232 0.1355 0.0984 0.1057 0.11511 0.1242 0.1037 o.mlll 
0.65 0.1 0.5076 0.6180 0.1135-< 0.6470 0.8380 0.6540 0.72112 0.7504 0.741111 0.7510 0.8020 
0.5321 0.4Q21 0.41ll!G 0.4943 0.5116 o.~ 0!1493 0.5411 0.6470 0.8094 o.sase 
o.1<10S 0.1979 0.15!13 0.1593 o.t!>IO 0.11145 0.1789 0.1805 0.11185 0.1723 0.111<17 
0.3 0.3828 0.48e0 O.SlaO 0.5460 0.6510 0.4994 0.9010 0.83119 0.8516 0.8032 0.91134 
0.5970 0.5422 0.5l?97 0.5388 0.5623 0.8314 0.59118 o.seoe O.satl7 o.esee 0.11215 
0.1:i!83 0.1- 0.16'12 O.HMl3 0.1545 0.1«2 0.1llllO 0.1885 0.14141 O.IS:le 0.17211 
0.5 0.2e30 0 . .014 0.'578 0.47« 0.481111 0.38&2 0.5112 0.- 0.511<19 o.- 0.9042 
0.8491 0.5715 0.55S3 o.ssoo O.!lllM o.8n4 o.82!11 0.8158 0.8135 0.0075 0.4S41 
0.1170 0.18:!5 0.1&40 0.1878 0.1837 0.1351 0.15$0 0.1832 0.1831 0.13111 0.1881 
0.7 0.1762 0.3150 0.31124 0.4130 0.4309 0.3048 0.31174 0.4838 0.5030 0.4088 0.5018 
0.7049 0.5955 o.5n• 0.5798 0.0152 0.7ZIS o.esee 0.11357 0.844-4 0.7408 0.8922 
0.11:10 o.1en o.11oe 0.1734 0.1815 0.1165 0.1507 0.1038 0.1839 0.1245 0.1595 
0.9 0.1000 0.2414 0.2922 0.3564 0.3690 0.1860 O.t/SH 0.3742 0.41.0 0.12534 0.3730 
o.ns1 0.6332 0.6057 o.eo79 0.&443 0.7935 0.7072 0.8759 0.8753 o.aoee 0.73114 
0.0956 0.1751 0.1798 0.154 0.19511 0.1021 0.1839 0.1717 0.1725 0.1053 0.1497 
0.95 0.1 0.5050 0.6374 0.6480 0.655& 0.6506 0.6448 o.7534 0.7602 0.7540 0.7434 0.11102 
o.san 0.4788 0.4864 0.4970 0.5099 o.5799 0.5392 o.san 0.5471 0.8094 0.5749 
0.1487 0.18:19 0.1733 0.1657 0.1819 0.1650 0.194:1 0.1830 0.175!1 0.1731 0.1975 
0.3 0.3450 0.5'08 0.5"'2 0.5374 0.6574 0.5118 0.11<110 0.85311 0.8480 0.51174 0.7124 
0.8054 0.5021 0.5214 0.5318 0.5535 0.9355 0.!5650 0.5714 o.seee 0.6527 0.51194 
0.1322 0.193' 0.1818 0.1754 0.1819 0.1- 0.19211 0.11132 0.1611G 0.1521 0.1941 
0.5 0.25311 0.4748 0.4742 O.A744 0.4874 0.4042 0.5722 0.57&4 0.57« 0.5002 0.6504 
0.8473 0.51211 0.5308 0.5487 0.5802 0.8791 0.57811 O.sQeO 0.6114 0.111111 0.8197 
o.11n 0.2090 0.18117 0.1861 o.1ne 0.1307 O.i2018 0.1821 0.1721 0.1392 0.19S3 
0.7 0.1870 0.4239 0.42.0 0.4282 0.4308 0.3008 0.5098 O.lioell 0.5084 0.408ll 0.5722 
0.708S 0.51« 0.5345 o.seeo 0.8040 0.7:105 0.5853 O.G0311 o.em 0.7388 0.9321 
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Acquirer's strategy parameters 
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APPENDIX 5.C. A numerical example of a hypergame situation in merger negotiations 
Assume that Player A (the acquirer) bases its decision regarding a choice of 
strategy on the submatrix G0' of expected gains as defined in §5.3.1. Thus Ns perception 
of the strategies available to itself and its opponent (Player B, the target) are 
A' = { ai. a13, ~4· a3o• a33• a42• asi• asg} 
and B' = {b1, b4, b1, b10, b13, b16, bi9}. 
This matrix yielded a unique solution point <~, b16> with E(gain to acquirer) = 0.5227 
and E(gain to target) = 0.3431. 
Assume also that Player B's perception of the situation is somewhat different: B 
perceives that the available strategies to the two players are 
* A = { a1, a6, ag, a13 } to the acquirer, 
* and B = { b5, b9, b15, b1s} to the target, 
which yields a matrix G0 * of expected gains as follows: 
al a6 ag a13 
A( .1 ; .1, .3) A.(.3; .3, .3) A( .3; .9 ,.3) A(.7; .7, .3) 
bs B(.9;.05) 
0.0802 0.1450 0.3315 0.2832 
0.0684 0.1052 0.2048 0.1543 
bg B(.7;.35) 0.1261 0.2169 0.4428 0.3773 
0.1195 0.1716 0.3397 0.2224 
bis B(.9;.65) 
0.0809 0.1425 0.4355 0.2879 
0.0683 0.1023 0.3335 0.1570 
bis B(.5;.95) 
0.1684 0.2646 0.4383 0.4280 
0.1741 0.2253 0.4120 0.2645 
After elimination of dominated strategies relative to the other's complete strategy set, the 
associated reduced game G1 * is 
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Player B's choice is b9 (since 0.4428 > 0.4383), and the optimal strategy pair is<~. b9> 
with E(gain to acquirer) = 0.3397 and E(gain to target) = 0.4428. 
The acquirer's view of the game gives itself an expected gain of 0.5227, 
considerably more than that afforded it by the target (0.3397) in its perception of the 
game. Similarly, the target sees itself as expecting a gain of 0.4428, a lot more than that 
expected in the acquirer's view of the game (0.3431). 
Thus the acquirer will play strategy 32 (anticipating the target to play b16), and 
the target will play b9 (in the expectation of the acquirer playing ~). The actual outcome 
of <a2, b9> yields 
E(gain to acquirer) = 0.2648 < 0.3397 = E(GA(B» < 0.5227 = E(GA<A» 
and E(gain to target) = 0.2399 < 0.3431 = E(GB(A» < 0.4428 = E(GB(B»• 
where E(G1(Jy is the expected gain for Player I as perceived by Player J. 
Both A and B thus end up with expected gains far below what either player 
anticipated, since their initial perceptions of the game were different. , 
6-1 
CBAPTER6 
FURTIIER SIMULATION RESULTS: THE EFFECT OF THE 
CONTEXTUAL MODEL PARAMETERS 
§6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter S a Monte Carlo simulation procedure was constructed to execute the 
multi-stage merger bargaining model with full and symmetric uncertainty. This procedure 
was implemented for a particular set of contextual model parameter values, and the effect 
of varying both players' strategy parameters was investigated. Furthermore we were able 
to identify strategies which were Pareto-optimal to the players using a process of 
successive elimination of dominated strategies as well as applying a Bayesian approach. 
This initial simulation did not take any account of the effect of changes to the 
contextual parameters. These parameters describe the environment within which the 
negotiations take place as perceived by the two players, and include the players' 
perceived uncertainties about the others' reservation price, the playe~· joint propensity 
to identify the difference in their reservation prices, and their perceived relative 
dominance at the negotiating table. In the next section of this chapter we will examine 
the effect of a change in the value of each of the contextual parameters separately, 
specifically focusing on (i) how the players' optimal bargaining strategies change, and 
(ii) how the players' expected gains at the optimal bargaining strategies change. The aim 
here is thus to perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameters in question. 
The chapter concludes with some comments on the realism and applicability of the model 
for decision support, and some general observations which might prove useful from a 
decision support point of view. 
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§6.2 THE EFFECT OF A VARIATION IN THE VALUES OF THE MODEL'S 
CONTEXTUAL PARAMETERS 
§6.2.1 VARIATION IN THE TARGET'S UNCERTAINTY, crB 
In the development of the model in Chapter 4 we assumed 'that the acquirer's 
reservation price, VA• might not be known with absolute certainty to the target This 
uncertainty in VA as perceived by the target was modelled in terms of a normal 
distribution with variance crn 2. In this section we will examine the effect on the players' 
optimal bargaining strategies. and their expected gains at these optim8.I bargaining 
strategies, of changes in cre. It is important to note at this stage that crn is not a strategy 
parameter: it merely represents the degree to which the target's management believe that 
they are able to identify the true value of VA• and only alters if further information 
concerning the acquirer (and its attitude towards the target) becomes available. 
The contextual parameter cre only appears in setting the target's initial acceptance 
level, A1• However, since acceptance level ~· j ~ 2, is based partially on acceptance 
level ~-l• all acceptance levels~ are dependent on cr8• This parameter does not affect 
the acquirer's offer stream in any way. The model has 
where Ve is value of the target's known reservation price, 
On is the target's perceived relative dominance, 0::; ~B ::; 1, 
and ~B is the target's strategic concession parameter, 0::; ~B ::; 1. 
For simulation purposes we arbitrarily normalised the target's reservation price to 0, and 
thus 
The target's strategic concession parameter~ determines whether the target will set its 
' 
initial acceptance level high (i.e. above· its own expectation of a fair price; ~B > 0.5) or 
low (i.e. below its own expectation of a fair price; ~B < 0.5), and crB serves only to act 
as a multiplicative nmagnifying" factor of this strategy. Thus for any value of crB (~ 0), 
if ~B > 0.5 ( and so <ll" 1(~) > 0) we have that A1 > Se (the target's expectation of a fair 
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price), and if '3B < 0.5 (i.e.<ll-i(13B) < 0) we have that Ai < Os· The effect of an increase 
in cra is merely to increase the amount that Ai deviates from Sa (above or below). 
The simulation was rerun with both players' perceived dominances SA and Sa set 
equal to 0.5, the acquirer's uncertainty in the estimation of Va, crA, set to 0.1, and the 
players' propensity to estimate the difference in their reservation prices, cr, set to 0.1. The 
value of cr8 was varied from 0.1 to 0.25 in steps of 0.05.i For ease of assimilation the 
7 x 8 submatrix G0' formed by choosing subsets A' c A and B' c B of acquirer and 
target strategies (as in Chapter 5) will again be used as a starting matrix in analysing the 
effect of the change in cra. The matrices G0' of players' expected gains for these values 
of cra can be found in Appendix 6.A. The players' optimal bargaining strategies on G0', 
and their resulting expected gains based on the simulations are displayed in Table 6.1. 
We observe that, barring one exception, the optimal bargaining strategy is always 
<ai, bi6> for all levels of cra ~ cr = 0.1 and for both approaches to identifying the 
optimal strategy. (The one exception is the BDM approach for cra = 0.1, where the 
optimal acquirer strategy is~). This very robust optimal strategy <ai, bi6> implies that 
the acquirer should initially take a hard-line approach, with an initial offer well below 
its expectation of a fair price, but be prepared to negotiate persistently, if necessary, up 
to a final offer level still well below its expectation of a fair price. When the target is 
uncertain of the true value of VA it should in general take a soft-line approach, starting 
with a very low initial acceptance level and rapidly yielding towards the acquirer's initial 
offer. The players' expected gains (under the EDS approach) as cra varies are graphically 
displayed in Figure 6.1. 
i Since the two players do not share their reservation prices with each other, there is 
inherent uncertainty to both players as to the true value of the difference in their 
reservation prices, VA - Va· A lack of full knowledge about the other would have the 
effect of contributing to the uncertainty each has in estimating the other's reservation 
price. Thus for all practical purposes cr A ~ cr and cra ~ cr. The model could, of course, 
produce simulated results for the case cr A < cr or cra < cr, but since these would only arise 
out of extreme measures being taken by one or both players, and since we can not 
anticipate the players' behaviour for these levels of player's uncertainties, we will omit 







Table 6.1. Optimal bargaining strategies and resulting expected gains as cra varies 
(BA= Ba= 0.5; <J = <JA = 0.1) 
Elimination of dominated 
strategies (EDS) 
Optimal E(gain to acquirer) 
strategy E(gain to target) 
<a2, bi6> 0.4716 
0.3903 
<ai. bi6> 0.5007 
0.4081 
<a2, bi6> 0.5158 
0.4140 




Optimal E(gain to acquirer) 
strategy E(gain to target) 
<a24• bi6> 0.4276 
0.4256 




<a2, bi6> 0.5346 
0.4237 
0.6..--------------------~--------------. 
0.55 .............................................................................................................................. ······································ .. . 




E(gain to target) 
0.4 
0.35 ······················· ···························································· .................................................................. ······································· 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 
<Je 
0.2 0.25 
Figure 6.1. Players' expected gains as <Ja varies (under EDS) 
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Both players expect their gains to increase as the target's uncertainty regarding 
VA increases, with the acquirer's gains increasing at a greater rate on average (the 
average slope of the expected gain to the acquirer is 0.4200, whilst the average slope of 
the target's expected gain is 0.2227). At first glance the concept of increasing uncertainty 
being rewarded with increasing expected gains might appear counter-intuitive. However 
the optimal target strategy here (bi6) has ~ = 0.1 and so ct>-i(~) < 0, implying Ai < ~· 
Thus an increase in crB will lead to an initial acceptance level Ai which is further below 
~. and thus closer to Oi and OL, the range within all offers will occur. This will 
necessarily increase the probability of merger agreement being reached, but at a lower 
transaction value if agreement is indeed reached. The probability of merger agreement 
and the average transaction ~ue (under EDS) in the case of successful mergers for 




0.8 ............................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
0.1 .................................................................................................................. ································ 
0.6 
0.5 ....... .. 
Average transaction value 
in successful mergers 
0.4 L__ __ ...1...._ _ __.i._ _ __._ _ __.. __ ~.__ _ ____. 
0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 
Figure 6.2. Probability of merger agreement and average transaction value in 
successful mergers as crB varies (under EDS) 
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In §5.2.1 we defined the expected gains to the two players in terms of the 
probability of merger agreement, P(merger occurring), and the average transaction value 
in successful merger agreements, Ave. On the basis of these definitions we would expect 
E(gain to the acquirer) to increase in any event, and E(gain to the target) to increase if 
P(merger occurring) increases faster than Ave (which it does, as is evident from the 
slopes of the respective lines in Figure 6.2). Thus the observed counter-intuitive effect 
of an increase in O'B is due wholly to the optimal target strategy having~ < 0.5; if the 
optimal target strategy had had ~ > 0.5 (i.e. the target choosing a more hard-line initial 
position relative to its expectation of a fair price, possibly a more intuitive response to 
increased uncertainty), the model predicts that both parties would have expected their 
gains to decrease as O'B increased. 
The important point in the above discussion is that A1 decreases and lies closer 
to [01; OiJ, and this leads to increased expected gains to both players. Even if there is 
no change in O'B the target could achieve the same result by simply reducing its strategy 
parameter PB· Mathematically, PB could be reduced to its lower limit (i.e. ~ = 0), 
leaving the simulated A1 = -oo (which might not be an optimal strategy anyway). In 
practice, however, human nature on the part of the target would almost certainly play a 
role here: the target would balk at setting an obviously ridiculously low acceptance level. 
For this reason we have deemed 0.1 to be the lowest "reasonable" level for Ps in the 
simulation. 
In terms of offering decision support, we thus note that the optimal bargaining 
strategy ~· b16> appears to be relatively robust to variations in the target's uncertainty 
regarding the true value of the acquirer's reservation price, VA· Furthermore, the nature 
of the target's strategy b16 is such that, providing that both parties stick to their optimal 
strategies, the probability of successful merger will increase rapidly as O'B increases, 
whilst the average transaction value in successful agreements decreases only very slowly. 
§6.2.2 VARIATION IN THE ACQUIRER'S UNCERTAINTY, cr A 
Recall that the acquirer's uncertainty regarding the target's true reservation price 
VB was modelled as the standard deviation O'A of some normal distribution on VB. In this 
section we will investigate the effect of changes in this uncertainty about VB on the 
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optimal strategies for the players and on the gains they would expect to receive at these 
optimal strategies. 
The parameter GA appears in the model in setting the acquirer's initial offer 0 1, 
and the final possible offer Di_. Thus if GA was to change, so would the off er interval 
[01; OtJ and thus all potential offers in this interval. Furthermore, since the target's 
acceptance level at each stage beyond the initial stage depends in part on the off er at the 
previous stage, each non-initial acceptance level Ai· A3, ••••• would also be affected by 
a change to GA- Note that the target's initial acceptance level A1 is not affected by a 
change to GA· In the model the initial offer was represented as 
01 = v A - OA (1 - GA <1>- 1 c~Al)) 
and the final possible offer as 
OL =VA - OA (1- GA <l>-l(~AI)) 
where v A is the known value of the acquirer's reservation price, 
oA is the acquirer's perceived relative dominance, 0 S oA S 1, 
~Al is the acquirer's initial strategic concession parameter, 0 S ~Al S 1, 
and ~AL is the acquirer' s final strategic concession parameter, 0 S ~AL S 1, ~AL > ~Al. 
For simulation purposes we arbitrarily viewed the negotiating position from the target's 
perspective; VA was varied according to the distribution aAB - N(l;cs2), and we thus had 
01 = TlAB - OA (1 - GA <1>- 1 c~Al)) 
and 
where TlAB is a specific simulated outcome from aAB. As in the case of the target's 
strategy, the acquirer's initial and final strategic concession parameters determine the 
charity of its offers; a value greater than 0.5 implies a generous offer (i.e. above the 
acquirer's expectation of a fair price) and a value less than 0.5 implies a hard-line one 
(below its expectation of a fair price). The uncertainty GA (~ G) again serves as a 
multiplicative factor of this strategy. Thus in the presence of acquirer uncertainty about 
VB, if ~Al > 0.5 (and thus <l>- 1 (~A1) > 0) we have that 0 1 > TlAB - oA, and if ~Al < 0.5 
(i.e. <l>- 1 (~A1 ) < 0) the initial offer is 0 1 < TlAB - oA. An increase in the value of GA 
results in a further increase of the deviation (up or down) of 0 1 away from the acquirer's 
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expectation of a fair price, 11AB - o A· An identical argument holds for determining the 
relative position of OL from the value of ~AL· · 
To examine the effect of a change in the value of GA• the simulation was rerun 
with the relative dominances oA = O.e = 0.5, the target's uncertainty about VA set to 0.1, 
and G set to 0.1. The value of GA was v~ed from 0.1 to 0.25 in discrete steps of 0.05, 
and the resulting submatrix G0' was used as a starting matrix for determining optimal 
strategies. The submatrices G0' for these values of GA can be found in Appendix 6.A. The 
optimal bargaining strategies on G0' and their resulting expected gains to the players 
based on the simulation runs are displayed in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Optimal bargaining strategies and resulting expected gains as GA varies 
(OA = 0a = 0.5; G =GB = 0.1) 
Elimination of dominated Bayesian decision-making 
strategies (EDS) approach (BDM) 
Optimal E(gain to acquirer) Optimal E(gain to acquirer) 
GA strategy E(gain to target) strategy E(gain to target) 
0.10 <ai· b16> 0.4716 <~4, b16> 0.4276 
0.3903 0.4256 
0.15 <~. bi6> 0.4694 <ai4· b16> 0.4118 
0.3530 0.4060 
0.20 <~. bl6> 0.4665 <as9.b16> 0.3970 
0.3214 0.5081 
<a59. bi> 0.3979 
0.5096 
0.25 <~. b16> 0.4668 <a59• b16> 0.3938 
0.2959 0.5280 
<a59. bi> 0.3962 
0.5312 
Since the classical game-theoretic method of finding an optimal solution point and 
strategies by successive elimination of player's dominated strategies differs fundamentally 
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from the Bayesian approach to optima location, we might expect that the optimal 
strategies (and hence players' expected gains) detennined by the two methods may differ 
from one another at different values of certain contextual parameter values (notably a A 
here). For this reason we will examine the effect of a change in a A for each of the two 
approaches (EDS and BDM) separately. 
As a A increases from 0.1 · the players' optimal strategies under EDS exhibit two 
distinct phases. Firstly, as the value of a A increases to moderate levels (0.10 s a A s 
0.15) the acquirer's optimal strategy is ai. which indicates a hard-line positioning of all 
the acquirer's offers, but with a willingness to negotiate persistently within this fairly 
narrow range. The target's strategy b16 is to start with a low acceptance level but give 
up ground very rapidly as the negotiations proceed. Secondly, as a A increases to high 
levels (C'JA ;:: 0.2) the players are faced with a choice of strategy, since there are two 
equilibrium points now. One possibility is for the players to remain with the strategy pair 
~· b16> (as at more moderate levels of acquirer uncertainty), and the other is to switch 
to <a.59, b1> (in which the acquirer starts with a very generous offer but with very little 
penchant to negotiate further, whilst the target still starts with a low acceptance level but 
is disinclined to yield much). The player's expected gains for varying aA for the EDS 
approach are depicted in Figure 6.3. 
Whilst the optimal strategy pair remains the same (at <8.i· b16>) and a A increases 
above 0.1, the offer interval [01; OiJ shifts downwards, lying completely below the 
acquirer's expectation of a fair price, TlAB - SA (since <IJ" 1(~Al) < 0 and <IJ" 1 (~AI.) < 0 at 
acquirer strategy ai>. Since the acquirer's degree of persistence remains constan4 the 
probability of merger occurring can be expected to decrease, as will the average 
transaction value if agreement is reached, since the target will have to yield more in order 
to "reach" the acquirer's offer interval. Figure 6.4 shows the simulated probability of 
merger and the average transaction value in the case of successful agreement. The 
expected gain to the target for this strategy will thus decrease sharply as C'JA increases, 
whilst the acquirer's expected gain, made up of the product of a decreasing term 
k 
(P(merger occurring)) and an increasing term ( ..!.. L Tl~ - Average transaction value, 
k k h=l 
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Figure 6.3. Player's expected gains as CJ A varies (EDS approach) 
will not be expected to vary a lot. Finally, as CJ A reaches high levels, the strategy pair 
<a59, b1> becomes a co-optimal equilibrium point. This strategy has <l>-
1 (~A 1 ) > 0, and 
thus the offer interval will be situated well above the acquirer's expectation of a fair 
price. Thus all offers are generous (even though the acquirer's propensity for making 
further offers is low), which, combined with the target's optimal strategy of a low initial 
acceptance level, will lead to a very high probability of success at a high transaction 
value. This combination clearly favours the target company, a fact borne out by Figure 
6.3. Again we note that the EDS optimal strategy is stable for moderate levels of acquirer 
uncertainty. However when this uncertainty gets large the model is unable to identify a 
single optimal point (multiple equilibrium points exist), which renders it inadequate for 
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Figure 6.4. Probability of merger agreement and average transaction value in 
successful mergers as <J A varies 
Turning to the BDM approach we notice that an increase in <J A has no effect on 
the target's optimal strategy, b16• The acquirer's optimal strategy, however, does vary 
with <J A· For moderate levels of <J A (0.1 s cr A s 0.15) the optimal acquirer strategy is a24, 
switching to as9 for high levels of acquirer uncertainty about VB• <J A ~ 0.2. 1\vo points 
are worth noting. Firstly, the strategy <a59, b16> is the cooperative strategy (in the sense 
of §5.3.2) arising out of the dual equilibrium points <a2, b16> and <a59, b1>. Secondly, 
ai4 represents moderately persistent negotiating by the acquirer within a wide offer 
interval straddling the acquirer's expectation of a fair price, whilst as9 represents a very 
high initial offer but with a very low inclination to negotiate. Thus the BDM approach 
tends to indicate that increased acquirer uncertainty should lead to an increased initial 
offer position, but with less inclination to enter into protracted negotiations. 
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Thus whilst the two approaches to identifying optilllal player strategies appear to 
yield slightly different outcomes. they both have highlighted the fact that as soon as the 
acquirer's uncertainty about VB exceeds a certain value, an instability sets in, malting 
strategy choice extremely difficult The Bayesian approach might prove more useful as 
a tool for decision support in this instance since it offers a single optimal strategy pair 
which is in a sense a compromise between the two offered by the more conventional 
game-theoretic techniques. 
§6.2.3 VARIATION IN THE LEVEL OF a, THE PLAYERS' FUNDAMENTAL 
PROPENSITY TO DETERMINE THE TRUE DIFFERENCE IN THEIR 
RESERVATION PRICES 
We now turn to investigating the effect on the players' optimal strategies and 
expected gains of a change in the level of a, the inherent propensity that both players 
have to determine the true difference in the companies' reservation prices. We have 
argued that for the purposes of this study it is reasonable to assume that the individual 
players' uncertainties about the others' reservation price (aA and OB) are both at least as 
great as a. We will start by observing the effect of a change in a when a A = aB = a, · 
and later examine the situation when a A = aB = 1.Sa. Thus a change in a will 
necessarily be accompanied by a change in a A and an as well. 
We have already examined the effect of a change in a A and in aB individually 
in §6.2.2 and §6.2.1 respectively. We showed that for the optimal strategy pair an 
increase in aB led to a decrease in the target's initial acceptance level, A1, and an 
increase in aA led to a downward shift in the entire offer interval [01; OtJ. The 
combined effect of these changes is that the entire negotiating process would simply take 
place at a somewhat lower level. This would have little effect on the probability of 
agreement being reached, but would naturally reduce the average transaction value in the 
case of successful agreements, facts borne out by the trends evident in Figures 6.2 and 
6.4. 
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In the model we defined L\AB - N(l;cr), and in the simulation implementation of 
the model we had 
and 
01 = TlAB - OA (1 - CJA <l>- 1 <~A1)) 
OL =TlAB - OA (1- CJA <l>- 1 (~AJ) 
where TlAB is a specific simulated outcome from LlAB. The effect of an increase in CJ 
would be to make the simulated position of the offer interval more variable, providing 
all the other parameters are held constant. 
The simulation procedure was rerun with CJ = CJ A = CJB varying from 0.1 to 0.5 
in discrete steps of 0.1. The results (using submatrix G0' as starting matrix for the 
analysis) are presented in Table 6.3. The submatrices G0' for these cases can be found 







Table 6.3. Optimal bargaining strategies and resulting expected gains 
as CJ= CJA = CJB varies (oA = ~ = 0.5) 
Elimination of dominated Bayesian decision-making 
strategies (EDS) approach (BDM) 
Optimal E(gain to acquirer) Optimal E(gain to acquirer) 
strategy E(gain to target) strategy E(gain to target) 
<a2, bi6> 0.4716 <a24• bi6> 0.4276 
0.3903 0.4256 
<ai, bi6> 0.5128 <ai, bi6> 0.5128 
0.3569 0.3569 
<a2, bi6> 0.5227 <a2,b16> 0.5227 
0.3431 0.3431 
<ai. bi6> 0.5290 <a2, bi6> 0.5290 
0.3321 0.3321 
<a2, bi6> 0.5376 <a2,b16> 0.5376 
0.3165 0.3165 
<a2, bi6> 0.5519 <ai. bi> 0.4908 
0.3058 0.3015 
* This case corresponds to the initial simulation examined in some detail in §5.3.1 
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The EDS approach indicates that the optimal strategy pair, <a2, b16>, is very 
stable under changes in CJ, CJ A and CJB within the ranges considered here. The BDM 
approach appears to again suffer from an "edge effect": at low levels of uncertainty the 
acquirer's strategy is at variance with that proposed by EDS and at high levels of 
uncertainty the target's optimal strategy differs. The expected gains to the players under 
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Figure 6.5. Players' expected gains under EDS for varying CJ= CJ A= CJB 
We notice from Figure 6.5 that the acquirer's expected gain increases as the 
players' uncertainties increase (but at an ever-decreasing rate), whilst the target expects 
its gain to decrease. For the optimal strategy pair <a2, b16> we have shown that the 
combined effect of increasing CJ, CJ A and CJB is that the bargaining will take place at lower 
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levels, and the (simulated) position of the offer interval is more variable. In other words, 
increasing cr would increase the probability that [Oi; OJ is further from Ai, thus 
reducing the chances of a successful bargaining agreement in these cases. This increase 
in the common propensity of the two players to determine the true magnitude of the zone 
of agreement, VA - VB, would similarly tend to increase the probability that the offer 
interval was closer to Ai as well; this would tend to have little effect on the probability 
of agreement, since in these cases agreement would have been reached for smaller cr, but 
it would increase the average transaction value in successful cases. Thus combining the 
effect of an increase in cr A and crB with that of an increase in cr indicates that we would 
expect a decrease in the probability of agreement without a material change in the 
average value at which agreement is reached. The components of the players' expected 
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Figure 6.6. Probability of merger and average transaction value in successful 
mergers as cr = cr A = crB varies 
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The expected gain to the target comprises of the product of the above two tenns. 
Since P(merger occurring) is decreasing whilst the average transaction value in successful 
mergers remains approximately constant. the expected gain to the target will decrease as 
c:t, GA and c:tB increase. Turning now to the behaviour of the acquirer's expected gain as 
c:t changes. recall that the acquirer' expected gain is 
k 
P(merger occurring) . .!. L <11.!a -Th) 
k h=l 
where Th is the simulated transaction value in the hth successful merger, and k is the total 
number of successful agreements in M simulations, k ::;; M. This can be written as 
k 
P(merger occurring) . .!. L 11!e - E(gain to target). (6.1) 
k h=l 
Now by definition £\AB - N(l;a2). Low values of 11AB where 11AB is a specfic outcome 
from £\AB (say< l) would tend to not lead to agreement, since this situation implies that 
the entire offer interval has been shifted downwards whilst A1 remains constant. As c:t 
increases, then, more and more cases would fall into this class. Thus the average 
simulated value of the 11AB conditional on successful merger agreement would tend to 
be somewhat greater than 1, and this would increase rapidly as c:t increases. The first 
tenn in (6.1) thus consists of a decreasing tenn, P(merger), and an increasing 
k 
tenn, .!. L 11.!e , which results in a tenn which is approximately constant. Since we 
k h=l 
have already shown that E(gain to target) decreases as c:t increases, the acquirer's 
expected gain increases with increasing c:t. Thus greater levels of uncertainty appear to 
offer an opportunity to the acquirer, but to be detrimental to the target's aspirations of 
gains. In a real-world bargaining situation this means that as both players' uncertainties 
increase it becomes more likely that a very low offer will be accepted, an event which 
will, of course, strongly advantage the acquirer and disadvantage the target. 
We turn now to the situation where c:t A = <ta > c:t. In particular, we examine the 
simulated results for the case c:t A = <ta = I.Sa. The results are displayed in Table 6.4. The 
optimal acquirer strategy is observed to remain unchanged at a2 for all levels of c:t and 
for both approaches to optima identification. The target's optimal strategy, however, is 







Table 6.4. Optimal bargaining strategies and resulting expected gains 
as cr A = crB = 1.5cr varies (o A = ~ = 0.5) 
Elimination of dominated 
strategies (EDS) 
Optimal E(gain to acquirer) 
strategy E(gain to target) 
<ai. bi6> 0.4991 
0.3686 
<a2, bi6> 0.5627 
0.3114 
<ai. b16> 0.5848 
0.2689 
<a2, b13> 0.4596 
0.2518 




Optimal E(gain to acquirer) 
strategy E(gain to target) 
<ai· b16> 0.4991 
0.3686 
<a2, b16> 0.5627 
0.3114 




<ai. b1> 0.4903 
0.2385 
under both EDS and BDM to other strategies as cr increases. The Bayes optimal strategy 
is again more sensitive to the change in parameter values, switching at lower values of 
cr. This would tend to indicate that this approach is not sufficiently stable for use in a 
decision support role, and that the more traditional game-theoretic technique of 
eliminating player's dominated strategies should rather be pursued. Turning to the 
players' expected gains, where comparison to the case cr = cr A = crB is possible (i.e. 
where the optimal strategies are identical), the effect of increasing cr A and crB to 1.5cr is 
to increase the acquirer's gains and to decrease the target's gains still further. 
§6.2.4 VARIATION IN THE TARGET'S PERCEIVED RELATIVE DOMINANCE,~ 
The target's perceived dominance, ~. appears in the model in determining the 
target's initial acceptance level, A1 = vB + ~ (1 + crB <I>"1(J3ii)), and does not affect the 
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acquirer's offer stream. Providing that the target's optimal strategy and level of 
uncertainty about VA are such that a8 <l>-
1(~) > -1 (the values for a8 and ~B used so 
far in this study satisfy this criterion), the effect of an increase in Sa is to shift the 
target's initial acceptance level upwards.1 
The simulation procedure was run with a = a A = as = 0.25 and the acquirer's 
relative dominance constant at 0.5 whilst~ was varied from 0.3 to 0.7 in steps of 0.1. 
The case ~ = 0.5 is simply the initial simulation discussed at length in §5.3. The optimal 
bargaining strategies on G0' and the expected gains are shown in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5. Optimal bargaining strategies and resulting expected gains 
as Ba varies (a= aA = a8 = 0.25; SA = 0.5) 
Elimination of dominated Bayesian decision-making 
strategies (EDS) approach (BDM) 
Optimal E(gain to acquirer) Optimal E(gain to acquirer) 
strategy E(gain to target) strategy E(gain to target) 
0.3 <ai. b16> 0.5742 <a2, b16> 0.5742 
0.3504 0.3504 
0.4 <a2, b16> 0.5557 <a2, bl6> 0.5557 
0.3493 0.3493 
0.5 <a2, b16> 0.5227 <ai. b16> 0.5227 
0.3431 0.3431 
0.6 <ai. b16> 0.4944 <a2,b16> 0.4944 
0.3336 0.3336 
0.7 <ai. b16> 0.4733 <ai. b16> 0.4733 
0.3247 0.3247 
1 Recall that in the derivation of the model the target's expectation of a fair price offer 
was merely Sa· Thus the more dominant a target believes itself to be, the more it expects 
to be able to achieve from the negotiations. 
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For the range of ~ values considered here we note that EDS and BDM both offer a 
single optimal bargaining strategy: the well-frequented strategy <a2, b16>. T~e expected 
gains to the players are displayed in Figure 6.7. 
0.55 
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Figure 6.7. Players' expected gains for varying~ 
Both players' expected gains decrease as ~ (which in the model is also the 
target's expectation of a fair price) increases. The acquirer's expected gain, however, 
decreases at a far greater average rate than does the target's expected gain (the average 
rate of decrease for the acquirer is 0.2523, whilst for the target it is 0.0643). In practical 
terms, the more dominant the target perceives itself to be, the less the acquirer could 
expect to gain from the negotiations (providing the players stick to the optimal strategy 
pair). Now the target's initial acceptance level increases with increasing~ at the target's 
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optimal strategy, b16 (providing, of course, that crB remains at reasonable levels; if crB > 
[-4'-1(~)r1 = (1.28r1 = 0.7813 then A1 will, in fact, decrease with increasing ~. but 
we will not consider such large levels of uncertainty as being realistic), and the acquirer's 
offer interval is not affected. Obviously, then, the chances of reaching agreement become 
less. Since a modelling assumption was that the target revised its acceptance level 
downwards based partly on the acquirer's most recent offer, the target would tend to 
yield more as ~ increases, leading to a transaction value which was, on average, only 
slightly higher than for lower values of~· The probability of merger agreement and the 
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Figure 6.8. Probability of merger and average transaction value in successful 
mergers as ~ varies 
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The expected gain to the target comprises of the product of the two tenns graphed 
in Figure 6.8. Since P(merger occurring) decreases faster ·than the . average transaction 
value increases. the target's expected gain will in actual fact decrease with increasing 
perceived negotiating power. This is due in the main to the target relenting quicker than 
the acquirer. The acquirer's expected gain is based on the product of two decreasing 
terms, implying a rapid decrease as On increases. 
From the above discussion, some useful observations can be made. Firstly, it is 
clear that the model provides a very stable optimal bargaining strategy as Os varies. 
Furthermore, the target is active in revising its acceptance levels downwards towards the 
acquirer's previous offer. Thus any change in the contextual parameter values that leads 
to the player's initial bargaining positions being further apart will be more detrimental 
to the target's expected gain than to the acquirer. 
§6.2.5 VARIATION IN THE ACQUIRER'S PERCEIVED RELATIVE DOMINANCE, 
5A 
The acquirer's perceived relative dominance, 5A, appears in the model in setting 
up the acquirer's offer interval. In the simulation the offer interval was represented as 
[ 01 = 1lAB - a A (1 - Cl A <fj-l(~A1)) ; ~ = T\AB - a A (1 - Cl A <fj-l(~AL)) ] • 
Now providing that CIA and the acquirer's strategy parameter ~Al are not too pathological 
(SO that CIA <fj-l(~Al) remains less than 1), an increase in 5A will lead to a downward shift 
in the off er interval providing that the players continue with their same strategies. 
We examine the simulated results for Cl = Cl A = Cle = 0.25 and On = 0.5 while a A 
is varied from 0.3 to 0.7 in steps of 0.1. The results are shown in Table 6.6. We notice 
that the strategy pair <a2, bi6> appears to be optimal for all values Of 5 A except for large 
values: in this case the EDS approach suggests two possible solution (equilibrium) points 
(one of which is <a2, b16>) and the Bayes optimal approach suggests that the acquirer 
should switch to strategy 324. 
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The expected gains to the players are displayed in Figure 6.9. The acquirer's 
expected gain for the strategy pair <a2, b16> increases with increasing o A• flattening off 
for o A ~ 0.5. The target's expected gain, on the other hand, decreases rapidly as o A 
increases. Thus if the acquirer's perception of its negotiating strength increases it will 
Table 6.6. Optimal bargaining strategies and resulting expected gains 
as oA varies (er= crA =<rs = 0.25; Os = 0.5) 
Elimination of dominated Bayesian decision-making 
strategies (EDS) approach (BDM) 
Optimal E(gain to acquirer) Optimal E(gain to acquirer) 
OA strategy E(gain to target) strategy E(gain to target) 
0.3 <a2, b16> 0.3789 <a2, b16> 0.3789 
0.5881 0.5881 
0.4 <ai. b16> 0.4645 <a2, b16> 0.4645 
0.4600 0.4600 
0.5 <a2, b16> 0.5227 <a2, b16> 0.5227 
0.3431 0.3431 
0.6 <a2, b16> 0.5373 <a2,b16> 0.5373 
0.2321 0.2321 
0.7 <a2, b16> 0.5270 <a24• b16> 0.4224 
0.1532 0.2595 
<ai4. b1> 0.3349 
0.2687 
expect to gain more from any agreement, whilst the target will expect to lose. This is 
explained by referencing P(merger occurring) and the average transaction value in 
successful mergers, shown in Figure 6.10. 
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As mentioned earlier, an increase in 8 A will lead to a downward shift in the off er 
interval without affecting the position of A1, thus leaving the parties further apart at the 
initial bargaining stage. This clearly reduces the chances of agreement, and, since the 
target is yielding towards the acquirer's most recent offer, will reduce the transaction 
value on average if success is achieved. This leaves the target worse off and the acquirer 
better off as 8 A increases. 
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Figure 6.9. Players' expected gains for varying 8A (under EDS) 
Again the target's active role in responding to the acquirer's most recent offer 
leads to the target being worse off, as comparison to the case when ~ was varied over 
the same range clearly shows. This is summarised in Table 6. 7. 
Table 6.7. 
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Comparison of changes to BA and~ over the interval [0.3; 0.7] 
Average slope 




of E(gain to target) 
- 1.0873 
- 0.0643 
It can be seen that as the acquirer's perceived dominance increases over the range the 
acquirer expects to gain whilst the target expects to suffer massive losses. As the target's 
perceived dominance increases over the same range the acquirer expects to lose 
somewhat, but the target also expects to suffer a small loss. This apparent imbalance in 
reaction to a change in a player's perceived dominance is a consequence of the lack of 
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Figure 6.10. Probability of merger and average transaction value in successful 
mergers as BA varies (under EDS) 
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§6.3 SOME OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
The parameters examined in this chapter are merely abstractions of reality, and 
are thus neither documented nor empirically measurable - they are idealised 
representations of what are in fact intangible perceptions arrived at by the decision 
makers in an unstructured way. Their conceptual nature makes it virtually impossible to 
compare the effect of a change to a parameter's value in the model to changes induced 
in a real-world negotiating situation due to modifications to the bargaining environment. 
At best, in §6.2 we "translated" the effect of a change in each of the contextual model 
parameters into a change to the modelled negotiating environment, and in each case the 
simulated change induced in the probability of merger agreement and the average 
transaction value in successful mergers was entirely that which would have been 
anticipated had an equivalent alteration to the real-world negotiating situation in fact 
occurred. As such we can conclude that our model provides an adequate representation 
of the merger bargaining process insofar as environmental changes are concerned. 
Several observations can be made from the simulations in §6.2 which might 
provide better u?derstanding of the negotiation process and hence help in offering 
constructive decision support. Firstly, a striking feature is that the optimal bargaining 
strategy <32, b16> is extremely robust to changes in the values of the contextual 
parameters, no matter which approach is applied to determine optimality and over fairly 
wide ranges for each of these parameters. The only exceptions to this tend to occur when 
the relevant parameters assume pathologically large or small values; then either a co-
optimal point occurs or one of the players' strategies change. The analysis was, of course, 
performed on a fairly coarse grid of player's strategies (the submatrix 0 0', which 
consisted of only a subset of 7 target and 8 acquirer discrete strategies). If some finer 
grid of strategy pairs was used as the basis for analysis it is possible that slight deviations 
away from 82 and/or b16 to strategies which represent fairly similar negotiating behaviour 
might be observed. However since the players' strategy parameters are merely 
abstractions of reality it would be impossible to differentiate between, for example, the 
target strategy represented by(~ = 0.1; y = 0.95) and that represented by {~ = 0.15; 
'Y = 0.9): when translated into practical negotiating actions there would be little to choose 
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between the two. Thus <a2, b16> will be considered as a generic optimal strategy pair, 
representing the acquirer being prepared to negotiate with great persistence within a 
narrow range situated well below its expectation of a fair price, and the target starting 
with a low initial acceptance level but being prepared to capitulate rapidly towards the 
acquirer's (low) initial offer. 
Any change in perception by the acquirer of its contextual parameter values which 
leads to a downward shift in the offer interval (i.e. when C'JA or 8A increase) will have 
the players start negotiating from positions more extreme from one another, and this is 
observed to leave the target severely worse off and the acquirer at worst no worse off in 
terms of expected gains. Similarly a change in perception by the target of its contextual 
parameter values leading to an upward shift in its initial acceptance level (i.e. when~ 
decreases or 8s increases) is seen to leave the acquirer realising significantly smaller 
expected gains and the target only slightly reduced gains. In general then, the target 
appears to suffer more from changes which lead to an initial negotiating position which 
pitches the players further apart. The reason for this is that the model has the acquirer 
devising offers within the offer interval completely independently of the target's 
acceptance levels, whilst the target yields in its acceptance levels at a rate which depends 
on the value of the acquirer's offers. Thus extreme initial positions combined with a 
fairly narrow offer interval and a persistent acquirer (the case in acquirer strategy 31, 
where PAi = 0.1. PAL= 0.3 and p = 0.3) will lead to the target giving up considerably 
more than the acquirer does. The simulated probability of agreement changes much more 
rapidly than does the average transaction value in these cases, producing the observed 
results. 
The flowchart of the merger bargaining process depicted in Figure 4.1 and which 
was modelled in §4.3 is an idealised representation of the merger negotiation process, and 
takes no account of anomalous individual behaviour. As an example we can cite the 
scenario just mentioned, where under certain conditions the model has the target giving 
up more than the acquirer. If this situation were to occur in practice it is possible that a 
target could act in one of a number of ways not catered for by the model. For example, 
the target could provide information, directly or indirectly, to the acquirer to indicate that 
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the acquirer's offers are all far below its acceptance levels, in the hope that this would 
drive the offers upwards at a greater rate. Alternatively, noticing that all the offers are 
occurring in a narrow range far below levels acceptable to itself, the target could simply 
break off negotiations. Thus instead of achieving agreement. at lower levels, the 
probability of agreement is decreased. This anomalous behaviour (especially by the 
target) is a function of the individual concerned, and so is extraordinarily difficult to 
model. Whilst the above actions could occur (and if they do they would affect the 
negotiated outcomes) they are beyond the scope of this study. A much more refined 
version of our model, focusing on this issue, might provide scope for future research. 
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APPENDIX 6.A. Simulated submatrices G0' used in investigating the effect of a 
change to contextual parameter values 
b1 B(.l ;.05) 
b4 ep ; .05) 
1>, ec.3; .35) 
b10 B(.9; .35) 
bu B(.5; .65) 
b16 ec.1 ;:95> 
b19 ec.1;.95) 




b16 ii<.1 ; .95) 
b19 iic.1; .95> 
8A = 8s = 0.5; a= a A= 0.1; a8 = 0.1 





















































































8A = 8s = 0.5; a= a A= 0.1; a8 = 0.15 















































































































































b1 iic.1 ; .o5> 
b4 8(.7;.05) 
b7 iic.3 : .35) 
b10 iic.9 ;.35) 
b13 iic.5;.65) 
b16 B(. I ; .95) 
b19 iic.1 ;.95> 
b1 B(. I ; .05) 
b4 iic.1 ;.o5> 
b7 iic.3 : .35) 
b10 iic.9;.35) 
b13 ec.5;.65) 
b16 B(.I ;.95) 
b19 ec.1;.95) 
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8A =Sa = O.S; a= aA = 0.1; as= 0.2 
82 813 824 830 833 842 





















































































8A =Sa= O.S; a= aA = 0.1; as= 0.25 













































































































































b1 B(.I ;.OS) 
1>, iic.J ;.JS) 
h10 B(.9 ;.JS) 
b13 B(.S; .6S) 
b16 iic.1 ;.9s> 
b19 iic.1 ;.9s> 
b1 B(.I ;.OS) 
b7 iic.J ;.Js> 
b10 iic.9 ;.Js> 
b13 B(.S; .6S) 
b16 B(.I ;.9S) 
b19 iic.1; .9s> 
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aA = 8s = O.S; a= au = 0.1; aA = 0.15 





















































































a A= 8s = O.S; a= au= 0.1; aA = 0.2 















































































































































b1 ii<.1 ; .05) 
b4 8(.7; .o5> 
bi ii<.3; .35) 
b10 ii<.9; .35> 
b13 8(.5 ;.65) 
b16 8(.1 ; .95) 
b19 B(.7;.95) 
b1 ii<.1 ;.o5> 
b4 ii<.1; .05> 
bi 8(.3 ; .35) 
b10 ii<.9;.35> 
b13 ii<.5 ;.65) 
b16 ii<.1 ;.95> 
b19 iic.1;.95> 
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8A =Se = 0.5; a= a8 = 0.1; a A= 0.25 . 
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b13 sc.5: .65) 
b16 B(.I ;.95) 
b19 B(.7;.95) 
b1 sc.1 : .05) 
b7 B(.3;.35) 
b10 B(.9;.35> 
b13 B(.5 ; .65) 
b16 sc.1 : .95) 
b19 sc.1 ;.95) 
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b16 ec.1 ;.95> 
b19 ec.1:.95> 
b1 ec.1 ;.05> 
b7 ec.3 ;.35> 
b10 ec.9:.35) 
b13 ec.5;.65> 
b16 iic.1 :.95) 
b19 iic.7:.95> 
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82 813 824 830 833 842 





















































































&A= 8s = 0.5; (J = 0.1; (JA = CJ9 = 0.15 
















































































































































b1 ec.1 ; .05> 
b4 ep; .05) 
b-r ec.3; .35> 
b10 B(.9;.35) 
b13 ec.5 ;.65) 
b16 ec.1 ;.95) 
b19 ec.1;.95> 




b13 ec.5; .65) 
b16 ec.1 : .95> 
b19 ec.1: .95) 
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& A = &a = 0.5; a = 0.2; a A = a8 = 0.3 





















































































&A= &a= 0.5; a= 0.3; CJA = a8 = 0.45 



















































































































































b16 B(.I ;.9S) 
b19 8c.1;.9s> 
b, B(.I ;.OS) 
bi B(.3; .JS) 
b10 ec.9;.Js> 
b13 B(.S;.6S) 
b16 0(.1 ;.9S) 
b19 8c.1;.9s> 
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8A = 8s = 0.5; a= 0.4; (JA = CJs = 0.6 
82 813 824 830 833 842 





































































































































































































































b1 ec.1 ;.05> 
b7 iic.3; .35) 
b10 B(.9;.35) 
bu ec.5; .65> 
b16 iic.1 ;.95> 
b19 iic.1 ;.95) 
b1 iic.1 ; .o5> 
b4 iic.1;.05> 
bi ii(.3;.35> 
b10 iic.9; .35) 
bu ec.5;.65) 
b16 BC.I ;.95) 
b1g ec.1;.95> 
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~A= 0.5; 8s = 0.3; CJ= CJA =Os= 0.25 
82 8u 824 830 833 842 





















































































~A = 0.5; 8s = 0.4; CJ = CJ A = Os = 0.25 















































































































































b1 B(. I ; .05) 
try ec .3 ; .35) 
b 10 ec.9;.35) 
b13 ec.5; .65) 
b16 ec.1 ;.95) 
b19 ec.1;.95) 
b1 B(.I ;.05) 
b4 ec.1;.05) 
b7 ec.3 : .35) 
h10 0(.9; .35) 
b13 ec.5: .65) 
b16 ec.1 :.95) 
b19 ec.1;.95> 
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8A = 0.5; lie= 0.6; a= a A= as= 0.25 





































































































































































































































b, B(. l ; .OS) 
b4 B(.7;.0S) 
b7 B(.3 ;.3S) 
b10 B(.9; .3S) 
b13 B(.S ;.6S) 
b16 B(.l ;.9S) 
b19 B(.7 ;.9S) 
b1 B(.l ; .OS) 
b4 B(.7; .OS) 
b7 B(.3; .3S) 
b10 B(.9;.3S) 
bu B(.S;.6S) 
b16 B(.l ;.9S) 
b19 B(.7;.9S) 
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aA = 0.3; lia = O.S; a= aA =as= 0.2S 
82 8 u 824 830 833 842 





















































































liA = 0.4; lia = 0.5; a= aA =as= 0.25 















































































































































b1 iic.1 ; .o5> 
b7 iip;.35) 
b10 iic.9 ;.35> 
bu iic.5 ; .65> 
b16 iic.1 ;.95> 
b19 iic.1 ;.95> 
b1 iic.1 ; .o5> 
b4 iic.1 ;.o5> 
b7 iic.3; .35> 
b10 iic.9;.35> 
bu ii(.5; .65> 
b16 iic.1 ;.95> 
b19 iic.1;.95> 
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8A = 0.6; Sa= 0.5; CJ= CJA = CJ9 = 0.25 
82 813 824 830 833 842 





















































































8A = 0.7; Sa = 0.5; CJ= CJA = CJ9 = 0.25 
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THE USE OF THE NEGOTIATION-BASED MODEL AND ITS MONTE 
CARLO SIMULATION IN DECISION SUPPORT 
§7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The model created in Chapter 4 was based upon the broad principles of 
negotiation analysis (Sebenius (1992)), and contains ideas and notions which are not 
dissimilar to some of those found in Raiffa (1982). In broad outline the model assumes 
that the competing parties would independently arrive at an estimate of an expected fair 
price for the target company. Providing that these estimates are situated within the 
players' zone of agreement, negotiation might take place. The model allows for a 
continuum of negotiating strategies for both players, and in the previous chapters these 
have been analysed to identify what negotiating behaviour might be construed as a 
"good" strategy for each player under various contextual scenarios. 
The aim of the model is to focus on the dynamic nature of the bargaining or 
negotiating which might occur prior to agreement being reached regarding the merging 
of two companies. The extent of the dynamism of offers and responses to these offers 
is reflected in the values of the various strategy parameters. We have attempted to 
provide a model based on the way negotiators think in practice, making frequent use of 
"soft" and even qualitative parameters rather than restricting ourselves to hard, 
measurable parameters, such as accounting information. To be sure, the contextual and 
strategy parameters used in the model are just abstractions of reality comprising of a 
complicated combination of cognitive variables and thus will tend~ be judgemental and 
subjective to any user of the model. Analysis of the model results will off er insights into 
the effects of important components which should be considered when formulating a 
merger bargaining strategy. 
The potential usefulness of this model to merger and acquisition practitioners 
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would be best demonstrated by the design of a decision support system (DSS) 
incorporating the negotiating model as a key component. A range of software to aid in 
practical merger and acquisition decision-making is currently available but none to our 
knowledge focuses on the bargaining aspects of the process. In this chapter, we will 
outline the essential components of a DSS based on our model. avoiding the duplication 
of many features already provided by other more conventional merger and acquisition 
software, and thereby emphasising our different modelling approach. The construction 
and implementation of such a DSS is a major project in its own right, and so we have 
made no attempt at this in this thesis. This chapter will instead be restricted to an 
overview of a conceptual system based on the negotiating model. Detailed software 
design would best be left to analysts and/or software engineers actually involved in the 
programming function. 
In the next section we introduce and define what is meant by a decision support 
system, and we will examine the applicability of DSSs in the area of mergers and 
acquisitions. We will briefly outline several systems which are currently available, 
highlighting gaps which our model might fill. In §7.3 and Appendix 7.A we will present 
the architecture for a conceptual DSS based on our model. The final section in the 
chapter contains a short discussion on the practical usefulness and possible impacts of the 
modeVsystem, including perceived shortcomings and areas that could be improved upon. 
§7.2 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND MERGERS AND ACQUISmONS 
The decision to follow a strategy of growth by merger is an important one for any 
company. This will necessarily be followed by further decisions relating to the profile of 
potential targets, target valuation, bid timing, negotiation and post-merger integration, 
amongst others. Thus the decision processes involved in the lead-up to successful 
completion of a merger deal are many, interrelated in a complex way, and often have to 
be made under severe time pressure. The value of good decision-making in these · 
circumstances is obvious; any system or means of making use of modem technology 
which might largely automate aspects of the decision processes (i.e. a DSS) should be 
welcomed by the decision-maker. 
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§7.2.1 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Despite there being no established universal definition of a DSS (Keen (1987)), 
one widely accepted description is 
"an interactive computer based system, which helps decision makers 
utilize data and models to solve unstructured problems" (Sprague (1980)). 
A working description, provided by Turban (1993) says that 
"A DSS is an interactive, flexible and adaptable computer based 
information system, especially developed for supporting the solution of a 
particular management problem for improved decision making. It utilizes 
data, it provides easy user interface, and it allows for the decision maker's 
own insights." 
All characterisations of DSSs suggest that the computer system consists of a 
knowledge base (the system's database), a model base (the problem-processing system) 
and a dialogue generation and management system (the human user interlace system) 
which all interact with each other and with the user/decision maker, who will have some 
feel for the rather fuzzy, unstructured and complex problem at hand. 
The concept of a DSS has been around since the early 1970s, and literally 
thousands of DSSs have been built, implemented and recorded in the literature. 
Application areas are diverse: some areas of work include financial management, human 
resource management, marketing, transportation, production scheduling and natural 
resources management. A fairly comprehensive list of recent published material on DSS 
applications is contained in Eom and Lee (1990). 
§7.2.2 COMPUTER TOOLS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISIDONS 
Finance theory has produced a number of models which might prove helpful 
during merger and acquisition deals (Myers (1976)), and several computer-based tools 
based on these models exist (Rock (1987)). Since up-to-date quantitative financial data 
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regarding various aspects of a company (eg. stock price, price/earnings ratios etc) are 
readily available from on-line databases (for example, Compustat and Value Line in the 
US, Datashare in South Africa), the above financial models can easily be implemented 
to generate numerical estimates of certain financial parameters such as forecasted cash 
flows, balance sheets etc. 
Several software packages are commercially available which provide the type of 
facility mentioned above. Two programs (named Value Planner and Merger Planner) 
marketed by the Alcor Group Inc of Stokie, Illinois provide one such example. The Value 
Planner allows a user the opportunity to generate historical and forecasted financial 
statements. income statements, balance sheets, cash flow statements and other accounting 
ratios for a company. The Merger Planner builds on these abilities by allowing the user 
to analyse mergers and acquisitions between two or more companies, and divestures of 
a conglomerate company. A user can "combine" an acquirer and a target company into 
a single entity by specifying the deal structure. tax arrangements and accounting 
treatment. 
Another example, marketed by Disclosure, Inc of Bethesda, Maryland, attempts 
to determine the financial viability of a possible merger through the review of income 
statement and balance sheets, examination of stock ownership (to judge the feasibility of 
a successful deal), and can even search amongst candidate targets to determine the most 
compatible. The output of these programs and financial models, together with subjective 
analyses of various qualitative factors (eg. an industry analyst's opinion of the future of 
a target company) can then be used to value the target company. 
Bonissone and Dutta ( 1989) have suggested that this purely financial approach has 
certain limitations. For example, this approach is unable to take advantage of current 
state-of-the-art intelligent information retrieval methods which can process natural 
language information provided in business literature such as the Wall Street Journal and 
the Dow Jones News Service (in the US). This information, qualitative in nature, is 
usually in the form of editorial analyses, industry reports etc, and can play an important 
role in decisions regarding a merger deal. Financial models furthermore do not take 
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cognisance of precedents (within a particular industry sector, say) which might affect the 
structuring of various aspects of a particular merger deal. The ability of a decision 
support system to employ case-based reasoning would help here. Expert knowledge, 
expressed in the form of rules (as typified by conventional expert systems) is also lacking 
in most financial tools. Bonissone and Dutta have used conventional financial models, 
fused with a reasoning and simulation environment (to capture qualitative information), 
to overcome the above limitations in their MARS system ("Mergers and Acquisitions 
Reasoning System"). 
All the above software systems focus specifically on the valuation of the target 
company through quantitative and/or qualitative means. What the prospective acquirer or 
target company's management do with this information once negotiations actually begin 
is not touched on. We thus propose the development of a conceptual decision support 
system whose main aim is to answer this particular question. The emphasis will be on 
what negotiating strategy (given in terms of the qualitative/quantitative strategy 
parameters introduced in Chapter 4) a user (who will assume the role of one of the two 
main players: acquirer or target) should employ, given certain contextual conditions. 
Additional information supplied will relate to what share of the total merger gains each 
of the players can expect to achieve, i.e. how well each can expect to do. This proposed 
system thus picks up where existing computer-based tools leave off: it is assumed that 
the user has already developed an estimate of the value of the target company and some 
measure of the degree of precision of this estimate. This could have been arrived at by 
using one of the systems mentioned previously, or by some subjective method. Indeed 
it is envisaged that this conceptual system, once developed, could be attached as a back-
end to an existing computer package similar to one of those mentioned above, thus 
offering enhanced decision support capabilities to management of acquiring and target 
companies involved in merger negotiations. 
§7.3 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FOR A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM BASED ON 
THE NEGOTIATION MODEL 
In this section we propose the architecture of a conceptual DSS incorporating the 
negotiating model as a key component. We have not created an operational DSS here, 
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since our proposal requires the compilation of an external database consisting of a large 
number (possibly as many as 625) of matrices similar in dimension to that presented in 
Appendix 5.A (i.e. 20 x 60), each of which took almost 6.5 hours of CPU time on a 
MicroVax 3100-90 mainframe computer to generate. The compilation of the database and 
construction of the DSS is a major study in itself and beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Since the DSS will remain conceptual at this stage we will merely describe it in broad 
terms, and outline the operation of each proposed module of the system in an appendix 
to this chapter. We leave such details as input and output screen designs, retrieval 
methods etc to software engineers and analysts who might be involved in the operational 
construction of such a system, and who would base their decisions regarding these details 
on actual user requirements and programming language/environment capabilities. 
§7.3.1 THE DATABASE 
The conceptual DSS will extract information regarding the optimal strategy and 
expected gains at that strategy from an external database. The design and contents of this 
database warrant a short discussion. 
The database should consist of the values of the two players' expected gains 
(E(Gacq) and E(Gtar)) and the average transaction value for each of a number of both 
players' negotiating strategies (say 20 target strategies and 60 acquirer strategies, as in 
the matrices in Appendices 5.A and 5.B), for each of several values of the four 
contextual parameters aA, aa, BA and Ba· For example, the chosen values of a A and aa 
could be 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20 and 0.25, whilst the chosen values for BA and Ba could 
be 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. The database might thus consist of s4 = 625 matrices each 
of dimension 20 x 60, where each matrix element consists of 3 items of numeric 
information. Each matrix would require approximately 20 x 60 x 6 bytes = 7 .2 Kb of 
fixed memory space; in the above configuration the total memory requirement would be 
approximately 625 x 7.2 Kb= 4.5 Mb. This could reside on the hard drive of the user's 
PC. 
Whilst storage requirements are fairly moderate, the time and computing 
requirements to generate this quantity of simulated data is enormous however; for this 
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reason a somewhat sparser grid of contextual parameter values might make the task more 
practical. For the present study, time and computer availability do not allow us to 
compile such a database. 
§7.3.2 A MODULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE DSS 
A merger and acquisition DSS to help in the decision of how to proceed with 
negotiations could be used by either of the two main players: the acquirer and the target. 
The conceptual DSS therefore runs in either of two modes: Acquirer Support Mode or 
Target Support Mode. Note that another player of interest who is outside the structure 
of the actual merger deal, but who has a keen interest in the entire bargaining process is 
the arbitrageur, who attempts to make arbitrage profits by following and trying to 
accurately predict the course of a merger deal. Such an arbitrageur may use the DSS in 
either mode to determine optimal bargaining behaviour for both players, and may make 
arbitrage profits by acting on players' deviations from their optimal bargaining strategies. 
We have chosen to display the conceptual DSS in modular form since this is good 
programming practice and enhances clarity and understanding. We will proceed with an 
overview of the DSS in the Acquirer Support Mode (ASM) configuration and later 
outline the DSS in Target Support Mode (TSM) configuration. 
§7.3.2.1 ACQUIRER SUPPORT MODE (ASM) CONFIGURATION 
The DSS operating in ASM allows a user to input his/her own reservation price, 
estimates of the contextual parameter values and perceptions about the target company 
in monetary terms, and outputs an optimal negotiating strategy for the acquirer in 
monetary and qualitative terms. Other relevant merger information relating to this optimal 
strategy is also provided, such as an outline of the target's optimal negotiating strategy. 
Between the input and output stages the DSS 
(a) rescales the input data into a form which is compatible with our model (and hence 
the database); 
(b) accesses the relevant information from the database, interpolating if necessary; 
and finally 
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(c) transfonns this and other calculated infonnation for output back into units 
compatible with the input data. 
These steps effectively comprise the model base, or problem processing system. Further 
to this the user is able to perfonn various sensitivity analyses around his/her optimal 
(acquirer) strategy. Specifically, if it is suspected before negotiations commence (or 
observed, if negotiations have already commenced) that the target will pursue a particular 
strategy different from its optimal one, a user in ASM may identify the acquirer strategy 
which is Pareto-optimal against this target strategy. Similar, a user in ASM may examine 
the effect of a deviation from the optimal acquirer strategy. In principle the DSS follows 
the same model base steps during the sensitivity analyses as during the running of the 
main program i.e. rescales input data, retrieves from the database, and transfonns back 
into the original units. 
The user will only see one or more input screens (which will guide his/her input) 
and one or more output screens (which will explain the necessary course of action). 
These are the dialogue generation and management system of the DSS and alone carry 
the responsibility of ensuring that the somewhat fuzzy input and output parameters are 
satisfactorily interpreted through the user/machine interface. The use of one or more 
interactive graphical user interfaces to achieve this (making use of tools such as graphical 
Likert scales) should be thoroughly explored. The architecture of the conceptual DSS in 
ASM is presented in Figure 7.1. 
It will be noted from Figure 7 .1 that each module has been given a short 
descriptive name and a code numbering. The letter "A" in the code indicates that the 
module fonns part of the ASM configuration. Each module is more fully described in 




Function: A concise statement of role of the module. 
Operational input: The parameters that are actually used within the module.1 
Operation: A fuller description of how the operational input and other 
infonnation is used to achieve the overall function of the module. 
1 These should be differentiated from parameters that are merely carried through for use 
in a later module. Such parameters have been totally omitted from this description to 
enhance clarity. 
DSSl MAIN_MENU 









Al DATA_INPUT _MAIN_ASM 
Data input by user: 
Al RESCALE_INPUT_ASM 
Rescale Input data 
(VA'· µA'· a A'· ae') 
onto a standardised scale 
A3 OPT_STRAT_ASM 
Retrieve information at the optimal 
strategy pair <a2, b16> from the 
database on each variable individually 
,• I I 
A4 CONVERT_STRAT_ASM 
Transform back to monetary values: 
E(G1.,.), E(Gacq>• Ave, 01, OL• A1 
AS OUTPUT_MAIN_ASM 






~TABASE (on dis~ 
Matrices of E(G1.,.), E(Gacq> 
and Ave for a A, a 0 , l)A• liiJ 
Exit 
, if finished with 
analysis 
/' '' 




' Sensitivity analysis: ..-- -
I Target strategy changes 
2 Acquirer strategy changes 
1 l 2 
I 
A7-1 DATA_INPUT _SENS_ TA R_ASM A7-2 DATA_INPUT _SENS_ACQ_ASM 
Data input describing anticipated Data input describing alternative 
target strategy (jl11 and y) acquircr slrategy (jlAI• llA1. and p) 
•It •II 
A8-1 R ETRIEVE_SENS_ TA R_ASM A8-2 RETRIEVE_SENS_ACQ_ASM 
Rescale input data and retrieve Rescale input data and retrieve 
E(G1.,). E(G.cq). Ave for b for E(G1ar). E(G,cq), Ave for a for ..-
all acquircr strategies from the ~ target strategy b16 from the ·-
dalabase (inlerpolate if necessary) database (interpolate if necessary) 
for the given values of for the given values of 
aA' On, SA and Sn aA• on, SA and Sn 
•II 
A9-1 OPT_STRAT _ TSENS_ASM 
Choose a• which maximises 
E(Gacq) I b 
', '~ 
Ato-1 CONVERT_STRAT_TAR_ASM At0-2 CONVERT_STRAT_ACQ_ASM 
Transform back to monetary values: Transfonn back to monetary values: 
E(G10.), E(Gacq>• Ave, o,, OL• A1 E(G1.,), E(Gacq)• Ave, 0 1, OL• A1 
, 
~ 
AH-I Ol!TPUT_SENS_TAR_ASM A 11-2 OUTPUT _SENS_ACQ_ASM 
Output (to screen or print device) Output (to screen or print device) 
converted information converted information 
I I 
Exil Exit 
er (or revised) 
if finished with Another (or revised) 
Anoth 
scnsit ivi1y analysis 
analysis 
if finished with 
analysis sensitivity analysis 
Figure 7.1. Architecture of the conceptual DSS in Acquirer Support Mode (ASM) 
(continued) 
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Note that both the ASM module sequence and the TSM module sequence in the 
conceptual DSS are preceded by a module named MAIN_MENU and coded DSS l. This 
comprises a menu which passes control to either ASM or TSM, depending on the role 
chosen by the user/player. As indicated by the code, this module does not strictly fonn 
part of either the ASM or TSM configurations. 
§7.3.2.2 TARGET SUPPORT MODE (TSM) CONFIGURATION 
In this mode the user is required to input his/her own reservation price, 
perceptions about the target company's reservation price and estimates of the contextual 
parameter values. The output of the DSS in TSM is in the fonn of an optimal target 
negotiating strategy in monetary and qualitative tenns, together with other relevant 
information relating to the optimal strategy, including an outline of the acquire rs optimal 
negotiating strategy. The user is then invited to perfonn sensitivity analyses around the 
optimal strategies supplied here. A user may investigate the effect of a particular acquirer 
strategy (different from the optimal one), and is able to identify ~e target strategy which 
is Pareto-optimal against this acquirer strategy. Similarly, a user may examine the effect · 
of a deviation from the optimal target strategy. The layout of the DSS in TSM is 
presented in Figure 7 .2. Each module in TSM is recognisable by the letter "T" in the 
module code. It will be noted that TSM is the mirror image of ASM; for this reason we 
have felt it unnecessary to describe any of the modules in detail in an appendix. 
7-12 
DSSl MAIN_MENU 
Choose ASM or TSM 
mode 
ASM 
ASM mode module IO!'<'-----------------l TSM 
sequence 
DATABASE (on disk) 
~ ·__/ 
Tl DATA_INPUT_MAIN_TSM 
Data input by user: 
T2 RESCALE_INPUT_TSM 
Rescale input data 
(Ve'· µ9', oA'• oe ') 
onto a standardised scale 
'II 
T3 OPT_STRAT_TSM 
Matrices of E(G1.,), E(Gacq) 
and Ave for oA, 09. &A, Se 
IE~~-----"'!' Retrieve infonnation at the optimal 
strategy pair ~· b16> from the 
database on each variable individually 
Exit 




Transfonn back to monetary values: 
E(Gw)• E(Gacq)• Ave, 0 1, <>t_, A1 
TS OUTPUT_MAIN_'l"SM 








Figure 7.2. Architecture of the conceptual DSS in Target Support Mode (TSM) 
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Architecture of the conceptual DSS in Target Support Mode (TSM) 
(continued) 
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§7.4 THE VALUE OF THE CONCEPTUAL DSS 
The conceptual DSS outlined in this chapter (and more ·fully described in 
Appendix 7 .A) is relatively simple in design and operation, yet offers an additional facet 
of decision support to currently existing computer based systems, i.e. information relating 
to how to negotiate. The model introduced in Chapter 4 described each of the players' 
negotiating strategies in terms of several aspects relating to the approach or tactics used 
by that player during the negotiating stage of the merger deal, and the conceptual DSS 
allows a user to investigate the effect of changes to one or more of these tactical aspects. 
We have made no attempt to duplicate or improve the performance of any existing 
DSS - our aim here has been to emphasise the difference in our modelling approach. 
Indeed, an operational version of this conceptual DSS would be well suited to be used 
in conjunction with existing software, or even as an "add-on" module. 
Since we do not have an operational DSS here, we cannot conclude that the DSS 
as proposed in this chapter is absolutely suitable for all users. As with all operations 
research studies, we should review an operational version of the DSS and possibly 
improve various aspects of the system, for example: 
• the database design (are the functions of expected gains and average transaction 
values smooth enough to allow a sparser grid of contextual parameter values?) 
• interactive input screens (are the graphical user interfaces as described sufficient 
to elicit an accurate value for the "fuzzy" parameters?). 
• output information (could this be presented in a clearer, more usable way?) 
Furthermore, the proposed use of the operational DSS should be considered. For example, 
if it is to be run in conjunction with some other existing DSS, input/output data 
requirements might have to be amended to ensure compatibility of the two systems. 
To conclude, we have proposed a conceptual DSS in this chapter based on the 
model of an earlier chapter. Once an operational version has been constructed, 
7-15 
considerable work may have to be done to ensure its viability as a useful decision support 
tool. However, we believe that in concept it offers management support on one of the 
most crucial aspects of any merger deal - the tactics of negotiation. 
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APPENDIX 7.A. Description of the proposed modules comprising the conceptual 
DSS in Acquirer Support Mode (ASM) 
Al DATA_INPUT_MAIN_ASM 
Function: A user-interface module to allow the user to input his/her perceptions of 
the contextual parameters and players' reservation prices .. 
Operational Input: None 
Operation: This interactive user interface module prompts the user to enter his/her 
perceptions of the players' uncertainties (a A, and <JiJ '), their negotiating 
strengths (OA and Os), the user's (in ASM) own reservation price (VA') an~ 
the. user's perception of the target's reservation price (µA'). The prime 
representation here indicates that the data is in monetary terms and will 
need to be rescaled later (see module A2) to be compatible with the model. 
The data is captured when the user responds to either 
(1) a relevant question (with care being taken in the design stage so 
that technical language (such as the use of words "reservation 
price") be avoided); or 
(2) a graphical user interface. 
Since VA, is known to the user, its value may be elicited by means of a 
simple question, such as "What is the maximum amount you would be 
prepared to offer for the target company?" 
The acquirer's uncertainty in its estimation of the target's reservation price 
is a somewhat fuzzy concept to a non-technical user, and is best elicited 
from the user by making use of an interactive graphical user intelface. We 
propose that a one-dimensional axis be presented on the user's screen, with 
calibrations running from 0 up to at least VA, (probably somewhat larger, 
say 1.3V A'). The cursor is mouse-controlled and moves up and down along 
this axis. The user is asked to identify a range within which he/she is 95% 
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sure that the target's true reservation price lies (again, technical language 
is to be avoided), and the upper and lower bounds are. delimited by clicks 
of the mouse. The selected range is highlighted. Allowance is made within 
the module for the user to alter these bounds until he/she is satisfied with 
his/her choice. This effectively identifies a 95% confidence interval around 
µA'· which covers approximately 4<iA'· Then 
, _ upper bound - lower bound 
<JA - ----------
4 
, _ upper bound + lower bound 
µA - ----------
2 
The user is required to estimate the target's uncertainty in its estimation 
of the acquirer's reservation price (<Jii'). This is likely to be an even more 
fuzzy concept for the user, and a similar graphical interface to the one 
outlined above is proposed. The acquirer's reservation price VA, should 
always be positioned at the middle of any range chosen by the user, and 
thus the user's freedom to determine this range should extend to only one 
side of VA'· The value of aB' is found identically to a A'· 
The acquirer's perceptions of its own negotiating strength (8A) lies in the 
unit interval. It is proposed that a graphical Likert scale be used here. Thus 
the user will be exposed to a range of statements, ranging from 
I am very much weaker and feel that I will 
be completely dominated during the negotiations (if 8A = 0.1) 
through 
to 
We are of about equal negotiating strength 
I feel that I will be able to completely 
dominate during negotiations 
(if 8A = 0.5) 
(if 8A = 0.9) 
which are positioned alongside the graphical axis at the relevant value of 
8 A' The cursor can be moved up and down the axis using a mouse, which 
is clicked when the user has made his/her choice, thereby selecting 8 A e 
[0;1]. The sum of the players' negotiating strengths should theoretically 
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equal 1. Thus the acquirer's perception of the target's negotiating strength 
is Os = 1 - o A· However we can allow deviations from this ideal behaviour 
by asking the user if he/she thinks that the target will overestimate, 
realistically estimate or underestimate its own negotiating strength. The 
parameter Os is adjusted accordingly by a multiplicative factor depending 
on the answer to the question. This raw input data is rescaled (if 
necessary) in module A2. 
A2 RESCALE_INPUT_ASM 
Function: To rescale the raw input data in monetary terms onto a standardised scale. 
Operation: The raw input data. relating to the user's perception of the players'. 
reservation prices in monetary terms are converted onto a standardised 
scale through the transformation 
, 
Xraw - µA 
Xrescaled = --,--..,. 
VA -µA 
This results in a rescaled acquirer's reservation price of VA = 1 and a 
rescaled acquirer's perception of the target's reservation price of µA = 0. 
The uncertainties cr A, and crB' are rescaled through the transformation 
, 
cri. raw 
cr i; rescaled = -v-, _. --
A - µA 
where i =A or B. 
Note that the players' perceived negotiating powers oA and ~. although 
being an integral part of the input, are not affected by this module. 




Function: To retrieve relevant information at the optimal strategy from the database, 
and interpolate on each variable individually, if necessary. 
Operational Input: <J A• <JB 
BA, Os 
(from module A2) 
(from module Al) 
Operation: One of the main conclusions of Chapter 6 was that the strategies 
comprising the optimal strategy pair <ai, b16> were extremely robust to 
changes in the values of the contextual parameters. This module thus 
retrieves from the database the relevant statistics (E(Gtar), E(G2cq) and 
Ave) for the given values of <JA, <JB, BA and Os at strategy pair <a2, b16>. 
If the user-defined value of one or more of the parameters is not resident 
in the database, the module retrieves data for that parameter closest on 
· either side of the user-defined value, and interpolation occurs on each 
variable individually. It is envisaged that a simple linear interpolation will 
be entirely adequate, although more complex (and computer-intensive) 
interpolation methods such as kernel methods, splining and kriging could 
be investigated (see Hastie and Tibshirani (1990) and Thisted (1988) for 
a full overview and discussion of such methods). This module also notes 
the values of ~Al• ~Av-P• J3s and y at <32, b16> for later use (modules A4 
and A5). 
A4 CONVERT_STRAT_ASM 
Function: To convert the solution at the optimal strategy on the standardised scale 
into monetary terms. 
Operational Input: <JA, <JB, BA, Os· µA'• VA, (from module A2) 
(from module A3) E(Gtar), E(G2cq), Ave, ~Al• ~AL• ~B 
Operation: The solution at the optimal strategy pair <32, b16> is now converted back 
into monetary terms in preparation for output to the user. An inverse 
transformation to that used to standardise monetary amounts in module A2 
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is used here, i.e. 
~aw = µA' + (V A
1 
- µA ').~escaled 
Thus the avearage transaction value is 
Ave' = µA' + (VA' - µA ').Ave 
The players' expected gains E(Gtar)' and E(Gacq)' are not measured relative 
to µA'; they are 
E(Gtar)' = (VA' - µA ').E(Gtar) 
and E(Gacq)' = (VA' - µA ').E(Gacq) 
The probability of merger agreement being reached is found from the 
relationship E(Gtar) = P(merger occurring).Ave (see (5.2) in Chapter 5). 
Thus 
E(Gtar) 
P (merger occurring) = ---
Ave 
The optimal negotiating strategy will be presented to the user as an initial 
offer amount, a final offer amount and some indication of the persistance. 
that the acquirer should maintain. The initial offer amount (in monetary 
terms) is thus 
01' = µA' + (V A1 - µA ').01 
=µA'+ (V A1 - µA ').[1 - SA(l .; aA-cI>-1 (~A1 la2))] 
where ~Adai is the value of the acquirer's initial strategic concession 
parameter conditional on its strategy ai. Similarly, the final offer amount 
in monetary terms is calculated as 
OL' = µA' + (V A1 - µA ').OL 
=µA'+ (VA' - µA').(1- SA(l - aA.Cl>-1 (~Ada2))]. 
The target's co-optimal strategy will also be presented; it will be given in 
terms of an initial acceptance level and a yield decrement. The initial 
acceptance level in monetary terms is 
Ai' = µA' + (V A1 - µA ').Al 
= µA' + (V A1 - µA ').(~(l + C1a.Cl>-l(~ lb16))] 
where ~ lb16 is the value of the target's strategic concession parameter 
conditional on its strategy b16. 
On completion control is passed to module A5 for output to the user. 
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AS OUTPUT_MAIN_ASM 
Function: To output to the screen or print device information relevant to the 
decision-maker regarding the players' optimal strategies. 
Operational Input: p, y (from module A3) 
E(Gt3/, E(Gacq)', Ave', P(merger occurring), 0 1', OL'• A1' 
(from module A4) 
Operation: .The players' optimal strategies and related information about the expected 
negotiated outcome (assuming both players play these optimal strategies) 
are presented to the user. The optimal acquirer strategy consists of 
• the initial offer (in monetary terms), 0 1' 
• the final offer (in monetary terms), OL' 
• the degree of persistance, p, that the acquirer should maintain in his/her 
offers in pursuit of a negotiated outcome. 
Since the acquirer's optimal strategy is the real essence of the DSS in 
ASM, it should be presented in as user-friendly and understandable a 
manner as possible. An example of a concise yet comprehensible 
exposition is as follows: 
The optimal strategy to employ for this scenario is to begin with an initial 
offer of no lower than R [0/J. Be prepared to negotiate upwards to a 
final offer no greater than R [OL']. 
The degree of persistance, p, is presented as a qualitative indicator variable 
on a Likert scale, rather than as a number on the unit interval, which 
would be difficult for a user to interpret, especially since he/she would be 
likely to be unfamiliar with the model. Thus the acquirer's degree of 
persistance could be termed 
very reluctant to make further offers, if p = 0.9 
hesitant to make further offers, if p = 0. 7 
ambivalent to making further offers, if p = 0.5 
persistant in making further offers, if p = 0.3 
extremely persistant in making further offers, if p = 0.1 
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The optimal target strategy is also presented to the user. This strategy 
consists of 
• the initial acceptance level, A1' 
• the target's yield decrement, y, which indicates how rapidly the target 
should decrease its acceptance level towards the acquirer's previous 
offer. 
·Again, as the user is likely to be unfamiliar with the terms and definitions 
used in the model, the information should be presented in layman's terms, 
for example: 
Under this scenario .the target should optimally not accept an offer less 
than R [A/]. 
The target's yield decrement, too, should be presented in qualitative terms 
on a Likert scale. Thus the target's reaction to non-initial offers could be 
maintain the acceptance level, if 'Y = 0.05 
slight reduction in acceptance level, if 'Y = 0.35 
large reduction in acceptance level, if 'Y = 0.65 
capitulation in acceptance level, if 'Y = 0.95 
Other information relevant to the merger negotiations (assuming both 
players employ their optimal strategies, as outlined above) can now be 
presented. This includes 
• the probability that agreement will be reached [P(merger occurring)] 
• the average transaction ·value if agreement is reached [Ave] 
• the exp~cted gains to the two players [E(Gtar)' and E(Gacq)1. . 
Once the output has been presented the user has the option to either 
• exit the system; or 
• make, changes to his/her data input (i.e. return to module Al); or 




Function: To pass control to one of two sensitivity analysis module sequences. 
Operational Input: None 
Operation: At this point the user is allowed to ask "what if ... ?" type questions. The 
conceptual system allows two questions here: 
( 1) What if the target plays a strategy different from its optimal one 
as described in module AS? 
(2) What if I (the acquirer) play a strategy different from the optimal 
one described in module AS? 
The module A6 prompts the user to make a choice of sensitivity analysis, 
and merely directs control to the sequence of modules which then answers 
the relevant question. 
A7-1 DATA_INPUT_SENS_TAR_ASM 
Function: To capture a user's perception of a target strategy. 
Operational Input: None 
Operation: A target strategy is characterised by the target's degree of concession, ~B 
(which determines its initial acceptance level), and its yield decrement, y. 
In this sensitivity analysis we allow investigation of target strategies other 
than that described in module AS. 
The user is prompted to enter a target's likely initial acceptance level and 
a likely yield decrement. The yield decrement y is captured by using a 
graphical Likert scale as was the case for BA in module Al. Descriptive 
statements defining discrete points on this scale would be similar to those 
describing y used in module AS. 
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AS-1 RETRIEVE_SENS_TAR_ASM 
Function: To rescale the target strategy data onto a standardised scale, and to retrieve 
(from the database) and interpolate the relevant negotiating information for 
all acquirer strategies for the given target strategy. 
Operational Input: CJ A• CJB, VA'· µA' 
BA,~ 
(from module A2) 
(from module Al) 
(from module A7-1) 
Operation: Initially the given target initial acceptance level A1' is converted to the 
standardised scale by the transformation 
A I - µ I 
A 
_ 1 A 
1 - I ' 
VA - µA 
This in tum gives rise to a value of f3i3, since 
A -~ 
cl>-1( ~ ) . = ___,,_1 _"B_ 
B . ~ CJB 
The module then retrieves from the database the relevant statistics E(Gtar), 
E(acq) and Ave for the given values of the contextual parameters a A• aB, 
BA and~ for all strategy pairs <ai, b>, where 6 is the target strategy 
implied by the target strategy parameters f3i3 and y. If the user-defined 
value of one or more of the parameters is not resident in the database, the 
module retrieves data for that parameter closest on either side of the user-
defined value, and interpolates on each variable individually. The module 
also notes the values of~ Al, ~AV p, ~B and "(at < ai , b > , for all acquirer 
strategies ~· - .. 
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A9-1 OPT_STRAT_TSENS_ASM 
Function: To identify an optimal acquirer strategy for a given target strategy. 
Operational Input: i = 1, 2, ..... , n 
where n = number of distinct acquirer strategies stored in the 
database. 
Operation: The acquirer's optimal strategy conditional on the given target strategy b 
is the one which maximises the acquirer's expected gain given b. This 
module identifies the value of i, and hence a• = ~ which achieves this. 
Then 
E(Gacq) I b, a• = m~ [E(Gacq) I b, ad 
1 
Al0-1 CONVERT_STRAT_TAR_ASM 
Function: To convert the solution at the optimal acquirer strategy for the given target 
strategy on the standardised scale into monetary terms. 
Operational Input: E(Gacq) I b ,a• 
Ave I b, a• 
~AI I b •a• 
(all from module A8-1) 
(form module A2) 
Operation: The operation of this module is identical to module A4, except that the 




Function: To output to the screen or print device information relevant to the 
decision-maker (in ASM) regarding negotiating strategies and outcomes. 
Operational Input: 
I A • 
E(Gacq) I b, a E(Gtar)' I 6, a• 
Ave' I 6, a• 
o; I 6, a• 
P (merger occurring)' I 6 , a • 
O~ I 6 , a • A; I 6 , a • 
(all from module Al0-1) 
p I 6 , a • 'Y I 6 , a • (from module A8-1) 
Operation: The operation of this module is identical to module A5. Once the output 
has been presented the user has the option to either 
• exit the system; or 
• try another sensitivity analysis (i.e. return to module A6). 
A 7-2 DATA_INPUT_SENS_ACQ_ASM 
Function: To capture a user's acquirer strategy. 
Operational Input: None 
Operation: An acquirer strategy is characterised by the acquirer's initial and final 
degrees of concession (~AI and ~AL respectively) which determine the 
initial and final offers, and its degree of persistance, p. In this sensitivity 
analysis we allow investigation of acquirer strategies other than that 
described in module A5. 
The user is prompted to enter his/her initial and final offers. It is proposed 
that the initial and final offers at the optimal point <a2, b16> are presented 
on the screen for comparison whilst the decision is being made. The degree 
of persistance p is captured by using a graphical Likert scale as was the 
case for oA in module Al. Descriptive statements defining discrete points 
on this scale would be similar to those describing p used in module A5. 
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AS-2 RETRIEVE_SENS_ACQ_ASM 
Function: To rescale the acquirer strategy data onto a standardised scale, and to 
retrieve (from the database) and interpolate the relevant negotiating 
information for the optimal target strategy (b1~ . 
. Operational Input: cr A• crB, VA'· µA' 
oA' ~ 
(from module A2) 
(from module Al) 
(from module A7-2) 




1 - µA 
This gives rise to a value of ~Al, since 
<ll- l ( J3 Al) = 
0 1 +OA -1 
This module retrieves from the database the relevant statistics E(Gtar), 
. ECacq) and Ave for the given values of the contextual parameters crA, crB,. 
OA and Os for strategy pair <a, b16>' where a is the target strategy 
implied by the acquirer strategy parameters J3Al• J3AL and p. If the user-
defined value of one or more of the parameters is not resident in the 
database, the module retrieves data for that parameter closest on either side 
of the user-defined value, and interpolates on each variable individually. 
The module also notes the values of J3Al• J3Av p, J3B and y 
at <a. b16>, 
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Al0-2 CONVERT_STRAT_ACQ_ASM 
Function: To convert the solution at the given acquirer strategy on the standardised 
scale into monetary terms. 
Operational Input: E(Gacq) I a' b16 
Ave I a' b16 
PA1 I a,b16 
(all from module A8-2) 
(form module A2) 
Operation: The operation of this module is identical to module A4, except that the 
optimal strategy pair <ai. b16> is replaced by < a, b16>. 
All-2 OUTPUT_SENS_ACQ_ASM 
Function: To output to the screen or print device information relevant to the 
decision-maker (in ASM) regarding negotiating strategies and outcomes. 
Operational Input: E(Gacq)' 1 a, b16 E(Gtar>' I a, b16 
Ave I I a' b16 P(merger occurring)' I a' b16 
(all from module Al0-2) 
p I a' b16 'Y I a' b16 (from module A8-2) 
Operation: The operation of this module is identical to module A5. Once the output 
has been presented the user has the option to either 
• exit the system; or 
• try another sensitivity analysis (i.e. return to module A6). 
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY, MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
§8.1 SUMMARY AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
This study has examined mergers and acquisitions from the viewpoint of game-
theoretic modelling. We have assumed that the players in a merger deal are essentially 
in conflict over the single issue of price; any such deal is thus characterised by some 
negotiating or bargaining between the management teams of the two companies 
concerned. Our aim has been twofold: to construct (and test where possible) bargaining 
models which might lead to greater understanding of the behaviour of the players 
involved in merger "games", and to develop a dynamic model of the negotiations in an 
attempt to offer useful decision support for merger players. These two aims were 
developed in Part A (Chapters 2 and 3) and Part B (Chapters 4 through to 7) 
respectively. 
In Chapter 2 we began the study of analytic models for mergers and acquisitions 
by assuming full and shared information amongst the two players about the pre- and post-
merger values of the companies, and modelled the merger bargaining game as a co-
operative two person non-zero sum game, where the outcome was the net gains to the 
two players. A Nash-Kalai bargaining model, which depended on the players' utility 
functions, was implemented to explain the proportion of the synergy gains from merger 
that accrue to the target company. 
Two separate families of utility functions for the model were proposed and tested: 
a linear utility family and a negative exponential utility family. It was shown that in the 
simple linear utility family the only determinant in explaining the variation in the 
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proportion of the synergy gains accruing to the target was the relative bargaining strength 
of the acquirer vis-a-vis the target, and this was successfully estimated by two different 
models, each comprising of only 2 parameters. Amongst the negative exponential utility 
family the best model comprised of four estimated parameters which were used in the 
estimation of the risk aversion coefficients of the two companies. Unlike in the case of 
the linear utility family the model fit here did not depend to any great extent on the 
relative bargaining strength of the two companies. Simplifications of this model 
employing fewer model parameters failed to provide significant model fit. Specifically, 
the risk aversion coefficients of the two companies involved were found to be different 
functions for the companies, and dependent on company size. In general, the best of the 
negative exponential utility models produced a far better empirical model fit (in terms 
of the coefficient of determination) than did the linear utility models, but employed many 
more parameters. On a parameter-adjusted basis, however. there was not much to choose 
between the two models. 
Whilst the modelling approach of Chapter 2 succeeded in offering significant 
empirical fits, and hence provided a degree of understanding about the bargaining 
behaviour of merger participants, the oppressive (and unrealistic) assumption of complete 
certainty of information amongst both players needed to be addressed. In Chapter 3, 
therefore, we assumed that the two parties had complete certainty and agreement about 
the pre-merger values of the two companies, but shared uncertainty about the post-merger 
value of the combined entity (i.e. the extent of the uncertainty was known to both players 
with certainty, in the form of some probability distribution). A Nash-Kalai bargaining 
model incorporating the uncertainty was developed. The advantages offered by this model 
over those of the previous chapter were several. Firstly, the degree of empirical model 
fit (in terms of predicting the total amount paid by the acquirer) was significantly greater 
than before due to the presence of an extra explanatory parameter (the uncertainty), and 
secondly by introducing a measure of uncertainty, the model was able to discriminate 
between the amount that should be paid to the target shareholders by means of cash and 
by means of a share transfer for any given level of uncertainty. The theoretical model 
produced some results which have practical application. Firstly, a cash-only offer is never 
optimal: the optimal off er will consist of an exchange of shares and possibly a cash side 
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payment. This ensures that the target bears at least a portion of the risk involved in the 
merger. Conditions were identified under which shares only would be offered as a means 
of payment. and a combination of cash and shares. Secondly, the optimal amount offered 
by an acquirer depends on the form of payment (the cash/share split) and the level of 
perceived risk. In a pure share exchange the offer amount remains constant regardless of 
the risk. In general, if cash is included in the payment, an increase in risk implies a 
decrease in the optimal amount of cash offered. Examination of a specific empirical 
example indicated that the acquirer (who makes the offer) appears to be dominant over 
the target when it comes to choosing the optimal form of payment. The form of financing 
the optimal offer always appears to satisfy the acquirer' s desired form of payment 
regardless of the levels of the players' risk parameters. 
The uncertainty about the post-merger value of the combined entity is a 
conceptual variance, and cannot be empirically measured for any single merger. A Nash-
Kalai model was thus constructed, utilising a family of additive mean/variance utility 
functions (the risk-adjusted analogue of the linear utility function used previously), which 
allowed empirical estimation of this uncertainty. Due to the presence of the uncertainty, 
the model was also able to provide estimates of the optimal cash and share portions of 
any offer. The model solution showed that the proportion of the post-merger company 
offered to the target by means of an exchange of shares was independent of the level of 
uncertainty in the post-merger value of the combined company; it depended only on the 
relative sizes of the risk aversion coefficients of the two companies. The amount of cash 
offered, however, was more complex: it was a function of the risk aversion coefficients, 
negotiating power, the uncertainty in the post-merger company value and the sizes of the 
companies involved. Model fits showed significant improvement over comparable simpler 
risk-free models, indicating that the incorporation of uncertainty is a necessary feature 
of any model attempting to provide understanding of this complex bargaining process. 
An extension of this model was proposed, in which a risk-adjusted analogue of 
the negative exponential utility function was employed. Apart from possible improvement 
in model fit it did not offer any greater insights into the bargaining process. 
The analytical models considered in Part A omitted a multitude of the 
complexities involved with a real-world merger or acquisitions. They did however, by 
virtue of their fit, help to shed understanding on aspects of the bargaining process. 
In Part B a model based on the ideas of negotiation analysis was constructed 
which focused away from the usual game-theoretic idea of an equilibrium solution, and 
as a result offered a more positive solution to the merger bargaining problem (i.e. closer 
to what might really happen in real-world bargaining). This model is a first attempt at 
analysing the ill-structured and complex processes involved in negotiation, and was 
constructed to capture the dynamic, multi-stage nature of the negotiation process. It 
offered prescriptive advice to one of the players on likely Pareto-optimal bargaining 
strategies, given a description of how the other party might behave. The parsimonious 
model made use of several parameters, some contextual (describing the negotiating 
"environment", i.e. perceived bargaining strengths and risks) and some defining the 
players' strategies (describing a course of action to be followed by the players). The 
nature of the input data employed by this model is judgemental and subjective, and as 
such may be totally different for apparently similar negotiating pairs. 
The model was implemented by means of a Monte Carlo simulation procedure 
which would tend to describe typical long-run outcomes of similar negotiations. The 
implementation produced a matrix of expected gains to both players and average 
transaction values for a wide range of each of the players' strategies. Several observations 
were evident from examination of the resulting game matrix. Firstly, each of the players 
can achieve a wide range of expected gains, depending on which combination of 
strategies the players implement. Significant opportunities appear to exist for the target 
company to claim a larger share of the merger synergy gains than the acquiring company. 
Secondly, the combined expected gains accruing to the two companies never reached the 
maximum synergy available, i.e. the players can expect that a Pareto-inefficient 
agreement will be reached. Thirdly, an acquirer offer of making an initial bid and holding 
firm is always inferior to one in which at least some increase in the offer is shown in 
later bargaining rounds. 
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The choice of an "optimal" negotiating strategy was examined using two differing 
approaches. Firstly, the conventional game-theoretic approach of eliminating players' 
dominated strategies was implemented, but this method makes the rather severe 
assumption that both players are hyper-rational. An alternative means of identifying 
"optimal" strategies is to follow a softer Bayesian decision-making approach. It was 
shown in the simulated merger game that in terms of expected gains there was little to 
be gained from using one method over the other. The "optimal" strategies identified 
showed that the acquirer should start with a low initial offer, but be prepared to negotiate 
vigorously up to a final possible offer still below the acquirer' s perception of a fair price. 
The target, on the other hand, should be prepared to accept an offer far below its 
expectation of a fair price, and in any event rapidly decrease its acceptance level towards 
the initial offer in the next bargaining round. 
The players' strategies were described in the model by parameters which were 
continuous in nature but were evaluated at only a discrete number of values in the Monte 
Carlo simulation. The question of how coarse the grid of discrete strategy parameter 
values should be to adequately identify features contained in the game with players' 
continuous strategy sets was raised, and it was found that a grid consisting of 7 or 8 
discrete strategies for each player was sufficient, in the sense that a matrix of this 
dimension satisfactorily identified "optimal" negotiating strategies whilst avoiding issues 
which clouded the decision-making process, such as multiple equilibrium points and 
Prisoners' Dilemma problems which were evident in game matrices of larger dimensions. 
Furthermore, a matrix of this compact size could easily be assimilated by the human 
(user's) mind and drastically limited computational requirements. Care had to be taken 
_to ensure that the subset of strategies used for this purpose were chosen in such a way 
that an even spread of strategies across all those available was achieved. 
The simulations were repeated for a wide range of contextual conditions (players' 
perceived risks and negotiating powers), with specific attention being paid to how the 
optimal bargaining strategies changed, and how the players' expected gains at the optimal 
bargaining strategies changed. This effectively constituted a sensitivity analysis with 
respect to the contextual parameters. It was shown that the optimal bargaining strategy 
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pair arrived at in the initial simulation was extremely robust to contextual changes, a 
point useful for later decision support. Furthermore, changes to the contextual parameter 
values which led to the players starting negotiations from positions more extreme from 
one another appeared to have a greater negative effect (in terms of expected gains) on 
the target than on the acquirer. This was mainly due to the model having the target 
yielding towards the acquirer' s offers, whilst the acquirer' s offers were made 
independently of the target's reaction. 
The model and its simulated results could provide useful decision support to 
merger and acquisition practitioners regarding strategies to be employed during 
negotiations. The final chapter of this study therefore proposes a conceptual decision 
suppo_rt system that incorporates the model and a set of simulated outcomes as the model 
base and knowledge base respectively. Although not constructed, this DSS in concept was 
able to respond to a user's queries regarding an optimal strategy for either player, and 
expected outcomes from deviations from this optimal strategy. 
§8.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH IN THIS AREA 
This study could be extended in several directions, some of which we will outline 
in this section. 
The analytical models of Chapter 2 utilised a linear utility function and a family 
of negative exponential utility functions. Many other (more complex) functional forms 
could serve as utility functions. If the objective is to optimise model fit some other 
functional form might prove superior to those considered here. Apart from providing a 
"good" descriptive model, this research might shed light on the form of utilities actually 
employed by players in bargaining situations. The same comment applies to the models 
with shared uncertainty in Chapter 3. 
We made several simplifying assumptions about the functional forms of the 
relationships linking the model "components" (negotiating power, risk aversions etc) to 
' assumed known data (pre- and post-merger values or estimates of company sizes). These 
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were purposefully kept simple for clarity's sake. More complex forms here might also 
improve model fit and estimates of the cash portion and share portion of the actual offer 
amount. 
The negotiation-based model of Chapter 4 was a first attempt at modelling the 
dynamic nature of the negotiation process, and as such showed promise to serve as a key 
component in a DSS. This model might provide a starting point for a more refined model 
which might take better cognisance of actual behavioural properties of human negotiators. 
Our model, for example, has a target responding to each acquirer offer by reducing its 
acceptance level. In practice the target might not react so passively; it might pass on to 
the acquirer (directly or indirectly) that the offers are far too low, or simply break off 
negotiations. Since a DSS should supply management information for real-world use, 
these options should also be considered. Furthermore, the model described the concept 
of a bargaining strategy in terms of just two or three fuzzy (but reasonably 
understandable) parameters. Practical research at the cognitive level might offer 
information as to whether this formulation of a strategy is sufficient for practical 
interpretation by a human user. Our model could be adapted accordingly. 
Since the aim of the model was to promote understanding and supply decision 
support, the conceptual DSS (based on the existing model or some refined version) 
should be constructed and tested on a panel of human managers who have been or are 
currently involved in merger negotiation. This will provide feedback about further user 
requirements for a commercial version of this DSS. 
Of course this model has considered a specific example of a negotiation scenario. 
Negotiation situations abound in many walks of life (e.g. political, business etc) and our 
model could be easily adapted to offer support to any such negotiation. An important 
adaptation here would be to extend the model to consider negotiations in which the 
conflict extends over multiple issues. 
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